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EDITORIAL

FROM the days of Thales it has been a common taunt against philosophy that it is a form of star-gazing without relation to earthly things. Yet it would be strange if the study which Plato defined as "the contemplation of all time and existence" had nothing to say of that portion of time and existence that is passing before our eyes. As a matter of fact the revolutionary changes that are going on and taking different forms about us are each proclaimed in the name of a philosophy of life—a theory of what makes life worth living, and of the means to attain it. If, moreover, the main issue that is being fought out in the politics of nations at the present moment is that of democracy *versus* one or other form of dictatorship, the relation between it and the main issue of philosophy leaps to the eyes.

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From the days when Parmenides declared that all things are one and the heart of the world at peace, Heraclitus that things are many and that war is the father of them all, the problem of philosophy has been to see how these two elements in things can be united, how the unity and order of the whole can be made compatible with the freedom of the parts, permanence and stability with the freshness of new creation. Have unity and peace their principle in the depths of human life itself because it partakes of the wider harmonies of Nature at large whose child it is? Or have they for ever to be enforced from without? There were those who saw in the Great War just the struggle between these two principles. On the one hand was a new Heracliteanism whose chief prophet was Nietzsche. Pitted against it was a new Parmenideanism of an innate

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reasonableness in men strong enough in the end to permeate and take the sting out of their differences: all that was needed was that the world should be free from the menace of force in order to give reason scope to operate. On the one hand, as Lord Sankey put it the other day, belief in *one* man (or one class), on the other hand, belief in *man*. What has changed all this and clouded this great hope?

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It would take more than a few editorial paragraphs to tell the whole story, if it could ever be told at all. But one or two things stand clearly out. What has been called "the art of living together," as the highest and more difficult of all the arts, requires, as they do, long preparation. It is the child of a long tradition and of self-discipline in peoples. It cannot be acquired by any one at a moment's notice. In the second place, for a century now the question has been no longer merely a political one. Men have found that political freedom is bound up with economic. Besides the domination by individuals or classes, there was the domination by industrial circumstances and by the power that control of them gives. Yet this too might yield to reason; and the turn of the century seemed to open a way of extending the reign of reason and conscience over the abuses of industry by the establishment of social services and safeguards against the appeal to naked force. Into this prospect of orderly progress broke the War. One might have thought that it would have taught on a large scale the futility of force. So to some extent it did. It awakened a new sense of the solidarity of mankind and of reason as the only way. Unfortunately the lesson was little more than skin deep. Force was relied upon for the maintenance of peace. The belief in it was scotched but not killed. The War itself had even accustomed men to the idea of it as a means of getting their ends, and when the political and economic hopes the War had stimulated were delayed the idea recurred.

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It is unprofitable to ask Who began it? Whoever did forgot that force begets force, and can in the end beget nothing else, and now the appeal to it is spreading like a conflagration from nation to nation on the Continent. Whether the flames will be allowed to leap the Channel depends on the wisdom and firmness of our Government. Meantime philosophers may see in these revolutions something that goes far deeper than a conflict between parties. It is the conflict which Whitehead has described in his great book *Adventures of Ideas*, as that between Force and Persuasion. If, as he say, "The creation of the world, that is to say the world of civilized order, is the victory of persuasion over force," then it is no less than the

existence of that world that is at stake. Are what the same writer calls the "gentler modes of human relation" and the "inherent persuasiveness of ideas" *alias* "the divine persuasion," which religion calls Grace, to be allowed to continue their creative work, or are we to be doomed to the stagnancy and stale repetition which is all that a dictated culture can offer to our afflicted hearts? Let us not deceive ourselves by specious arguments which strive to make the worse appear the better cause. The truth that the recurrence of force, however unavoidable, is the disclosure of the failure of civilization, confronts us in its austere simplicity and shatters all such sophistries.

THE PRESENT NEED OF A PHILOSOPHY

(Letter to the Editor from Sir HERBERT SAMUEL,
President of the Institute)

My dear Editor,

You have suggested that the *Journal* of the Institute might render a useful service if it could become a forum of discussion on living issues, and you have done me the honour to invite me to open a correspondence which would have that aim. But I make no pretence to be a professional philosopher; I am only, as George Moore puts it, "prone to philosophy"; and if I accept your invitation, it is less with the hope of making any positive contribution of my own, than with the desire of urging upon philosophers of authority, on behalf of the ordinary man, the need of an effort more effective than hitherto, to give direction in these difficult times to a troubled world.

We are experiencing now the results of the freedom of thought which has been established during the last two or three centuries. The old ontology, the old ethics, and the old social order, based upon systems of theology that were generally accepted, are crumbling under the influence of new ideas inspired by the discoveries of science. Urgent practical questions—of personal and social morality, of economic organization, of international relationship—press upon the peoples, but the leaders of thought give little guidance for their solution. This generation is dissatisfied, anxious, apprehensive. It feels itself as in a ship, launched on an unknown sea, without navigator, chart, or compass. Since the old theologies cannot meet the new problems, and since science cannot claim to deal with the larger issues, men are asking what philosophy has to say to the present age.

What indeed has it to say? When I am asked by some young man or woman to suggest one or two books which will convey the message of philosophy to these times, what books are there that I should recommend?

There is no doubt that the ordinary man is repelled from philosophy by its incessant discussion of epistemology. Common sense declares that the objective world is real, as real "in its own right" as, for example, the existence of the planet Neptune before anyone had discovered it; that our minds and their capacity to perceive the objective world are real also; that the media through which the perceptions are invoked are real as well; and that our ideas are the product of

the three. Is it impossible that that should be accepted as a working basis, and that we should then pass on to the things that are urgent?

Books of philosophy detain us with lengthy and subtle discussions on the nature of "the Good," on the problem of "Evil," on the proper understanding of conceptions such, for example, as "Colour." But the ordinary man is beginning to suspect that the philosopher is obsessed by generalizations of his own creation, that represent nothing actual or existent.

Take "Colour" for example. The physicist has discovered that various groups of atoms have the capacity of absorbing rays of light of certain wave-lengths which happen to fall upon them and of reflecting rays of other wave-lengths. Those groups of atoms which constitute, let us say, the surface of a table may reflect a set of rays of one of these wave-lengths so that it passes through the retina of my eye to my brain; they may be of that wave-length which produces there a sensation which I am accustomed to call seeing the colour yellow; when another set of rays of a different wave-length impinges upon the eye, I say that I see the colour green. Consequently the table is said to be yellow or green as the case may be. Human beings generalize from a number of such incidents and say that there is such a thing in the universe as "Colour." We then begin to formulate a series of philosophic problems about "Colour," and are disappointed to find that they never lead to any clear and agreed conclusion. May it not be that no conclusion is possible, and for the reason that we are trying to start from a point which is imaginary to reach a non-existent goal?

So also with "Evil" or "the Good." There are things, thoughts, or deeds which, for reasons of our own that can be explained, we describe as "evils," and others which we describe as "goods"; and it may be convenient to classify them into groups, and finally to bring the groups together into comprehensive units, and to call them "Evil" or "the Good." But such generalizations are only what Vaihinger termed "fictional abstractions." They may be useful for purposes of discussion; but philosophy, I venture to suggest, has lost its influence upon the world largely because it has persisted in treating them as realities. "Values," says Alexander, "are human inventions." May it not be largely for the reason that the ordinary man recognizes that that is so, while the philosopher would have him treat these "fictional abstractions" as fundamentally important, that there is the present divorce between philosophy and life?

It will not be disputed that one of the greatest gifts, perhaps the greatest, that science has made to philosophy in the modern age is the establishment of Evolution as the key to one part of the cosmic mystery. So far as it relates to human development, such evolution had not been self-conscious; it had been largely the outcome of what

Whitehead calls "senseless agencies." But now philosophy, basing itself on science, may bring us into an era of Conscious Evolution. Cannot the philosophers give to a generation that is intellectually starved some sustenance drawn from that conception, leaving epistemology, at all events for the time being, in the background; relating itself directly and deliberately to the needs of life; seeking to answer the anxious questionings of the individual, of the society, of all mankind?

Yours faithfully,
HERBERT SAMUEL.

February 26, 1934.

THE LEADERSHIP OF PHILOSOPHY[1]

HILDA D. OAKELEY, M.A., D.Lit.

The positions that I would support in regard to the question whether philosophy has any relation to practice are as follows. In the first place, there are certain problems of modern civilization, and those amongst the most crucial, with which philosophy alone can deal. In the second place, in spite of appearances to the contrary, the present age will not be deaf to the voice of philosophy, if it can speak with sufficient clearness and power to secure a hearing. The problems to which I refer do not belong to the sphere of science, in the strict modern sense. Science is triumphant in its own sphere, but it is not concerned primarily with the values of human existence, or the activity of the mind by which they are discovered, pursued, enjoyed. But it is in respect to the values, the ideas we have inherited from Greece and Palestine, the conception of the future of our civilization, or whether it has any future, that we are in greatest confusion to-day. This confusion can be dispelled neither by contemplating the unparalleled additions to knowledge concerning the nature of things, which we owe to science, nor the astounding transformations in the conditions and forms of our life, which the application of new knowledge is bringing about. So far as can be discovered in history, no closely similar situation has previously occurred. Crises having certain analogous aspects have no doubt existed. Such a crisis there may have been—in miniature, though incomparably important for subsequent history—in the Athens of the late fifth and early fourth centuries B.C. Its importance was largely due to the fact that a supreme philosophic genius was there to point to it, and to the function which philosophy was called upon to perform. It must be admitted that from an immediately practical standpoint Plato failed. It might possibly be argued that as regards the application of his teaching to his own day he worked in consciousness of failure. He knew—as might be maintained—success to be impossible in his attempt to realize his ideal of philosophic government at Syracuse, in any case on his last visit. Only his conviction that it was the proper business of philosophy to show a remedy for the ills and wrongs of men and states induced him, when over sixty, to leave the Academy and the free and serene

[1] This article contains a line of thought presented in a paper given to the Manchester University Ethical Society, December 5, 1933, and entitled "The Leadership of Philosophy," but it has been recast.

pursuit of truth and wisdom for the storms and discomforts of a misgoverned city. And, in spite of the unrivalled persuasiveness of his language, was there not something of the spirit of failure, in his exposition in the *Republic*, of the way to reform the state? Even, however, if Plato was not convinced of the unpracticability of the pattern of the ideal *polis*, has not history wholly rejected it, whether with the ridicule of students, Sophists, and mob that Glaucon anticipated, the melancholy resignation of the Emperor-philosopher Marcus Aurelius, or the tragic blindness of the actual course of events for over two thousand years? For I venture to disagree with the Dean of St. Paul's suggestion of a similarity between Plato's *Republic* and any modern theory or practice of dictatorship.

The view, nevertheless, that the philosopher, though spectator of all time and all existence, is also particularly concerned with his own age, to which Plato's life, teaching, and constant criticism of tendencies of the day undoubtedly testify, seems to be true. We cannot be content with the idea of philosophy as *only* arising at the close of an age—the owl of Minerva which, in Hegel's saying, appears in the twilight, when the shapes of life have grown old and cold. We might ask, What has the owl been doing in the daylight? Has it been asleep, and would this state qualify it for the analysis of that which has vanished with the day? The chief tendencies of what Professor Hartmann terms in his last book, *The Problem of Spiritual Being*,[1] the "Objective Mind" of a people or an age, cannot be known in all their actuality except by those amongst whom they prevail. Hartmann refers to the chief provinces of objective Mind as the following: Language, production, technique, the existing moral customs, recognized law, predominant valuations, prevailing morals, traditional form of education and culture, ruling type of sentiment, prevalent tone determining taste, tendencies of art and of artistic understanding, the position of knowledge and science, ruling world outlook in every form, myth, religion, philosophy. "These provinces of content," he adds, "are not only incomparable" (or incommensurable) "but highly unequal in value. . . . Also at different times we have the domination of one or the other, and the subordination of the rest." He conceives Objective Mind as historical in nature, in a sense which renders his conception different from that of Hegel. Essential to it is that as living mind it is in a state of continual change. It cannot outlast its time. Only "objectified mind," including the objects of art, literature, law, science, moral concepts, is in some respects and degrees super-temporal. I refer to this conception not to examine or criticize it, but because as a catalogue of the domains of objective mind it gives a fairly comprehensive summary of those contents and characters of an age

[1] *Das Problem des geistigen Seins.*

which must be interpreted by contemporaneous philosophy if the interpretation is to have value for historic development, or even to be truly understood by posterity. For whether or not we find their source in "objective mind," we may agree with Professor Hartmann that in their inmost nature they do not outlive their time. Also there are qualities and tendencies, taken for granted as self-evident by the majority of those living in their midst, which only the philosophic mind can discern as not self-evident, except under conditions relative to the age.

Plato's view, then, of the necessity of philosophy to the sanity of the world in any period appears still to hold good, however little it has been acknowledged or realized in history. The purpose of this article, however, is not to attempt any sounding of the depth of his meaning, in the thesis that cities would never cease from ills until they submitted to the rule of philosophy. It is possible, or even probable, that he looked far beyond the creation of the perfect Greek community which must be assured in security even against other Greeks and is charged with no mission to the world. It is not the constructive but the critical line of his thought on which I propose very briefly to dwell, the significance of those hints he gives in regard to the profound critical work which philosophy must undertake, whether or not construction is yet possible. In the terrible indictments of Sophistry which occur in the *Dialogues* we may see the denunciation of a certain state of mind which he found to be very prevalent. This is characterized by loss of the sense of value and reality in life. In argument it is illustrated by preference for half-truths and the specious type of ratiocination which plays with high abstractions in those provinces in which the concrete grasp of things and events is most demanded. These are maladies of the mind which are found in all ages of civilization. It may be that they appear in most insidious forms at times when the efforts of man appear to be directed with greatest determination to the use of reason in the control of the modes of living and of human intercourse. Plato's criticisms apply to Sophistry, conscious and unconscious, wherever it occurs. The "Sophist" in the Dialogue with that title is always escaping the efforts of the "Eleatic Stranger" to define his nature. He hides himself in "Non-being." After discussing the various kinds of imitative arts in which the imitation is taken for the reality, the Stranger speaks of an imitative art of reasoning. "Is it not possible to enthral the hearts of young men by words poured through their ears, when they are still at a distance from the truth of facts, by exhibiting to them fictitious arguments and making them think that they are true, and that the speaker is the wisest of men in all ages?"[1] In this Dialogue, as elsewhere, Plato insists on the principle

[1] *The Sophist*, 234. Jowett's translation.

that the chief disease of error is that which has its source in involuntary or unconscious ignorance. But it is in the *Republic* that he pierces to this state of mind, as with the sharpness of a surgeon's knife. It is due to the "Lie in the Soul." This concept is introduced in connection with the criticism of the poet for representing people as appearing in different characters; above all, for suggesting that the gods will either change themselves, or cause us to believe that they change, and go about in various forms. "That lie which is lie in very truth (if I may so speak)," says Socrates, "is hateful to both gods and men. To lie with the highest part of himself, and in regard to the highest matters, no one willingly would do. . . . What I mean is that to lie in the soul concerning realities, and there to be ignorant and to cherish falsehood, all would most avoid and abhor."[1]

This passage, which expresses something that is fundamental in Plato's philosophy, seems to make clear that his conception of the meaning of truth went beyond that which we endeavour to make precise in our efforts to determine its nature in theory of knowledge. It is inseparable from an interpretation of the significance of human existence as consisting in the contact of the individual with the real sources of his being. Misunderstanding in regard to those parts of experience in which the essential self is less implicated is not so fatal. It may more easily be removed. It does not affect that part of his being which, underlying all his experience, can only with the greatest difficulty suffer a complete change. This it is which, constituting (as we may perhaps interpret) personal identity, can only escape from the false view of life, which is the worst evil and error, by the type of process described allegorically in the Myth of the Den, when the individual is brought out of the den and turned to the light, thus leaving behind illusions and unrealities, and entering a different world.[2]

Following the indications which are given by Plato of the method of philosophic criticism of an age in its own present time, we need not necessarily assume that either in his time and society, or in any other on which the searchlight of such criticism is cast, there was or is present a larger measure of Sophistry, a more incurable falsity in the soul, more widespread illusion than in other periods. The Prophet and Idealist will discern these phenomena in any society. The Pharisees of Jerusalem and the Sophists of Athens would have been found in other times and cities by the great Teachers who made them to be universal types. The increasing self-consciousness, however, which is characteristic of a civilization which has had a long and turbulent history, alike in the practical sphere and the sphere of mind, may make it less difficult for

[1] *Republic*, II. 382.

[2] *Republic*, VII.

reflection to-day, using the glasses which Plato lends, to realize some of the powerful illusions of the times, and ask for that further criticism which may help towards their exorcism. I would take as a single illustration the idea which seems widely prevalent that by some necessity, against their will, men will be driven to destroy their own civilization. This spectre stalks through much popular literature, and affects, perhaps unconsciously, many who would not admit it as a reasoned belief, or even a sufficiently caused foreboding. It appears to result from influences mainly due to great illusions. Professor Whitehead, in his *Science and the Modern World*, refers to a "radical inconsistency at the basis of modern thought . . . which accounts for much that is half-hearted and wavering in our civilization." "The enterprises produced by the individualistic energy of the European peoples presuppose physical action directed to final causes. But the science which is employed in their development is based on a philosophy which asserts that physical causation is supreme, and which disjoins the physical cause from the final end. It is not popular to dwell on the absolute contradiction here involved."[1] Sir James Jeans has recently said that since Professor Whitehead made this observation (in 1926) the contradiction has been removed, since science has given up determinism. But it seems very doubtful whether the undermining of the "mechanistic" view in the work of some modern physicists is in fact a contribution to the solution of the ethical question. Whatever view, however, we may take in regard to the forms in which the free-will problem appears in relation to the changing background of science, the purposive form will continue to characterize practical life. It is inescapable, because the self is an active creative principle. The contradiction indicated by Professor Whitehead is injurious to clear thinking, or, to use his words, "enfeebles" it, "by reason of the inconsistency lurking in the background," but it cannot, unless in abnormal cases, hamper action. There is an analogous contradiction in which lies, I think, a more insidious danger to the vigour of action, because it occurs wholly within the directly practical field of conduct. I refer to the combination of assumptions of moral freedom with the implication of historic necessity. We may be ethical determinists, but it is hardly possible for this creed to affect in any essentials our course of action. The ethical determinists do not refrain from the exercise of creative gifts in art or adventure. They may call upon theory to explain how such acts are, nevertheless, necessitated, but their works and deeds in form and spirit reveal that man is, as Aristotle says, a principle of action. Yet from the beginning of recorded history a certain fatalism has pervaded man's attitude in respect to the possibility of important changes

[1] *Science and the Modern World*, Chapter V.

in the tendencies and doings of men when acting together as crowds, nations, peoples, and the difficulty of maintaining respect for the great values of life when individuals are merged in such groups, and in rivalry with each other. In the famous reflections of Thucydides on revolutions,[1] it is said that the terrible calamities which war brought upon the Greek cities are such as "always will be while human nature remains the same." History up to our own day testifies to the truth of his picture of the effects of revolution. Also we feel as we read that, in the judgment of Thucydides, human nature *will* remain the same. This may be termed a belief in historic necessity. The contradiction to which I would call attention exists when this creed is held, whether clearly or obscurely, by individuals whose activities and mode of life testify to the assumption of practical freedom, whether or not they have thought out a philosophy which entails this principle.

Now, however deep our impression may be as we turn over the pages of history or of our daily newspapers, that obscure forces whose workings seem quite incalculable play a formidable part in the historic process, whether we speak with some historians of contingency and chance, or with Professor Whitehead of "senseless agencies,"[2] it is generally agreed that the energy or creative activity of human individuals is the most important factor. Yet, as already noted, there seems to exist at least a deep-seated doubt whether this creative energy can be consciously exercised by peoples in the mass or humanity as a whole, if not a conviction that this is impossible. A voluntary advance to a higher level of life would accordingly be inconceivable, except as an individual effort, or, if made by a community of like-minded persons, as enduring but for a limited time. The more permanent of such advances, it might be pointed out, have, on the whole, taken place unconsciously, and of none can it yet be said that they *are* permanent. The fatalism of which I have spoken accepts this by implication as inherent in the process of events, a kind of historic law, and inescapable. The sources of this tendency to believe in historic necessity are not those of ordinary scientific determinism, and it may be questioned whether if the latter could be removed this would affect the former. Scientific determinism, as I should maintain, is not applicable to history, because history in its essential truth is concerned with the individual, and scientific determinism belongs to the generalizing, categorial function of our understanding. It is valid, on the whole, for large-scale events in nature, the elements of which the laws hold good being the closely similar processes of the individual events concerned. In history such uniformities may be found roughly or in general to prevail when the subject is treated as a science dealing

[1] Book III. 82.

[2] *Adventures of Ideas*, Part I, Chapter I.

with historic categories, nations, civilizations, economic society, etc. These uniformities are, however, of a highly empirical character, because the real subjects of history, individual selves and deeds, may irrupt, as it were, in unforeseen ways into the scheme, and the similarities on which the law was based in this respect disappear.

What is signified, then, by historic necessity is that there can be no "creative advance" in history. This type of fatalism or necessitarianism may be characterized as one of the great illusions which is, in Plato's language, a lapse into non-being. Or, if combined, consciously or unconsciously, with a belief in moral freedom, it reveals a contradiction at the roots of our practical attitude, a contradiction, moreover, which enfeebles not only thought but practice. We meet with it in the sense of despair in regard to the improvement of international relations, the tendency to discover in present conditions signs of the decay of modern civilization, to seek out analogies between the later state of the Roman Empire and the state of leading modern peoples.

I would suggest that amongst the grounds for the failure of belief in historic liberty is the peculiarity of our experience of the passage of time. The past seems to have a certain kind of being or existence,[1] the future to be nothing except for imagination. The past exists as unalterable for knowledge or for action. It is irrevocable, irretrievable. Consciousness of the full significance of this fact is one of the chief roots of ethics, as leading to remorse and the perception of moral obligation. In reflection on history, and the actual process of past events, continued by the imaged series of the future, we are deeply conscious of this irretrievability. Also, in accordance with principles of our understanding in the attempt to complete the past process for knowledge and get beyond the irrational factor in the temporal series, by forming the concept of history as a whole, we incline to assimilate the future in its broad characteristics to the past. In this procedure the irrevocability of the past tends to be transformed into the necessity of the whole course of history, the fact that we, the observers, are situated midway between past and future being irrelevant. This concept of the necessary character of the process of events seems to approach in meaning the Greek "Ananke," or fatal necessity, a notion deeply charged with the quality of Greek genius in the dramatic interpretation of human life. The more philosophical method, however, is not to carry the necessity of the past from the standpoint of our present into the future, but to project our essential consciousness of present free energy into every stage of past history as always *possible* or potential. Our predecessors were free in their present, and their history was

[1] Cf. *Scientific Thought*, C. D. Broad, Part I, Chapter II. *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, Chapter V.

not in its dynamic course necessary, as the same history is now necessary in its static form for knowledge. To realize this is to be conscious of a heightening of free energy for the action of our own present. Our position in the series between past and future is not then irrelevant. The principle of freedom in relation to history demands a more positive characterization than has been given to that concept of moral freedom over which ethical analysis has always been in conflict. Professor N. Hartmann, in his book on freedom, asserts that if history shows in many respects retrogression, "historical experience cannot be decisive. The creative element in man is necessarily in opposition to it."[1]

History cannot decide. With this we may certainly agree. But the voice of history must be heard, since we are in its midst, and in our own nature largely constituted by history. I should maintain that, rationally contemplated, history need not lead to a conclusion of despair. It presents a tragic character because the nature of man, whose activity as thinker and doer has been the instrument of bringing value into history, seemed to promise so much more than has been achieved. This would hold whether we regard personality as creative in the sphere of value, or as "carrier" (or bearer), to use the term chosen by some modern thinkers, that is, as human means of conveying something of the eternal values into the temporal process.

"Why," asks Professor Rostovtzeff, in his work on Rome, "did such a powerful and brilliant civilization, the growth of ages, and apparently destined to last for ages, gradually degenerate? In other words, why did the creative power of its makers wax faint?"[2] It is for the analysis of philosophy to examine whether there are rational grounds for the view that such energy must in the course of time wax faint. I do not think that the ultimate ground of the decay of a people, any more than of its advance, can be found through study of biological, racial, or economic factors, but into this question it is not possible here to enter.

In conclusion, it has been argued in this paper that the detection of illusions of the age, tending to weaken the springs of action, is a function which belongs to philosophy. The idea of historic necessity or doubt of the possibility of historic freedom has been selected as an example of the first importance and relevant to the present time. In so far as such a concept is concerned in the determination of our apprehension of events through which we are passing—their form and significance—it may be termed a first order category of illusion. To contribute to the removal of such an illusion, by analysis

[1] *Ethics*, translated by Stanton Coit, Vol. II, p. 337.

[2] *A History of the Ancient World*, M. Rostovtzeff, translated by J. D. Duff, Vol. II (Rome).

of the conditions which give rise to it, would be to contribute to the destruction of a lie in the soul, as conceived by Plato. For it involves the kind of contradiction which, as he shows in the *Sophist*, is one chief source of evil in the soul. Whether in the precise sense proper to philosophy we can speak of the soul of an age or people, or, with Professor Hartmann, examine the true or genuine and the false elements in this, makes no essential difference to the problem as treated in this paper. It is a question of fundamental importance for social philosophy and, in the end, for metaphysics. But the considerations which have been here adduced will be equally applicable, whether there be any such common or "objective mind" or only the many minds of individuals similarly affected.

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

W. R. INGE, K.C.V.O., D.D., D.Litt., F.B.A.

The subject which has been chosen for me is sufficiently comprehensive. Several years ago I wrote the last of a series of essays in a book called *Science, Religion, and Reality*, in which, as requested, I tried to sum up the contributions of the other writers, with reflections of my own. I have also given a short statement of my opinions in the first volume of that interesting book, *Contemporary British Philosophy*. Lastly, I have tried, in a book published in the autumn of 1933, to consider the religious and philosophical implications of recent scientific theories and discoveries, and particularly of the conviction held by our leading astronomers and mathematicians that the Second Law of Thermodynamics is unassailable, so that the ultimate extinction of the universe as we know it is certain. I showed that the acceptance of this verdict raises important questions for the philosopher and theologian. The philosopher cannot avoid considering with increased interest the very difficult problem of the status of Time in reality. The theologian, who has already abandoned the notion of a geographical heaven above our heads, must reconsider the popular identification of eternity with unending duration. These are not new questions; but in a democratic age a problem becomes practical when it is brought before the eyes of the man in the street.

The reviews of *God and the Astronomers* (I apologize heartily for that dreadful title and for the star-spangled jacket) have not helped me very much—reviews seldom do. One of my critics, Lord Rutherford, has evidently not read the book, since he supposes it to be an attack upon the Second Law. That eminent man is no doubt much better employed than in reading my books, but in that case I think he might be better employed than in reviewing them. I expected to be torn limb from limb by Professor Alexander, if he deigned to notice the book at all. But that kindest and most courteous of men has dealt very gently with me, in the *Manchester Guardian*. Of course, he objects to my philosophy of values on the ground that a value must satisfy somebody, and that I will not allow this criterion to be applied. This, however, only makes clear the main crux of the whole problem—the question of Time. If God is only encountered towards the end of a temporal process, and if we can hardly say that He exists till He is so encountered, there is no conscious subject for whom the supreme values are truly real, and so they are not

truly real. But the Great Tradition in philosophy—at any rate in Platonic and Christian philosophy—finds the actualization of the supreme values in the mind of an unchanging and eternal God. Immense difficulties remain; but this particular objection does not trouble me.

The Professor's admiration of Bergson shows that he must be considered to have thrown his great weight into what I have called the Modernist scale, and against what Catholics call the *philosophia perennis*. Again, the question is how far we ought to "take Time seriously." The problem is complicated by the mathematical theory that Time is a fourth dimension, and that instead of Space and Time we should speak of Space-Time. Professor Alexander is no mean mathematician, and he understands Einstein and his supporters far better than I can hope to do. But when we try to build a philosophy on this mathematical theory, I cannot help thinking that the synthesis of Time and Space is the synthesis of the lion and the lamb or the lady and the tiger. They return from the ride with the lady (Space) inside, and the smile on the face of the tiger (Time). Bergson does not seem to care about Space, and Professor Alexander relegates it to a very subordinate position. Bergson accuses the old philosophy of spatializing Time. He himself makes Time into an absolute, and I cannot make out what he wants to do with Space.

In fact, I do not think the old antinomy—and the old impasse, "Are Time and Space infinite or bounded?"—have been transcended or solved by the Modernist Science and Philosophy. I know I am out of my depth when I try to understand Einstein's statement (accepted by Jeans, Eddington, and others) that Space is "finite but unbounded." The only explanation, adapted to the meanest intelligence, my own, that I have seen is that if you walk round the edge of a circle you will come back to the place from which you started. This is from Sullivan's excellent but misleadingly named book, *The Limitations of Science*. Well, we all knew that without Riemannian geometry. We have even known circular arguments. But perhaps I don't want to walk round the circle; perhaps I prefer to dig through it. Then I shall not come to the place from which I started. Or perhaps I want to leave the circle altogether. A disrespectful but by no means negligible American critic says: "If Einstein thinks that nobody can jump off his circle, he can't know much about fleas."

We are told also that Space is expanding. As far as I can understand, by Space they mean Space occupied by matter. The nebulae are receding from each other and from what we may call their centre. Is it really a foolish question to ask, Into what are they expanding? Does not the whole theory rest on the familiar Euclidean and Newtonian conception of Space? And does not the idea of

Space imply that there is no point anywhere with nothing beyond it?

Similarly with Time. Eddington very candidly says that his theory demands that Time "started off with a bang," and that he cannot believe this. If it did not start off with a bang, at a date which we could name if we knew it, why did Entropy not run its course much sooner, or, if it had no beginning, how can its entire content consist of a process with a beginning, middle, and end? I would go further and ask, Is it not part of the conception of Time that there is no moment within it which is not preceded by one moment and followed by another? Does the mathematical synthesis of Space-Time do anything to answer these questions? I venture to think not.

If I am right in thinking that mathematics gives us no help in solving a contradiction which inheres in our very ideas of Space and Time, it follows that the solution must be sought outside Space and Time. In other words, Space and Time proclaim themselves that they are not ultimates, either separately or in conjunction.

There is another point which, though it is no business of mine, since it is a purely scientific difficulty, I cannot refrain from mentioning. The theory of an expanding universe seems to be quite inconsistent with the time-scale which numerous converging arguments have almost established for the solar system. Most of us know that the age of the sun has been estimated at about seven or eight billion years, and that of the planetary system at about two thousand million. But the greatest age compatible with the theory of an expanding universe is one of some thousands of millions of years. If the galaxies are receding, it has been calculated, by tracing the process backwards, that all the universe would have been a compact mass long before we get back to billions of years. To the outsider, this looks like the famous old quarrel about the age of the earth, between physicists and geologists, and about the age of the sun before radio-activity and the annihilation of matter were thought of. In this case the advocates of the longer period won. It may be a matter of temperament, but I expect the long period will win again. If, however, the shorter period wins, it is the opinion of some scientists, such as Sullivan, that the theory of a building-up process, from smaller atoms into larger, may become acceptable. In either case, since the degradation of energy and the recession of the nebulae seem to be well established, and since they are incompatible with each other, there seems to be no escape from believing that some very important principle is yet undiscovered.

I have read carefully Sir James Jeans' new edition of *The Universe Around Us*. He does not use the very perplexing theories about Space-Time, and he does not discuss the scientific difficulty which I have just mentioned. He accepts the usual estimates of the past

life of the sun and of the planets. He thinks that the sun may continue to shine for some fifteen billion years, and that the dwellers on earth may drag out a rather chilly existence for a billion years or so. It is, however, possible, as he reminds us, that the sun may suddenly blaze out into a *nova*, or shrink into a white dwarf. Either of these would extinguish our precious race at once.

He will stand no nonsense about the Second Law. "Imagination sees new heavens and a new earth coming into being out of the ashes of the old. Science can give no support to such fancies. She cannot prove that the fanciful will not happen—she can only calculate the odds against it happening. And these prove to be so enormous that we may safely disregard altogether the possibility of its occurrence." He adds: "Perhaps it is as well. It is hard to see what advantage could accrue from an eternal reiteration of the same theme, or even from endless variations of it." This seems to me an odd point of view—a kind of prejudice against endless duration. Eddington shares it.

For most of us the prospect that the whole of history will one day be as if it had never been—that nowhere in the vast universe will there be life or intelligence or consciousness—is rather chilling. We may have to accept it; Jeans and Eddington say we must; but I do not find it easy to say, "So much the better." Whitehead, without expressing any preference, leaves a large loophole for future discoveries. "The moral to be drawn from the general survey of the physical universe, with its operations viewed in terms of purely physical law and neglected in so far as they are inexpressible in such terms, is that we have omitted some general counter-agency. This counter-agency, in its operation throughout the physical universe, is too vast and diffusive for our direct observation. We may acquire such power as the result of some advance. But at present, as we survey the physical cosmos, there is no direct intuition of the counter-agency to which it owes its possibility of existence as a wasting, finite organism." He implies that there must be such an agency, though I do not think he has joined those who find a *deus ex machina* in the cosmic rays.

I may be asked: "Why, since you end your discussion of the doom of the universe by reminding your readers that the Christian tradition has always predicted such an end, and has expected it to come very much sooner than our men of science think probable, should you have gone out of your way to study subjects which are not in your line, and to prefix to a defence of the traditional philosophy of religion a discussion the issue of which, as you say yourself, is not of vital importance to religion?"

I have asked myself this question. I admit that the withers of the orthodox theologian are unwrung. But the orthodox theologian

believes in an endless *future*; and when once you use the word *future* you have to find a stage for whatever the future may bring forth. Science can hardly find such a stage, either on this planet or anywhere else. I have in my book answered this by accepting Bosanquet's dictum that to throw our ideals into the future is the death of all sane idealism, only adding that if we attempt to picture our ideals without using the categories of Space and Time they will have a very ghostly existence for us.

But my trouble is rather metaphysical than religious. Let us grant that "earth is but the shadow of heaven"; that "every truth is a shadow except the last"; that "life like a dome of many-coloured glass stains the white radiance of eternity." Here we are on the lines of the Platonic tradition. "Let us fly hence to our dear country." But the visible world is no deceiving phantom; it is the creation and the copy of a higher sphere of existence. "Time," say the Platonists, "is the moving image of eternity." But is a wasting, doomed universe the moving image of eternity, and not rather a moving image of something very different? How can a dying world be a symbol of a world which knows no change or beginning or end? Does not the Second Law, with all that it implies, cut the cable between the Intelligible or Spiritual World and the World of Sense?

That this misgiving is not baseless is shown by the remark of Thomas Whittaker, one of the ablest expositors of the Neoplatonic philosophy. He thinks that the establishment of Entropy as the supreme and final law of the universe would "disprove" the philosophy of Plotinus.

Well, we none of us like to hear that our philosophy has been disproved, and we are not very ready to believe that any discovery in physical science could disprove a time-honoured type of idealism. I think Whittaker puts it rather too strongly. It is true that if the whole of creation can be summed up as the progressive realization of one great divine purpose, and if the end of this stupendous scheme, with all the labour and blood and tears, all the faith and hope and love which it has cost, is to be not the achievement of some splendid result, but final stultification and universal death, we should probably be driven, not towards Platonism or Christianity, but to some Asiatic world-renouncing creed like Buddhism. Human effort having been proved to end in nothing, we should have to admit that man walketh in a vain shadow and disquieteth himself in vain. But a cosmic law of unending progress has never been part of Platonism or of Christianity. It is merely the aftermath of the revolutionary fever of the eighteenth century and a substitute for the Christian hope of eternal life, which was then burning very dim. If, on the other hand, it is the lot of all that is born into the world to fulfil in some measure a finite and temporal purpose in the mind of God, and then

to take its place in the eternal order, there is nothing fatal in the discovery that the life of stars and planets, like the life of individuals, has its destined term. Some modern philosophies, which give an absolute value to Time and history, are, it seems to me, hard hit by the doom which Science pronounces on the universe; but Platonism is not. The way in which this prediction hurts us is rather different. Plotinus teaches that all grades of being, in their various degrees, flow forth from the primal source of Being, the One or the Good or Perfect; and that this overflow from the divine nature is no arbitrary fiat but a necessary result of the Supreme Being or First Principle being what He is. It is no accident that all things are linked together in an unbreakable chain. God creates because, being God, He must; "it is His nature to"; and as long as He is God He must create beings in His own image, though imperfect copies of His perfection. Thus for the Platonist the visible world is good, beautiful, and holy, and we can hardly believe that there will ever be a time when no rays of the divine perfection will shine in any part of the universe, for intelligent creatures to behold and enjoy. If life and soul and spirit are the result of a strange and unlikely accident in one corner of the universe, a mere evanescent flicker which will soon disappear and leave no trace behind, a local symptom of the disease of dissolution, it hardly seems as if God can be what we have supposed Him to be. I do not say that it destroys my philosophy, but it does to some extent chill my faith.

My way of escape is to remember that we do, as a matter of fact, frequently ascend in heart and mind above the world of time, space, history, and even personality. This is what I mean by reality as a kingdom of absolute or intrinsic values. They are very much the same as Plato's Ideas, as I understand them. I have tried to explain my philosophy of Values in my recent book. But since Professor Alexander is far from satisfied with it, I will offer some comments on his new book, *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*, which has come out since mine was published. This may perhaps make my own position clearer, though the Professor is not likely to regard them as serious criticism.

"Nature is beautiful," he says, "only if we see it with the artist's eye." The nature we find beautiful is not beautiful in itself; we select and combine; we construct and interpret." Yes, but who gave us the standard? What makes us recognize that this selection, combination, and interpretation of external nature lifts us out of ourselves, makes us happier, and is an enrichment of our personality? The Professor expresses a great deal that I mean when he says: "The beautiful, as that which satisfies an impulse become contemplative, is *disinterested*. . . . In essence, the beautiful is shareable because it is not *personal and practical*." This is in fact the distinc-

tion, immensely important, between absolute or intrinsic and instrumental values. This characteristic of the higher values is emphasized in other parts of the book. "In science the mind depersonalizes itself." "Truth is the satisfaction of disinterested curiosity." "The distinctiveness of morality lies in its disinterestedness." This is very welcome as an answer to the pragmatists. In the higher values the "I," the form of reference in the instrumental values, is forgotten. So it is in our religion. "What is the Cross?" said a witty Bishop, speaking to children. "It is the 'I' crossed out." But in philosophy we have to consider the meaning of this self-transcendence, and it can only be found in the real status of the human soul or spirit in a super-individual order. The same characteristics, as I have shown, are found in, and determine, all the absolute values.

But I am unable to follow this great authority when he makes Time and public opinion the arbiter of value. For instance, of Christ he says: "While goodness is the artistry of the gregarious instinct, there is room for the revolutionary moralist, the man who, putting forward a scheme of goodness new and paradoxical, like Jesus, is in fact forecasting a social scheme, who is in truth a genius of a social life which has yet to be, and which if sound wins its way from derision to acceptance." Alas, that is not at all what Christ expected, nor what has happened. "When the Son of Man cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?" Was it the Galilean who conquered with Constantine? "Right for ever on the scaffold, wrong for ever on the throne." Christianity is something much more heroic than an intelligent forecasting of the way the cat will finally jump. We cannot imagine Christ saying, like Jerome of Prague to his judges, "Post centum annos vos cito"; nor like Martial, "Si post fata venit gloria, non propero." No; as Anatole France says, "L'avenir est un lieu commode pour y mettre des songes"; but it is not to posterity that the brave man appeals. There is, I am afraid, no doubt that Professor Alexander makes public opinion, which he frankly calls the tyranny of the majority, the supreme arbiter. "The only rights," he says, "are claims that have been recognized." So there are no natural rights, no absolute standard of justice and injustice. When Socrates is bowed out at the door, Thrasymachus comes in at the window.

I wish he had carried the principle of the objectivity of value to its conclusion. "Morality is objective because it is determined by the adjustment of individuals, and has *therefore* authority over any one individual." Is this "objectivity"? I prefer the independence of Catholic casuistry. "Lex iniusta non est lex," says Suarez.

Before proceeding further in a defence of my conception of absolute values I should like to say something in reply to an exceedingly kind review of my book by the great mathematician Professor Whittaker of Edinburgh. He thinks I have paid too much attention to Entropy,

which, he says, "is not established beyond dispute. For the argument of Eddington and Jeans is based entirely on the classical or non-relativistic thermodynamics. . . . Tolman has shown that in certain cases a universe expanding or contracting can do so reversibly." Well, more power to Tolman's elbow; I have suspected something of the kind myself; but relativistic thermodynamics is out of my depth.

He then says: "The distinction between finiteness and boundedness is obvious to a mathematician, but seems to be very difficult for everybody else." It certainly is; I am afraid our ignorance is "invincible," as the Roman Catholics say in their charity to poor Protestants.

What follows is more important still. I have argued that a scientist has no right to take refuge in Berkeleyan mentalism. Professor Whittaker says: "Our knowledge of the objects treated in physics consists in the study of the relations between pointer-readings. Atoms, electrons, and so forth are not, strictly speaking, necessary in physics at all; they are introduced merely as picturesque aids to the imagination. The mathematics, on the other hand, is inherently necessary." Now no one disputes the right of the mathematician to make what patterns he pleases out of hypothetical or imaginary entities. But if he is really indifferent to the question whether these entities exist *in rerum natura* or not, I cannot help asking why he takes such infinite trouble to weigh, measure, and count material objects which are not mathematical but are given to him as brute facts. We all know the story of the Frenchman, the Englishman, and the German who were set to write an essay about the camel. The Frenchman visited the Jardin des Plantes, and produced a lively sketch of the appearance and manners of the animal. "Voilà le chameau." The Englishman travelled in Africa, and wrote an ill-composed treatise about the habits of the camel as he had observed them. The German retired to his study, and evolved the idea of a camel out of his inner consciousness. He could do this better—as Hegel and Fichte knew—without any exhausting preliminary research. But our scientists are genuine researchers, and they begin with ponderable matter assumed to be real. In the course of their investigations they find that matter, in its ultimate analysis, is not, in the ordinary sense, material. It is defecated to a transparency. Whereupon they say, "Avaunt, ye materialists; I am an idealist!" They have got rid of the dog, tail and all; but they want to keep the wag. The Cheshire cat is gone, but the grin remains. I really don't think we can disprove materialism by making positive and negative electrical charges devour each other like the Kilkenny cats. Besides, are there not queer things called neutrons, not electrically charged, and possessed of weight? Begin with mathematical symbols, and you can end with mathematical symbols; but if you begin with

concrete stars and atoms, you cannot end with pure mental concepts. I suppose there is an answer to this, but at present I am unconvinced.

To return to my main point in constructive philosophy. The old canon that *ens est unum, verum, bonum* is still to be maintained. Reality is *one*, against dualism and pluralism; it has degrees, but they are degrees of approximation to a fixed and absolute standard. It is *true*: "the perfectly real can be perfectly known," as Plato says; there is no conspiracy to deceive us. It is *good*: the axiological standard is a real standard; being and value cannot be separated. To quote a modern writer, what we recognize as value when our life is fullest and our soul at its greatest stretch, that we may confidently accept as real.

In opposition to this traditional philosophy, our modern guides turn the absolutes of the moral, artistic, and religious consciousness into the relatives of an evolutionary process; they make history the self-development and self-revelation of the divine Spirit, and the eternal values mere instincts in the service of life. This sceptical relativism has invaded Science itself, which, as we have seen, is infected with illusionism, the "as if" of Vaihinger. Bosanquet's warnings against futurism have been disregarded. Neither the abandonment of the old superstition about progress, so naïvely accepted in the last century, nor the dysteleology so emphatically proclaimed by physics and astronomy, have prevented the Time-philosophy of Bergson, Croce, and Gentile from winning many adherents in this country.

There is a natural metaphysic of the mind, which refuses to separate value and reality. It does not seem to me to matter much whether our new guides call themselves realists or idealists; that opposition is not fundamental. But to give us a philosophy without an ontology —this is indeed a vital matter.

Is it not the timeless order of values which alone gives the time-process significance? Are there not many things which we feel to be real, but which do not belong to the world of space and time, and which cannot be communicated in the idiom of space and time? We recognize these as part of our knowledge; they are not prejudices, but the foundation of any intelligible theory of reality. Bergson bids us overcome our "prejudice" in favour of the permanent over the changing, and proceeds to make the changing the ultimately real, doing violence to our deepest convictions. As Pringle Pattison says, we must start with a logically unsupported judgment of value. It is logically unsupported just because it is fundamental. These are the bricks out of which we must construct our fabric.

What is the metaphysical status of values? I dislike the word "validity," which Urban, to whom I owe much, uses freely. I entirely agree with him when he says that "the indefinability of value means

merely that we have to do here with one of the ultimate and underivable concepts with which we think or understand the world, and it shares this lack, if one wishes so to call it, with other concepts, such as being, existence, and reality." But "validity" for him seems to mean what ought to be, as opposed to what is, and this makes value a non-existential concept. He seems to deny static values, though these are obviously present in aesthetics, and entangles his value-philosophy with ideas of evolution and progress, which belong, I should say, to the school against which his book (*The Intelligible World*) is a sustained polemic. However, as he agrees with Bosanquet that "ultimately Time, and the Time process, are irrelevant to value," and says, "There is no such thing as entropy of being, or entropy of value," I think he is really on my side, though there are a few expressions in his book which do not seem to me quite consistent.

The doctrine of Values implies, I think, a super-individual subject, for whom the values are actual. The notion of an emergent Deity seems to me part of the futuristic error of which I have already spoken. The words God and Deity ought not, I venture to say, to be used in this way. It is an attempt to retain the religious meanings and values which are attached to the word while denying the assumption of existence or reality on which all religious values depend.

The word "substance," I suppose, has become a scandal in modern philosophy. But it simply means, as Lossky says, "something living and real, something that has in it no merely intellectual significance." To a Platonist, values are "substantial," and they are far from being merely ideals, because there is a spiritual world in which they are at home and operative. I know well that in all that we try to say about "heaven" we use grotesquely inadequate and crudely pictorical language. It is a pity, because astronomy spoils our pictures. But it does not spoil what we mean by them. Plato was not ashamed to speak of *τόπος ἀτόπων*, and we must do the same, for we cannot help it.

A great difficulty in the philosophy of values is the doctrine of degrees of reality. The principle of *scale* is, as Urban rightly says, an *a priori* character of value as such, and in existence apart from value there is no scale. I have also pointed out that whereas in the Being there are no negative signs, in values and most distinctly in moral values evil is no mere defect of being, but, to our minds at least, positive disvalue. This does make the identification of existence and value difficult. I fancy the new Time-philosophy is an attempt to insert a value-scale into existence as such by assuming that the later in time is necessarily better than the earlier. It will not do. Time has no essential connection with value-judgments, though most values need some duration in which to actualize themselves. We must insist that, though they do not belong to Time,

Values are indissolubly bound up with reality as it is presented to our minds.

Traditional philosophy has always made ultimate reality non-spatial and non-temporal. But, you will say, traditional *religion* has done nothing of the kind. Well, I have tried to answer this. When our feelings are deeply stirred, we use concrete imagery, clear outlines, and bright colours. We must do so; we need not be ashamed of it. When I think of heaven, or of Plato's intelligible world, it begins to look very like an improved duplicate of the world that I know. "The swan on still St. Mary's Lake floats double, swan and shadow." I am fond of quoting Isaac Pennington's words: "Every truth is shadow except the last. But every truth is substance in its own place, though it be but shadow in another place. And the shadow is a true shadow, as the substance is a true substance." Moreover, in popular teaching we must not disdain picture-book theology.

I agree with Urban that the weakness of the whole group of philosophies which make evolution itself creative is the false assumption that time, process, tendency themselves carry meanings and values. This packing of time or space-time with meanings and values is the only thing that gives to modern doctrines of emergence the apparent intelligibility they seem to have. Time and Space are as real as the objects for which they form a framework. But they cannot lead beyond themselves except by mere repetition of themselves; they have no "sufficient reason" in themselves. You cannot endow Time with a *nisus* without transforming it into something quite different from the *becoming* either of common sense or of science. So treated, Time becomes a mysterious entity endowed with some of the attributes of divine Providence.

Mathematical science clearly wants to substitute a logical order for the empirical space-time order; and with this we have no quarrel, for it means that the intelligible world is not spatial or temporal. But what room is there for historicism in a logical order? Bergson gives plausibility to *la durée* by de-temporalizing it, packing it with extraneous values, though of course he does not see this himself. He also errs, I think, by making biological categories world-categories, for life is a very rare and sporadic phenomenon in nature.

In conclusion, I believe with Lotze that our judgments of absolute value are "the inspirations of reason," and this is the highest kind of authority. We add nothing to their claim upon our confidence by translating them into any subordinate concepts. We see dimly before us a still higher form of experience in which all contradictions are harmonized. This, if we could attain it, would be the goal of religion, philosophy, and science, all three. The beatific vision can be seen by few and described by none. Nevertheless, it is a fact. As Whitehead says, "The fact of religious vision is our one ground for optimism."

INTRODUCTION TO EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AESTHETIC

SENATOR B. CROCE

THE dominant feature of eighteenth-century aesthetic is the inquiry and discussion concerning the theory of "taste." There is material or bibliographical evidence of this in the rapid sequence of treatises, essays, inquiries, observations, and controversies on this subject, extending from the close of the seventeenth to the last years of the eighteenth century, and bearing the names, in France, of Dacier, Bellegarde, Bouhours, Rollin, Seran de la Tour, Trublet, Formey, Bitaubé, Marmontel, and, still more eminent, of Montesquieu, Voltaire, d'Alembert; in England, of Addison, Hume, Gerard, Home, Burke, Priestley, Blair, Beattie, Percival, Reid, Alison; in Italy, of Muratori, Calepio, Pagano, Corniani; in Germany, of Thomasius, J. U. König, Bodmer, A. von Schlegel, Wegelin, Heyne, Herz, Eberhard, J. C. König, and, by German influence in Hungary, Szardahely; and, greatest of all, Immanuel Kant, whose *Critique of Judgment* consists in the main of a critique of the aesthetic judgment of taste. This list of names is intended to give examples merely, not a complete catalogue. During that century the word, originally a metaphor from the sense of taste, the palate, though not unknown before, acquired an altogether new and extremely wide popularity;[1] and the liveliest interest was taken in the problems connected with taste, whose solutions, however, gave rise to increasingly acute controversies and perplexities. "Il n'est point de société," wrote Seran de la Tour, and he was not the only one to say it, "dans laquelle on ne parle du goût; rien de plus commun que les conceptions sur ce sujet; chacun alors s'empresse de dire ce qu'il en pense; mais à peine s'est-on arrêté à une proposition pour en expliquer l'idée, que la contradiction suit immédiatement l'assertion."[2]

[1] The Hungarian aesthetician, G. Szardahely, named in the text, observes: ". . . ista hominis facultas sentiendi pulchrum et turpe dicitur *gustus*, non penitus novo, sed magis usitato nomine: constat enim mihi, ac eadem intelligentia locutos aliquando fuisse Graecos Latinosque veteres, metaphora a gustu palati facta. Modus iste loquendi tunc erat infrequens, deinde penitus cecidit iacuitque, dum tandem ab hominibus antiquae originis et spiritus suscitaretur et illa hominis proprietas facundo hoc Latinismo cognominaretur. Iam modo nomen illud gentium praecipuarum civitate est donatum, habetque sensum non adscititium sed proprium" (*Imago Aesthetices seu doctrina Boni Gustus breviter delineata*, Budae, 1780, p. 8).

[2] *L'art de sentir et de juger en matière de goût*, nouvelle édition revue et corrigée par M. Rolland (Strasbourg, 1790; ed. 1, 1762).

It is desirable to grasp and define the exact nature of this problem, and to that end it must chiefly be said that the problem was only the new form of a very old one, first raised by the sophists and dealt with in various ways by the Greek philosophers, further discussed by the Fathers and Schoolmen, and taken up again by the Platonists and Aristotelians of the sixteenth century: "What is the beautiful?"

This ancient problem had to this extent been approached in the wrong way, that the attempt had been made to define the character or characters of beautiful things, natural or artificial, that is, to conceive the beautiful out of relation to the human mind; hence the impossibility of a satisfactory solution. The doubts and dissatisfactions expressed in the *Hippias Major* may be taken as a symbol of the debate that occupied the succeeding centuries.

The same faulty approach persisted, in spite of appearances, in the new form of the problem, when the question "What is the beautiful?" was replaced by the question "What is taste?" Taste meant the pleasure felt in the presence of certain objects, and since it could not be simply identical with pleasure as such, nor with the pleasure excited in the mind by the true or good or useful—for without these exclusions, implicit or explicit, the problem would not have arisen—the question "What is the pleasure of taste?" turned into the old question once more: "What is the character, or what are the characters, of the objects that produce the pleasure of taste?" It was comparatively rare for a treatise to take the nature of the beautiful for its direct subject and title, though this was sometimes done, for example, by Crousaz, André, and Hogarth; but all, or almost all, discussions of taste developed into theories of the beautiful, natural and artificial, essential and arbitrary, intellectual and moral, visible and audible, of bodies, of spirits, of God, and so forth; even Kant's, which, as is well known, distinguishes the beautiful into "free" and "adherent," as well as into natural and artificial, and ends by explaining it as a symbol of morality.

It was no doubt both significant and important that the eighteenth century put first the inquiry into the pleasure of taste, that is, of a psychical movement, thus effecting in aesthetic, as elsewhere, the transition from ontology to psychology, or rather from physics and metaphysics to the philosophy of spirit, in the tradition of all modern philosophy since Descartes. That path was bound to be followed as the only promising one, the only one which did not seek a goal outside itself, since in it alone every stage was both goal and starting-point. But the attempt at a philosophy of the aesthetic spirit was fatally hampered by its initial assumptions. Pleasure, the pleasure of taste, was not an active form of the aesthetic spirit, but a passive moment of it, and was therefore helpless to determine its proper nature. So far as pleasure is concerned, one spiritual activity is like

any other; trying to distinguish these activities by means of pleasure is like—to use a fanciful parallel—trying to distinguish the different kinds of fish by means of the water in which they all live and move. This is why the eighteenth-century writers were unable, as I have said, to avoid being drawn back into the old, hopeless attempt to determine the nature of the beautiful—of things objectively, physically or metaphysically, beautiful.

There is a concept which is at once the evidence of this unsatisfied but constant effort towards a theory of the aesthetic spirit, and the tomb which holds its mortal remains: I refer to the concept of feeling, which rose during that century to the status of a theory and the dignity of a category of the spirit. There were no doubt exigencies in moral philosophy and the theory of knowledge, becoming acute and as yet unsatisfied, which contributed to the formation of this concept; but the main contribution came from the inquiries into aesthetic, on taste and the beautiful, and these were what led to the erection of feeling into a third spiritual form alongside of, or intermediate between, the form of knowing and the form of willing. The concept of feeling (in the German writers *Gefühl*, or sometimes *Empfindnis*, to distinguish it from *Empfindung*), so understood, is nothing but the systematic expression of an absurdity: passivity placed alongside of activity, as if it were one activity of a special kind, co-ordinate with the others. Historians of philosophy have erred in praising the eighteenth-century philosophers and psychologists for discovering this category of the spirit; for the supposed discovery was in fact a rash adventure which distracted them from genuinely discovering that of which they were in search. Defeat no doubt has its glory, but not the glory of victory.

In another respect, much praise is due to these inquiries concerning taste: not for the conclusions to which they led or in which they halted, but for observations and thoughts by the way which still possess a positive value. Concealed beneath the ill-formulated problems, the real problems made themselves felt, albeit through a distorting medium. For that matter, there was positive value in the ancient and medieval and Renaissance discussions of the beautiful, in so far as they held firm, in spite of inevitable waverings, the notion that beside the values of intellectual truth, moral goodness, and practical convenience there was another value, not capable of reduction to any of these or of analysis into a combination of them, namely beauty. And certain characteristics of the beautiful had been noted, such as its connection with contemplation and those senses which were thought especially contemplative; the unity which it gives to variety without abolishing the variety itself, but on the contrary adding life to it by harmonizing it; and so forth.

Far more fertile were the eighteenth-century inquiries concerning

taste, with their demarcation of a spiritual realm belonging neither to intellect nor to practice. What the previous century had expressed by asserting a *pulchrum* distinct from the *verum* and *bonum*, the eighteenth repeated in a more profound form by distinguishing a "sense of order and proportion," a "moral sense" of the good and the beautiful at once, an "inner sense" as detected within the human mind by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and others, or "feeling," the word most commonly used to denote the aesthetic sphere: to denote it in a manner still obscure and hesitant, but yet to denote it and to warn all comers against denying or forgetting its existence. And the general tendency of all these writers was hostile to the old saying, *De gustibus non est disputandum*, a saying which, in its secondary application to the facts of beauty, had the effect of denying and ridiculing their claim to originality and reality, and reducing them one and all to the caprice of sensation and individual fancy, or (as we should say to-day) to a hedonistic and utilitarian level. More or less successfully, by various expedients and with frequent contradictions, these writers of inquiries and treatises defended the rationality or absoluteness of taste, as a thing about which there is and ought to be disputation because it has its own criterion of value.[1]

It is equally characteristic of them to insist on the difference between the pleasure of taste and the pleasure caused by stimulation of the senses; the disinterested nature, or freedom from reference to utility, which belongs to this pleasure; the absence of end in a unity-in-variety which is an end in itself, that is, the peculiar synthesis effected by the beautiful, which Hemsterhuis, confusing ideal power with temporal rapidity, defined as "the greatest possible number of ideas in the shortest possible time." Burke, for instance, a strongly empirical and not highly philosophical mind, and as an empirical psychologist tending towards the position of a physiologist, none the less insists on the disinterested character of aesthetic pleasure, its difference from the judgment of "fitness" or purposiveness and from that of the perfection of a thing according to its end, and upon the difference between "love," which has beauty for its object and is contemplative, and "desire," which has affections of sense for its object and seeks possession; and so forth.

All these and other propositions, made by eighteenth-century

[1] *E.g.* Gerard (*Essai sur le goût*, French tr., Paris, 1766, p. 241): "On dit communément qu'il ne faut pas disputer des goûts. Cette maxime est vraie si par goût on entend le palais, qui rebute certains aliments et qui en aime d'autres. . . . Mais la maxime est fausse et pernicieuse, lorsque on l'applique à ce *goût intellectuel* qui a les arts et les sciences pour objets. Comme ces objets ont des charmes réels, de même qu'il y a un bon goût qui ne les apperçoit point; et il y a certaines méthodes dont on peut se servir pour corriger ces défauts de l'esprit qui corrompent le goût."

theorists of taste and the beautiful—including the invention of a third spiritual form, namely feeling, and the reference of the aesthetic and of beauty to that—unite in the Kantian *Critique of Judgment*, which, analysed into its components as by recent historians of thought, appears to offer little or nothing fresh;[1] yet the whole of it is fresh, and has led to the forgetting of those previous treatments which Kant knew and used. The novelty lies in the critical and philosophical sense with which he worked out and raised to the rigour of systematic concepts this confused and fluid mass of ideas; and it was a follower of Kant, and a notable aesthetician, Heydenreich, who shortly after the appearance of the *Critique of Judgment* proclaimed the new glory of German philosophy, which by contrast with English philosophy had introduced into the theory of taste, hitherto usurped in part by the dogmatic philosophers and in greater part by the empiricists, the "critical" method, combining speculation and experience.[2] And the provisional completion given by Kant to this succession of efforts took its place in the general process which I have described elsewhere, being indeed one of its most brilliant phases, by which modern thought bridged the gulf created on the one hand by ancient philosophy and on the other by Christian thought between reason and sense, morality and life.[3]

None the less, there remained in the *Critique of Judgment* something not critically worked out, but put together empirically: a legacy taken over from its predecessors. Such was the dualistic treatment of the beautiful and the sublime, handed on to Kant chiefly by Burke, who regarded the beautiful, which he held a social and sociable feeling, a love and sympathy for small and delicate things, as opposed to the sublime, which seeks for great and impressive things and is the pleasure we take in painful and terrifying emotions when we are safe from their practical effects and protected from harm. There remained or reappeared, too, a certain contradiction in substance, at least in the shape in which Kant expounded the theory; for example, in the exclusion from the beautiful of all interest, all purposiveness, and all concepts, as compared with the

[1] See the researches of O. Schlapp, *Kants Lehre vom Genie und die Entstehung der K. d. U.* (Göttingen, 1901), and more lately those of Baeumler, *Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, ihre Geschichte und Systematik* (Halle, 1903), and Cassirer, *Die Philosophie der Aufklärung* (Tübingen, Mohr, 1932), to omit others of less importance.

[2] See the preface and especially the appendix (I, 185–197) added by him to his translation of a work by one of these empiricists: Archibald Alison, *Ueber den Geschmack, dessen Natur und Grundsätze, verdeutscht und mit Anmerkungen und Abhandlungen begleitet von K. H. Heydenreich* (Leipzig, Weygand, 1792).

[3] See my essay, *Le due scienze mondane, l'Estetica e l'Economia*, in *Critica*, xxix (1931), part vi.

final conclusion that the beautiful is a "symbol of morality"; a contradiction which Herder was quick to remark.[1]

But, setting aside these secondary aspects and problems, what must be emphasized in the *Critique of Judgment*, both in its own shape and as representing the outcome of the eighteenth-century inquiries concerning taste, is that the truths laid down concerning the aesthetic or beauty, reached as they were indirectly and by the concealed working of the actual aesthetic consciousness operating in despite of the false statement of its problem, remained detached observations, never closely bound up and identified with the fact to be explained. It would be a caricature, but not an unfair one, to express the characteristics of the aesthetic fact which Kant collected and defined in the form of a riddle: "What is it that pleases without a concept, without a practical interest, as purposiveness without purpose, and is the object of a universal pleasure? If it is not intellectual truth or moral goodness or economic utility, what is it?"

To-day we know the answer: it is poetry, or in general art. But Kant never gave it, and in fact did not know it; certainly it was not art for him. It was not art for the eighteenth-century theorists of taste, who for the most part treated the theories of art and of the beautiful separately, when they did treat both; or connected the two by defining art as imitation of the beautiful or the beauty of imitation. Nor was it for Kant, who conceived art as beauty adhering to a concept, a result produced by the combined play of intellect and fancy, and poetic genius itself as thus producing, combining, and playing.

This, too, was a necessary consequence of the point from which the inquiry set out, namely pleasure, though a peculiar pleasure, that of taste: for pleasure is a passive moment, not an active or productive. A study of pleasure as such could not lead to the concept of poetry or art, or at least could do so only surreptitiously, indecisively, and by snatches; a study of the productive process of poetry and art led thither directly, and offered a bridge to the concept of taste and so to the explanation of what had been thought external to poetry and art, but was yet beauty, and was felt as beauty, and therefore could not be thus external, but must be itself a creature of the human imagination, like the things or rather images that used to be called "beauties of nature."

[1] "Da es vorher noch vier Kategorischen Momente ohne Begriff und Interesse, ohne Vorstellung des Zweckes u. f. nicht nur allgemein gefallen musste, sondern sogleich vom Schönen hinabsank, sobald man an Güte dachte; jetzt im letzten Paragraph des Werks wird das Schöne ein Symbol des Guten, des Sittlichen sogar, und zwar *alles* Schöne: schöne Formen, schöne Kleider, schöne Farben, schöne Gebäude" (*Kalligone: vom Angenehmen und Schönen*. Leipzig, Hartknoch, 1800, III, 259–260).

INTRODUCTION TO EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AESTHETIC

This study of the nature of poetry and art had been going on for centuries, forming a scientific tradition parallel to that concerning the beautiful, and remaining distinct and separate from it even when the two approached and interlaced. It was here that a true and genuine aesthetic was moving and growing; and it is strange—or rather, not strange to one who considers the prejudice as to the priority of the ideas of the beautiful and of pleasure—that historians of aesthetic have placed this tradition in the background, when they have not left it out of the picture altogether. Thus Zimmermann, to name one only, leaps from Plotinus in the third century after Christ to the eighteenth, and finds in the history of aesthetic "eine grosse Lücke" fifteen centuries long;[1] a gap containing all the ardent labours at the theory of poetry, literature, and art that were pursued at the Renaissance and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, especially in Italy, but also in France, Spain, and elsewhere. Even the concept of taste, "judgment without discourse," arose in the seventeenth century in Italy,[2] and precisely in the attempt to describe the judgment of poetic criticism, as did the concept of "genius," as distinct from intellect, to describe the faculty of poetic creation. The "sublime" belongs to the same tradition, being taken from the highly prized and deeply studied work that went under the name of Longinus,[3] where it was clearly and unambiguously expounded and meant, at bottom, nothing but that "excellence" or "beauty" of artistic expression for which the ancient critic had so exquisite a sense.[4]

In the eighteenth century this theory of poetry and art excited less interest and was less widely discussed and less highly valued than the theory of taste; but, in compensation, it worked hard to raise itself to the level of philosophy and organize itself into a system. It may suffice to recall the theory of poetry or "poetic logic" stated by Vico in his *Scienza nuova*, a logic of language or poetry which

[1] *Geschichte der Aesthetik als philosophischer Wissenschaft*, p. 147.

[2] It is sometimes incorrectly attributed to the Spaniard Gracian, who, as I have elsewhere pointed out (*Estetica*, p. 209), refers the term not to the sphere of the beautiful and art, but to that of practice. Before and after him, the Italians, with or without the word in question, asserted a special aesthetic power or faculty, capable of judging without logical reasoning; this was very clearly defined by Zuccolo as early as 1623. See my recent researches into the history of aesthetic ideas in seventeenth-century Italy, in *Storia dell' età barocca in Italia* (Bari, 1929), pp. 160–210, 217–232).

[3] For the authorship and date of the *De Sublimitate* see the recent and important investigations of Rostagni, *Il sublime nella storia dell' Estetica antica* (Pisa, 1933).

[4] Cf. the way in which he remarks *à propos* of an ode of Sappho that the things said in it are the things said by every lover, but that the excellence of the poem lies in choosing the culminating points (*ἡ λῆψις . . . τῶν ἄκρων*) and combining them (*ἡ εἰς ταὐτὸ συναίρεσις*): *De Subl.* 110.

enabled him to interpret Homer and Dante,[1] and the theory of *cognitio sensitiva*, or *Aesthetica*, for which Baumgarten a few decades later claimed the position of a special science.[2] But neither of these thinkers had pupils or followers to develop and pursue their new and highly fruitful ideas.

One of the two, a German professor and the founder of a school, certainly had pupils to repeat and disseminate his doctrines; but in general they misunderstood them and reduced them to superficiality, and replaced Baumgarten's definition of poetry as "perfect sensuous discourse," which ascribes a peculiar and autonomous "perfection" to "confused" or "sensuous cognition," sometimes by "representation of sensible perfection," sometimes by "sensible representation of perfection"; so that *cognitio sensitiva* or *poetica* finally assumed the aspect of a weakened or mutilated intellectual knowledge, as appears already in Meyer and still more clearly in Mengs, Mendelssohn, and others.[3]

When Kant in the *Critique of Judgment* undertook to combat the theory of "eminent philosophers" that "beauty is nothing but perfection confusedly thought," and pointed out that a confused cognition of perfection is still an intellectual cognition and distinguished from it, at most, as the plain man's judgment differs from the philosopher's,[4] he was certainly right; but he was arguing against Wolff or the misunderstandings of Baumgarten's school, not against Baumgarten, who never maintained any such view, and always meant to speak of the *perfectio* of *cognitio sensitiva qua talis*, though doubtless he did not wholly avoid the danger of falling back into intellectualism and conceiving poetry as the sensible representation of the distinct concept.[5] Kant's confusion is of importance

[1] Even now most German historians of aesthetic (Baeumler, Cassirer, etc.) persist in ignoring Vico or brushing him aside, because (they say) he was unknown and did not influence the Germans. None the less, he lived and thought; and the history of thought is not the history of influences on German writers, or any others.

[2] That Baumgarten belongs to another tradition than that of the theory of taste emerges even from what Baeumler writes, though intended to connect him with that tradition: "Baumgarten hat für das Geschmacksproblem im engeren Sinne nicht viel Interesse bezeigt" (*op. cit.*, p. 87).

[3] Mendelssohn, *Ueber die Hauptgrundsätze der schönen Kunste und Wissenschaften* (*op. cit.* Zimmermann, p. 181), expressly says: "Ist die Erkenntnis der Vollkommenheit sinnlich, so wird sie Schönheit genannt . . . die verständliche Vollkommenheit erleuchtet die Seele und befriedigt ihren ursprünglichen Trieb nach bündigen Vorstellungen. Wenn sie aber die Triebfeder des Begehrungsvermögens in Bewegen setzen soll, so muss sie sich in eine Schönheit verwandeln."

[4] *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 15.

[5] Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–61 (cf. p. 433), says that for Baumgarten beauty is "sinnlich erkannte Vollkommenheit," but neither these words nor

only as proof that he overlooked or failed to understand the concept of poetry which Baumgarten's system involved; just as he overlooked or failed to grasp the similar concept of poetry or language which, to say nothing of Vico, was gaining ground here and there in the early Romantic movement in Germany. Hence Kant, like the theorists of taste and even the writers of Baumgarten's school such as Riedel, his own immediate precursor in the tripartition of faculties and the connection of beauty with feeling, instead of grasping or even guessing the importance for the philosophy of spirit of Baumgarten's idea of a *cognitio sensitiva* distinct from *cognitio intellectiva* and prior to it, and indeed the whole realm of *facultates inferiores* in Wolff and *petites perceptions* in Leibniz; instead of using these ideas to work out a more organic and concrete connection between the terms of the old antithesis, theory and practice, or knowing and willing, fell back on postulating a third realm of "feeling," a mere pigeon-hole for the facts he had failed to understand.[1]

Among the post-Kantian aestheticians, no one pursued the inquiry into these fundamental elements of the aesthetic activity which had been discerned by Baumgarten, studied more deeply by Vico, and apprehended to some extent by other thinkers; no one except Schleiermacher, who for that very reason was misunderstood, slighted, and forgotten. True, while some like Herbart stood by the

this notion are to be found in §§ 15–16 of the *Aesthetica*, to which he refers; it is always *perfectiones cognitionis sensitivae*. Von Stein (*Die Entstehung der neueren Aesthetik*, Stuttgart, Cotta, 1886, p. 358) rightly observes that if Kant means to allude to Baumgarten he is misunderstanding him; thus also Sommer, *Grundzüge einer Geschichte der deutschen Psychologie und Aesthetik von Wolff-Baumgarten bis Kant-Schiller* (Würzburg, 1892), p. 345. Perhaps the explanation is to be sought, as by Baeumler (*op. cit.*, pp. 113–119), in the fact that Kant knew the references to the subject in the *Metaphysica*, where Baumgarten on this point was confining himself to Wolff's definition, and also knew Meyer and Mendelssohn, but perhaps had not read, or not read with care, the *Aesthetica*.

[1] The difficulty was felt by some writers of the time; cf. the following quotation from Meiners, *Revision der Philosophie*, pp. 226 *seqq.*, in the learned work of K. H. Politz, *Die Aesthetik für gebildete Leser* (Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1807, I, 22–23): "In der Aesthetik ist die Hauptquelle unserer Kenntnisse noch streitig. Eben so zweifelhaft ist es bisher ob die aesthetischen Begriffe zu dem Foro der bis jetzt von den Philosophen entdeckten Kräften oder einer eignen von den Griechen und Römer nicht wahrgenommen Fähigkeit gehören. Es giebt Männer, die einen angeborenen Geschmack des Schönen und Guten vertheidigen, und dabei unsere Idee von Schönheit u. s. w. als etwas ganz Relatives ausehen. Umgekehrt sieht man wieder unveränderliche Ideale des Schönen und Guten von solchen behaupten, die den Geschmack für eigentumliche kraft hatten. So lange diese Punkte unausgewacht bleiben, scheint die Aesthetik in die Form einer Wissenschaft nicht gebracht werden zu Können."

eighteenth-century tradition, started from the judgment of taste and sought a concept of the beautiful in formal or formalistic determinations of the object, most of them abandoned the discussion of taste and placed the centre of gravity in their treatises upon art, thus in a certain degree identifying aesthetic with the philosophy of art. In a certain degree, not altogether, and not essentially, because they retained as more or less distinct from this theory of art, although somewhat confused with it, a "callology" or metaphysical theory of the beautiful and a theory of natural beauty or beauty in natural objects. There was no consciousness of the truth that aesthetic is concerned with art and art alone, that outside art there is nothing really beautiful, and that therefore there can be no theory of the beautiful independent of, or parallel to, the philosophy of art. Even when, in the second half of the nineteenth century, psychological or empirical aesthetics took the place of metaphysical or philosophical, these new aesthetics still combined a theory of the beautiful with a theory of art, a combination due to misunderstanding the nature of the things combined; naturally, therefore, this is the view current in the *Aesthetica vulgaris* of to-day.

It was only in Italy, at the beginning of the present century, that this dualism was resolved with full consciousness of what was being done, and an aesthetic brought into being which was a philosophy of poetry, imagination, language, art, and pure intuition and expression; an aesthetic which put the productive process first, showed the beautiful as this process itself in its free development, and reduced to terms of this process the so-called beauties of nature, as themselves spiritual acts and not natural facts. As a result, no one in Italy, not even scholastics or neo-scholastics (and that is saying a good deal), dreams any longer of devising theories of the objectively beautiful, for there is now no place for such theories within our mental horizon, filled as it is by others which have consigned to oblivion the very name of the former occupants and have blotted them out as with a deluge.

In Germany, on the other hand, although the intense study of the history of art has created a demand for a philosophy of art to clear up its main concepts and standards, the problem of the relations between this so-called science of art (*Kunstwissenschaft*) and the theory of the beautiful has been solved in the most superficial and artificially simple manner imaginable: art is assigned to *Kunstwissenschaft*, beauty to aesthetic; as if the whole problem did not concern the relation between the concept of the beautiful and the concept of art, and as if, by handing one of them over to "specialists" and confining one's own attention to the other, one could ever rightly and thoroughly understand either. In the last resort, the root of the error lies in the false conception of a non-

philosophical or as it is called merely "scientific" (*Kunstwissenschaft*) treatment of an ideal category.[1]

So toilsome and slow is the progress of thought, still in places congealed and arrested at the same false statement of the problem of beauty at which ancient philosophy and eighteenth-century aesthetic once laboured.

[1] For this school of separate *Kunstwissenschaft*, cf. what was already to be said about it in 1911, in my essay on Fiedler (*Nuovi saggi di estetica*, Bari, 1926, esp. pp. 240–241), and in 1915, *à propos* of a book by Utitz, my *Conversazioni critiche*, I, 20–22; cf. also a short recent book by Utitz, *Geschichte der Aesthetik*, Berlin, 1932, pp. 70–73, where he expresses himself with more caution and reserve.

(*Translated from the Italian by* R. G. Collingwood.)

ARISTOTLE'S DEFINITION OF MORAL VIRTUE, AND PLATO'S ACCOUNT OF JUSTICE IN THE SOUL

H. W. B. JOSEPH, M.A.

NICOLAI HARTMANN, in an interesting discussion of Aristotle's account of moral virtue,[1] has called attention to the difference between the contrariety of opposed vices and the contrast of certain virtues. The ἄκρα or extremes, somewhere between which Aristotle thought that any morally virtuous disposition (with the possible exception of justice) must lie, are not conciliable. The same man cannot combine or reconcile, in the same action, cowardice and bravery, intemperance and insensibility, stinginess and thriftlessness, passion and lack of spirit. These are pairs of contraries, between which a virtue lies; but the virtue is not a synthesis of the extremes in a pair. It is true that on one interpretation of the doctrine of the mean, the mean is a synthesis of contraries, but not of contrary vices. According to this interpretation, which Burnet adopted, there are contrary tendencies or impulses, *e.g.* fear and delight in danger, and the virtuous disposition combines these in right proportion; but the vicious dispositions also combine them, in other and wrong proportions, the contrariety of these dispositions arising from the fact that either impulse may be unduly preponderant over the other. In support of this interpretation Burnet appealed to Aristotle's theory of bodily health, which was held to depend on a proper κρᾶσις or combination of the primary contraries or πρῶτα ἐνάντια, hot and cold, moist and dry. Many objections might be brought against this theory of health, both speculative and empirical, though they do not concern us here;[2] and it may also be doubted whether the theory of virtue is to be interpreted in analogy with it. Among other reasons for rejecting that view it may be noted that to the only illustration of the relativity of the mean to the individual which Aristotle offers it is quite inapplicable; the right quantity of meat for one man is not the right quantity for another, though it is always a mean between too much and too little. I have only mentioned the view here in order to point out that, even if it were accepted, the synthesis of contraries which, according to it, is involved in a virtuous disposition is not that of contrary bad dis-

[1] *Ethik*, c. 61, Gegensatzverhältnis und Wertsynthese.

[2] Cf. *infra*, p. 176, n. 2.

positions, the Aristotelian ἄκρα. These cannot be combined in an action, neither do we think that they ought to be; they ought both to be avoided.

But there are contrasted dispositions that we approve, from which, however difficult it may seem to combine them, issue actions both of which may seem to be required of us. A familiar instance is afforded by the respective claims of justice and forgiveness. Hartmann does not mention this, but he mentions justice and love of one's neighbour (*Gerechtigkeit* and *Nächstenliebe*). These stand contrasted; and the action to which a man with a strong sense of justice might be prompted in a given situation may be one from which neighbourly love by itself would hold him back. It is quite possible for a man to have this neighbourly love in strength, with very little regard to the observance of justice, or to have a strong sense of justice and lack any love of his neighbour. But both are good dispositions; and virtue would not be shown, in a particular situation, by an action displaying neither, as it would be shown by one displaying neither of the related and contrary vices, the ἄκρα to the μεσότης. Rather we think that we ought somehow to satisfy the claims of both. The case, therefore, is different with antithetic *Werte*, "values," and with antithetic *Unwerte*, "disvalues." Other examples of such antithetic "values" are purity (*Reinheit*) and fullness of life (*Fülle*); or love of one's neighbour (*Nächstenliebe*) and love of posterity (*Fernstenliebe*).

This antithetic of values is neither so frequently recurrent as the antithetic of disvalues, nor do the two correspond; *i.e.* the opposed virtues are not respectively contrary to the opposed vices, to both of which, as Aristotle said, in spite of their contrariety to each other, the one virtue which is in a mean between them is, in another way, contrary. Courage is in this way contrary both to cowardice and foolhardiness. On the other hand, the ideally courageous man should display both stout-hearted endurance (*behertztes Ausharren*) and thoughtful foresight, cool presence of mind (*bedachtsame Vorsicht, Kaltblütige Geistesgegenwart*); and it is the former which is specially lacking in the coward, the latter in the foolhardy. So again self-control (*Beherrschtheit*) is valuable, and a development of the emotional life (*Entfaltung des Affektlebens*) is valuable; but these are opposed "values," or at least capable of competing. Intemperance, ἀκολασία, and insensitiveness, ἀναισθησία, are opposed disvalues. The virtue of σωφροσύνη or temperance should somehow combine self-control with the development of the emotional life. But since there is a kinship between insensitiveness and a self-control that is not combined with the contrasted "value," the Stoics made insensitiveness itself into a virtue; and because of the likeness between intemperance and development of the emotional life uncom-

bined with self-control, the emotions have sometimes been rejected altogether.

Strict parallelism here would require Hartmann rather to point to some who had made intemperance into a virtue; perhaps Polus in the *Gorgias* might be cited in this sense; or Alfred Barratt, who said that "the highest virtue consists in being led, not by one desire, but by all," the cause of repentance being "never the attainment of some pleasure, but always the non-attainment of more: not the satisfaction of one desire, but the inability to satisfy all"; though, very inconsistently, he called the highest virtue, as just defined, "the complete organization of the moral nature."[1] But I do not wish to press this as a criticism, nor yet to ask how far anything like what Hartmann has said in regard to courage and temperance could be paralleled for all the virtues in Aristotle's table. That to which I wish to direct attention is Hartmann's suggestion of a synthesis of "values" being involved in the Aristotelian mean; for a synthesis of values is very different from a mean of "disvalues" or κακίαι.

I think that Hartmann's observation is a good one, but that it points to a more thoroughgoing criticism or restatement of the Aristotelian doctrine that he gives. In his "doctrine of the mean" Aristotle seems to me to have been trying, and failing, to improve on the account of virtue offered by his master Plato. Assuming what I have to say on this head to be sound, it would follow that the necessity for a synthesis of opposed "elements of value," to which Hartmann draws attention, is a special case of a more pervading necessity. I believe that no action is obligatory independently of relation to any good, but that this good may be, and in the last resort is, connected with a life to be lived, to the form of goodness in which the particular obligatory action is necessary. If so, a man's particular actions should be such as will together make a life in which this goodness can be realized; their "values" are connected with the goodness of the whole; and the synthesis of *Wertelemente* which Hartmann requires in a particular action is really the suiting of the particular action to the wider plan of life to which it belongs, in a situation of a sort that seems sometimes to call for exercise of one and sometimes for exercise of the other of two "opposed" virtues.

It is Plato's teaching that you cannot unexceptionably define any virtue by naming the sort of acts it requires of you. A man's courage should not always make him stand in the ranks and fight, nor his justice always make him restore what he owes. The statement that justice, in the widest sense of that word, will make him do his proper job, τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν, may seem open to an objection

[1] Cited by C. M. Williams, *A Review of the Systems of Ethics founded on the Theory of Evolution*, p. 117 (Macmillan, 1893).

just the contrary of what lies against the attempt to define virtues by naming their works; for while one method assigns to a virtue acts which do not belong to it, the other fails to say what do. Plato tries to meet this objection by describing the life of a good state and the constitution of the soul. By the first description we are helped to divine the particular acts that should be done; by the second to see through the development of what capacities in us and through what inner discipline we may do the acts belonging to us in the life of the state, and not other acts. This discipline and development bear fruit in all right actions, and the "inward and spiritual grace" from which the "outward and visible" deed issues is different because of them from what it would be if the agent were not thus "just," even though the outward and visible deeds might yet be on occasion the same. In that sense, virtue is one; though this unity involves, as Plato is careful to maintain, distinguishable constituent excellences in distinguishable forms or parts (εἴδη or μέρη) of the soul; and though also we may distinguish many virtues, according to the kinds of situation that repeatedly occur and the kinds of deed which for the most part are required in them. But that such deeds are right in such situations is true only for the most part; that is why the virtues cannot be unexceptionably defined by naming the sorts of acts they require of us.

Now Aristotle was more interested in the multiplicity of virtues than in the unity of virtue. To this we owe it that he devoted a book and a half of the *Nicomachean Ethics* to the detailed description of a number of particular moral virtues, and the vices alternative to them in their several fields. These are so many "values" and "disvalues," *Werte* and *Unwerte*, in the phrase of Hartmann and other exponents of "axiology." If all these "values" ought to be actualized, are *seinsollend*, and certain situations allow of one's actualizing more than one, but only alternatively, then antithetic relations and "antinomies" arise, and the need for "synthesis." If, however, virtue is one, it should not require of us incompatibles. That is why the synthesis of antithetic "values" which Hartmann finds to be involved in some moral virtue described by Aristotle as a μεσότης or mean is only a particular case of what must be always necessary for determining the right act in a given situation, if the unity of virtue is to be sustained against the multiplicity of the particular virtues.

And Aristotle, though more interested in the multiplicity, does not deny that unity, the belief in which led Plato to offer a definition of justice "in the soul" which would make the just man the man of complete moral virtue. Only he will not give to this all-pervading unity the name *justice*. If we ask ourselves whether anything corresponds in the *Nicomachean Ethics* to the Platonic distinction between justice in the state and justice in the soul, we must, I think,

admit that the distinction between *ὅλη δικαιοσύνη*, complete justice, and *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή*, moral virtue, as the generic identity of the various particular virtues in his table, so corresponds. Aristotle himself really says as much; for justice, in this comprehensive sense, is, he says, not a part of virtue, but the whole, *οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετή*: all virtue is contained in it, as the proverb says; the man thus just has "fulfilled the law."[1] And then, in the last section of the chapter, he gives its relation to moral virtue. They are the same thing differently regarded; *i.e.* what this same is, as justice and as virtue, are not the same; in relation to other men, it is justice; merely as a disposition in the man who is just, it is virtue.[2]

This is not really different from what Plato had written in the fourth book of his *Republic*, at the end of the passage in which, assuming that we mean the same when we call a state and when we call a man just, he has gone on to analyse the soul, and shown how the three sorts of excellence, whose display by different men holding different functions in the state make the actions just which we regard as corporate acts of the state, enter also into every action of a just man. Therefore they enter—and this, if we are to understand Plato, we must never forget—into those very actions of different men, by which they co-operate in a corporate act of the state. The statesman whose wisdom, the soldier whose courage, the others whose temperance contribute to make a corporate act of the state just, will each make his contribution as he should only because, in so ordering his own soul and his own life that he may do so, he displays all three excellences. The justice of the state, therefore, is an expression of the justice in the souls of those whose several actions are concerned together in what we call the state's acts; for Plato knew that only individuals act. And this is what he says in the passage to which I am referring. "Something of this sort is in truth, it seems, what justice was"—the justice of which he has been so long speaking—"concerned not with the outward doing of one's own *duties*, but the inward:[3] in very truth with a man himself and what is his, that he should not allow the kinds[4]

[1] *Eth. Nic.*, V. i. 12–19.

[2] *Ibid.*, § 20, 1130[a] 10, *τί δὲ διαφέρει ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὕτη, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὐτή, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ' ᾗ μὲν πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ᾗ δὲ τοιάδε ἕξις ἁπλῶς, ἀρετή.*

[3] I italicize words supplied in translation, after the manner of the authors of King James's translation of the Bible. The Greek—*οὐ περὶ τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν τῶν αὑτοῦ ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντός*—is ambiguous; for *τῶν αὑτοῦ* may be either one's own duties, or the "parts" of one's own soul; in the next words—*ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ*—it is the latter; but there is probably a shift of meaning (one might almost say a play upon the words) indicated by *ὡς ἀληθῶς*.

[4] *γένη*: *i.e.*, what are also called the *εἴδη*, or *μέρη*, parts, of the soul.

within his soul to do each another's *work* in him, nor to interfere one with another, but having verily set aright what is his and gained rule himself over himself, having ordered and come to friendship with himself and conciliated *these kinds* in their triplicity, just as if it were three strings in a scale, top and bottom and middle, and any there may be between, having bound all these together and become out of many one, temperate and ordered, so at length should act, if he do some action whether concerned with getting money or with the care of his body or with some affair of state or transaction of private *life*, in all these counting and calling just and noble whatever action preserves and helps to complete in him this disposition, and wisdom the knowledge that presides over this action, and *likewise* unjust whatever action at any time undoes this *disposition*, and folly the opinion presiding over this."[1]

Such is Plato's account of the disposition which is virtue, in whatever particular sort of virtuous action and in whatever dealings with others it is shown. Aristotle, in the passage cited above, as often elsewhere, has but put into a succinct phrase or formula what Plato had set out at length. He does the same when he contrasts appetite and purpose, saying that a man's purpose may be contrary to his appetite, but that he cannot have contrary appetites at once.[2] This statement sums up the result of the argument by which Socrates, in the *Republic*, 436B–439D, convinces Glaucon that what makes it possible for a man to refrain from gratifying an appetite he does not cease to feel, and so to be contrarily affected in himself towards the same thing at the same time, is that there is a rational or considerative as well as an appetitive principle or part or form or kind in his soul. It is of course to similar experiences of contrariety within the soul that Socrates appeals in arguing further for a principle of spirit distinguishable alike from the appetitive and the considerative forms of the soul's being.

It is not necessary here to expound the reasoning by which this account of the soul is commended, nor to discuss the value of the account. All that I wish to do is to consider how Aristotle's definition of moral virtue is related to Plato's definition, based on this account, of "justice in the soul." I have suggested that the most famous feature of Aristotle's definition, the doctrine of the mean, expresses an attempt—I think an ill-advised attempt—to improve upon Plato's account of the part which "temperance" plays in "justice in the soul." I have so far offered reason for saying that anyone looking for Aristotle's treatment of the facts to which Plato directed our attention, when expounding justice in the soul and its

[1] *Rep.*, IV. 443B–444A.

[2] *Eth. Nic.*, III. ii. 5, 1111[b] 15. *καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ'ἐπιθυμίᾳ οὔ.*

relation to justice in the state, would expect to find it in the definition of moral virtue, *ἠθικὴ ἀρετή*, and the exposition of the relation of this to *ὅλη δικαιοσύνη* or complete justice.

But we cannot judge this question fairly without bearing in mind what Plato never points out in so many words, though the *Republic* contains several definite statements implying it, viz. that the three forms or parts of the soul are not merely co-ordinate: that the division as it were does double duty, and if not a "physical," is anyhow as well a "metaphysical" as a "logical" division. To call them parts suggests that the unity of the soul is by way of addition to an appetitive of the other principles. But the spirited and rational are not merely added to the appetitive, as an appetite for grass might have been added in Nebuchadnezzar to his existing appetites for other foods, instead of being substituted for them. It is itself modified by the presence of the other two, as the spirited also is modified by the presence of the rational. Besides this, in any action they are all involved; to crave, to be angry, or even indignant, to consider or approve, none of these is to act. And the co-operation of them in action—how the soul is at once in some respects the same in all action, in other respects differs according as a man acts more or less justly—this is one-half of Plato's teaching; that we may understand this is one purpose of his division; and so far as the human soul shows its being in all these modes at once, we might call the division metaphysical. But the appetites which Socrates in *Republic*, 436A, describes as for the pleasures of nourishment and procreation and their like, though, if the soul were merely appetitive, they would be the only sort of desire it would feel, are by no means this in fact. Other kinds of desire belong to it as spirited, and yet others as rational. This is most explicitly asserted in IX. 580D. Socrates there offers, as a further proof that a man's soul may be divided according to three "kinds," this: that there are pleasures of three kinds, each proper to one mode of the soul's being, and likewise desires and principles.[1] There are, that is to say, desires that belong to a soul as spirited, and again as rational, not only those which belong to it as appetitive; so that *ἐπιθυμία* has a generic as well as a specific sense, and so far as the soul is an *ἀρχή*, or initiates change, the threefold division is a logical division into three principles in virtue of which it does so.[2]

[1] *Τήνδε· τριῶν ὄντων τριτταὶ καὶ ἡδοναί μοι φαίνονται, ἑνὸς ἑκάστου μία ἰδία. ἐπιθυμίαι ὡσαύτως τε καὶ ἀρχαί. ἀρχαί* here presumably are movers to action; they "take the initiative."

[2] Aristotle again finds a way of expressing this, by distinguishing in the genus *ὄρεξις* the three species of *βούλησις*, *θυμὸς* and *ἐπιθυμία*. *Vide De Anima*, *γ* ix, 432^{b} 5–6; *Magn. Mor.*, I. xii. 1187^{b} 38, *ὀρέξεως δ' ἐστιν εἴδη τρία, ἐπιθυμία, θυμός, βούλησις*. When Aristotle says, *De Anima*, *γ* ix. 432^{b} 6–7, criticizing Plato for dividing the soul into parts, *εἰ δὲ τρία ἡ ψυχή, ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔσται ὄρεξις*, he says what Plato would have readily admitted.

The importance of all this is as follows: The function of the rational or considerative "part" in the soul is not merely to regulate the appetites, *i.e.* the activities of the appetitive "part," from which, at the outset of his analysis, Socrates proves its distinctness, by calling attention to its withholding a man from the gratification of his appetites. It has to regulate all a man's desires, including those of which it makes him capable itself, like desire of knowledge, and those, like desire of power, whereof the spirited "part" makes him capable. Similarly, the function of the spirited "part" is not only to hold a man steadfast to an approved course when this course involves rejecting the gratification of some appetite, but equally when it involves refusal to gratify a desire of which the spirited "part" itself, or even the rational, makes him capable; for a man may on occasion judge it right, in the interests of the community or of his own soul, that he should sacrifice some pursuit of power or knowledge.

Though it lies aside from my main thesis, it may perhaps be worth while to suggest here that this distinction between the generic and the specific senses of *ἐπιθυμία* might well be borne in mind by Freudian psychologists when they speak of the *libido*. When the direction of a man's energies into some other channel than the gratification of sexual appetite is described as a sublimation of the *libido*, it seems often thought that this appetite is being somehow transformed, say into a devotion to good works. But though such devotion may fill a larger part in the life of a man who has been disappointed in love, or in whom sexual appetite has been repressed, than otherwise it would have done, it is not itself a transformation of the specific appetite, but an alternative manifestation of the generic capacity of desire, and one of which another " form" of the soul than the appetitive makes him capable. To suppose that sublimation of the *libido* is transformation of appetite is like supposing that to draw a circle is to transform a drawing of a triangle.

The soul then, according to Plato's account, as rational or considerative, has at any moment, if it is to act justly, to divine what is best in the situation and act accordingly. But it has in it all sorts of impulses to action, some springing from its appetitive, some from its spirited, some from its rational nature. Any of these may move it towards doing something of which as rational it disapproves, or from doing something of which as rational it approves. What Plato calls courage, the excellence of the spirited "part" as this functions in all action, will sustain him in following his judgment, when thus moved contrarily. But the man of formed and settled "justice" will not be moved by appetite towards that of which "consideration" would never approve pursuit,[1] and his desires for what in suitable circumstances he would approve pursuing, in whichever "part" of

[1] Or, as Plato says, *Rep.*, x. 571B, by *παράνομοι ἐπιθυμίαι*.

the soul they originate, will not be so strong as to make it difficult for him to hold fast to the course approved by him. To determine, however, what place in the scheme of his life the indulgence of any particular desire, the development of any particular interest, the devotion to any particular occupation, should hold is to determine that scheme; and is the task of his rational nature, of the *λογιστικόν*. The inclusion in or omission from that scheme of any interest or occupation, the indulgence or disregard of any desire, must be so determined as may make his life the best that it can be; though what this is again cannot be settled without regard to what is best for the community of lives in which his must take its place; and there are of course, as Plato recognizes, certain "necessary" appetites, without whose indulgence the individual cannot live, or the race cannot continue. But some men in some situations ought to reject the indulgence even of these. No rule can be given by which to determine either when their indulgence should be altogether rejected, or how largely any desire, interest, or occupation admitted to have place in the scheme of a man's life should be allowed to bulk there.[1] That is what a man's wisdom, the excellence of his rational or considerative nature, is to enable him to decide, or at least to recognize when a wiser than he has decided it for him. And that his divers desires and interests should be developed in such mutual adjustment and relations of degree as the scheme that his wisdom approves requires is what Plato calls *σωφροσύνη*, or temperance: an excellence, as he says, not of the appetitive alone but of the whole soul, just because it involves desires or moving powers, *ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ ἀρχαί*, belonging to each of its "parts" or "forms."

Now how far does Aristotle recognize all this in his definition of moral virtue? Does he, too, see in moral virtue the union of three sorts of excellence, wisdom, courage, and temperance? It seems to me that he does, but with a profound difference in his view of the last; and this difference is shown in his doctrine of the mean.

He defines moral virtue as a disposition displaying purpose, in a mean relative to the agent and determined by a rule, whereby a wise man would determine it.[2] That it is a disposition, *ἕξις*, agrees

[1] It will be noted that the question *when* a desire should or should not be indulged is the question *ὅτε δεῖ*, whereas *how largely* is *ὅσον δεῖ*, and only the latter is a question of degree.

[2] *Eth. Nic.*, II. vi. 15, 1106^{b} 36. *ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρονιμὸς ὁρίσειεν.* Burnet, taking the mean to be a combination of contrary impulses in the right proportion (as explained above, p. 1), took *λόγος* here to mean ratio, viz. the ratio in which they were combined. But these impulses would themselves be capable of varying in degree of strength, and it is difficult to see how the ratio in which they are to be combined, in order to secure the "mean" required, can be fixed unless the strength of each is first fixed. Yet this strength might in turn

with Plato's language about justice in the soul, which he speaks of as *ταύτην τὴν ἕξιν*. And in calling it *ἕξις προαιρετική*, a disposition displaying purpose, Aristotle recognizes in it the factor which in justice in the soul Plato called courage, *ἀνδρεία*. For Plato defines this courage as holding fast in everything to a right and lawful opinion concerning what is and is not to be feared.[1] By this he means that the just man, whatever loss or suffering or unpleasantness may threaten him from the course which he approves, will by courage hold fast to the right opinion that these are less terrible than not to do what he approves. And when Aristotle says that moral virtue displays purpose, he means that a virtuous man abides in action by the judgment he has formed after deliberation, *ἐμμένει τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν*,[2] whatever there may be moving him to act otherwise, though of course it is not this resoluteness that makes his judgment correct; and thus to abide comes, in his opinion, of courage.

Further, Aristotle assigns a part to wisdom in the constitution of moral virtue, as Plato does in that of justice in the soul. For the mean is determined by a rule, namely, by that whereby the wise man, the *φρονιμός*, would determine it. It is true that a man may be virtuous without being capable of discovering the rule for himself; he may rely on the wisdom of some teacher or confessor; but at least he must have wisdom enough to accept the rule and think

be regarded as involving a combination of contraries in a certain ratio, and so *ad infinitum*. Others have interpreted *λόγος* to mean "reason," *i.e.* the faculty, *τὸ λογιστικὸν* or (as Aristotle calls it) *τὸ λόγον ἔχον*. Apart from the question whether *λόγος* ever means this in Aristotle's writings, it seems a fatal objection to such an interpretation here, that it would make the last six words of the definition redundant. For a fool misuses the same faculty as a wise man uses, when he (the fool) misjudges the mean. Moreover, § 7 of the chapter, 1106^{a} 36–^{b}5, where Aristotle illustrates what he intends by a *μεσότης πρὸς ἡμᾶς*, supports the interpretation "rule"; rules for training, it seems to be meant, would fix limits that an athlete should not overstep in either direction to the amount of food or exercise to be taken; but for particular athletes the precisely right amounts will fall at different points between these limits, and these niceties cannot be fixed by the rule. The late J. Cook Wilson held that *ὀρθὸς λόγος* in Aristotle's *Ethics* meant "right reason"; but Professor J. A. Smith, another eminent Aristotelian, has argued strongly for the interpretation "rule," and I have borrowed the last argument from him.

[1] *Rep.*, IV. 430B. *σωτηρίαν διὰ πάντος δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου δεινῶν τε περὶ καὶ μή.*

[2] *Eth. Nic.*, III. ix. 1110^{a} 31, in the discussion of *ἀνδρεια*; cf. *inter alia*, *ibid.*, VII. ix, where *ἐμμένειν τῇ προαιρέσει*, *ἐμμένειν τοις δόξασι* also occur. The weak or incontinent man, *ὁ ἀκράτης*, under the influence of the desire or impulse of the moment, fails to abide by his resolve or purpose; the virtuous man, in whom it is necessary *τήν τε λόγον ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν ὀρθήν, εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις σπουδαία* (*ibid.*, VI. ii. 2, 1138^{a} 24), will abide by his purpose.

it correct; *ἐμμένειν τοῖς δόξασιν*[1] is *ἐμμένειν τοῖς αὐτῷ δόξασιν*. And in this Aristotle is not differing from Plato, who says that courage is holding fast not knowledge but a right and lawful opinion, *δόξα*. For very few *know* good and evil; and if a man did really know what is good, he could not, in Plato's belief, voluntarily do what he did not think its attainment required of him; though on this question, which is the question of incontinence or *ἀκρασία*, Aristotle's view is not so clear. There is indeed a very important difference between Plato and Aristotle regarding the wisdom involved in moral virtue or justice in the soul. For Plato thought that it was the same intellectual excellence as is shown in science or speculative philosophy, whereas Aristotle did not, and consequently drew a distinction, unknown to Platonic usage, between *φρόνησις* and *σοφία*. But this difference does not affect the fact that they agree in holding wisdom, an excellence of the *λογιστικὸν* or *λόγον ἔχον μέρος* in the soul, to be a factor or moment in what the one calls justice in the soul and the other moral virtue.

There remains the question whether Aristotle recognizes as the third factor or moment "temperance" or *σωφροσύνη*. And it seems to me that he does so, but takes a different view from Plato's of what this factor is, when he says that this disposition is in a mean relative to the agent, *ἐν μεσότητι τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς*; and also that in this he is not, as I take him to have believed, improving upon, but spoiling the analysis which he follows.

It is, of course, no objection to this conjecture that temperance, *σωφροσύνη*, figures in Aristotle's table of particular virtues, as one among a number of means or *μεσότητες*. For it is quite consistent with the unity of virtue implied in Plato's account of justice in the soul that this disposition can show itself in, and give a special character to, some group of a man's actions distinguished by their being concerned with a special kind of appetite or desire, or a special kind of situation. So Aristotle distinguishes one particular virtue from another by reference to what kind of affection or action, *πάθος* or *πρᾶξις*, displays the general character of being in a mean. And there is no more difficulty in giving the name *σωφροσύνη* both to a factor in all virtuous action and to a particular virtue than there is in admitting, as Aristotle does, a distinction between justice as a whole, *ὅλη δικαιοσύνη*, and particular justice, *ἡ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνη*. Nor is the double use of the words mere equivocation; it points to a peculiar complexity in the facts.

We saw that, according to Plato, measure or moderation must be imposed on each appetite, interest, and desire; but that in what measure it should work or be indulged in a man's life depended on the plan, or form, of that life as a whole; and that such a dependence

[1] Cf. *supra*, p. 177, n. 2.

affords no rule by which to determine its measure, or in accordance with which to moderate it. For what life is just for a man can only be known by knowing what pursuits, indulgences, and occupations are to be included in it; since till this is known, the life to be pronounced just or unjust is not before us for judgment. Rules indeed there may be that hold good for the most part; but in the cases where they hold no longer, this is because of what else is required of a man—actions of other kinds than fall under the rule and constitute the field of the particular virtue in question. Such rules therefore are not criteria. The only criterion would be the just life; but what that is cannot be known until we know what ought to be done in the case for which a criterion is sought, and therefore the just life cannot be a criterion.

I conjecture that Aristotle was dissatisfied with this position, as we all may well be, even if the matter really stands so; and that he sought to go further, and show that the matter is susceptible of a more exact treatment than this, though he admitted that the exactness possible in moral questions falls very far short of what is to be demanded in mathematics. To secure this greater exactness or precision, he substituted for the notion that the measure, *μετριότης*, required in action or indulgence or emotion of any kind is to be determined by reference to the whole scheme of a good life, the notion that it can be determined to a certain place, upon a scale of quantity or degree, on which all actions, indulgences, or emotions of the kind in question must have a place; and he suggested that there may be rules, by help of which we may limit the range upon the scale within which that place falls for the agent concerned. It seemed to him easier to fix the mean by reference to contrary extremes or vices displayable in the same kind of action, indulgence, or emotion than by reference to anything so vague and hard to seize as the form or plan of life to which the required action must belong.

The doctrine of the mean has been often criticized. To one criticism Aristotle himself points out the answer. It does not imply that the difference between virtue and vice is one of degree. Characters not differing among themselves in degree may be grounded in conditions that do differ in degree or quantity, as beauty and ugliness of visible form depend on ratios between the quantities of the several parts of what is beautiful or ugly. It is a more serious objection that the differences in which virtuous and vicious acts are grounded are many of them not of degree or quantity, according to Aristotle's own account. The even-tempered man, or *πρᾷος*, will show anger not only in the right degree, but with the right persons; the generous man will give not only as much as but to whom and when he should. Such conditions fit well enough into Plato's account

of "temperance," but not into the theory of the mean.[1] Again, even if differences of quantity or degree more pervasively distinguished the "matter" of actions in the mean from those in either extreme than in fact they do, it would be a mistake to think that by directing attention to this Aristotle helps us to discover what is right in a given situation. No doubt if we knew already what was too much or too little, that knowledge would help us towards knowledge of what virtue requires, and the more so, the less difference there was between the excess and the defect. But in fact the knowledge that this would be too much and that too little is often reached through recognizing something else than either to be right or nearly right. And right rules are no better guides because they determine a mean than if they were like the commandments, "Do not kill," "Do not steal," "Do not lie." These hold good for the most part; but our difficulties arise when taking life, or ignoring rights of property, or saying what is false, seems the least evil course in the circumstances; and the rule does not help us to know when it should be broken. So a rule that fixes limits beyond which one should not go in either direction holds good only for the most part; the mean may fall between them for most agents in most situations; but relatively to a particular agent in a particular situation the rule may fail.

For if we consider a virtue that is especially patient of being presented as depending on the degree of certain impulses or *πάθη*, viz. courage, we must admit that there are situations in which the courageous man should avoid all danger, or again none. And we remember the man to whom Jesus said, "Sell all that thou hast." If then the limits between which, when we consider all occasions for a certain sort of action or affection, *πρᾶξις* or *πάθος*,[2] we must admit that the mean may lie are all and nothing, there is the same range for the virtue which is in the mean and for the vices which are not. We may have rules, as has been said, holding good for the most part, but so much is compatible with Plato's exposition. If we want more, and ask to what we should look, when the rules do not apply, Plato has at least something to say. We should look to what other acts, indulgences, pursuits seem required of us or commendable in our course of life. This will not tell us how to act now; but it will direct our attention to that of which consideration is necessary, if we are to reach a judgment. Aristotle substitutes for this reference to the play which should be allowed in one's life to other impulses, desires and interests a reference to the different possible extents of play that may be allowed to the one whose part is in question;

[1] Cf. *supra*, p. 176, n. 1.

[2] Aristotle says that his *μεσότητες* are *περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις*, and the particular virtues differ according to the sort of *πάθη* and *πράξεις* they concern.

and in consequence he has nothing to say regarding cases where a rule applicable for the most part should not be observed.

And in the *Eudemian Ethics* this is acknowledged: "When a man's action is rightly irregular, it is in the mean; for in a way the extremes fall within the mean."[1] Nothing is now left of the doctrine of the mean, except that there are useful rules of conduct, to be followed for the most part. What was intended, as I believe, to give more precision to that part of the analysis of moral virtue which concerns the description of the "acts and affections," approved by wisdom and sustained by courage, than Plato's account of σωφροσύνη gave, has turned out to give less. Indeed, it affords no guidance whatever. For if I were to ask what scope I ought to give in my life to the indulgence of my love of music (say), or travel, it is of some use to be told: Look beyond that activity, and consider what else there is for you to do and enjoy in life, how different determinations of your question will affect the rest of your life, and with which adjustment you think you will be living best. But it is of no use to be told: The degree or extent of scope to be given it must lie in a mean, and the mean lies between giving it none at all, and giving it all possible scope and the first place in your consideration.

For these reasons, while I think that Aristotle in his definition of moral virtue was following and trying to improve upon Plato's analysis of justice in the soul, I also think that by the modification he made in it, viz. by introducing the doctrine of the mean, he in fact largely spoilt it.

[1] III. xiv. 1234^{b} 4. *ὅταν μὲν γὰρ καλῶς ἀνώμαλοι ὦσιν, οἱ μέσοι γίνονται· ἐν τῷ μέσῳ γὰρ ἐστί πως τὰ ἄκρα.*

ITINERARIUM MENTIS IN DEUM

GERALD CATOR

Console thyself, thou wouldst not seek Me hadst thou not found Me.

PASCAL.

Prefatory. The Logic of Theism.—Our world, the thing or complex of things, which is continuous and co-ordinate with our present perception, is self-transcendent. The proof is from observation, from our reactions, which are often more sensitive than our direct observations, from the testimony of philosophers, expert psychologists, and poets (cited in the text).

To say that our world is self-transcendent is to say that it presents itself to our minds as indigent of *some* sort of supplement or complement having *some* sort of ontological status which it implies in *some* capacity.

The problem of the Logic of Theism is the problem of determining, assigning a definite value to, these "somes." In other words, the proof of God is the proof that what "our world implies" when it is made determinate corresponds with the received conception of God in such a way as to justify the substitution of the name God for the indication "what our world implies."

We begin with "what our world implies" as a determinable, and we proceed to determine it, that is to say, to make clear, distinct, and explicit what it is obscurely, confusedly, and implicitly from the first onset. We explore by various methods (see text).

To illustrate my meaning, and only to illustrate my meaning, let me suppose that we are successful in determining that "what our world implies" is (*a*) as regards ontological status something *existent* (existence, since it was in question, here counts as a determination of the determinable); (*b*) as regards relation, related to our world as its supreme cause; (*c*) as regards intrinsic character; endowed with such attributes as omniscience, omnipotence, and perfection; then we should be justified in giving to the determinable "what our world implies" now determined as "something existent, supreme cause of our world, having intelligence, will, and goodness," the name God. We should have proved the existence of God, or should have shown that the existence of God can be inferred from our world. Or rather, I will say that if we proved the existence of a Being in whom the most salient and important features of the received notion of God were realized, we should have proved the existence of God *for all practical purposes*, inserting this limitation because it

might seem that our determinable still further determined might develop characteristics incompatible with the received notion of God (*e.g.* such a unity as to be *incompatible* with triunity). However it may be with this speculative difficulty, which I do not personally believe to be insuperable, if we could get so far as I have described, then as a matter of practical perplexity and controversy the issue as between Theism and any available alternative construction of reality would be decided.

These prefatory remarks are not intended as a summary of what will be attempted in the body of the paper. They are intended to strip the mystery from the process of proving the existence of God, and to suggest that it consists in the determination of a determinable which in its most indeterminate and obscure form is a given fact of observation.

What a fact, or a complex of facts, implies is a property of it, and belongs to it in its own right, whether or not any mind which is aware of the fact is also aware of the implication.

But when a fact which has implications is present to a mind, then since the fact, so to speak, solicits of the mind the recognition of its implications, and this solicitation, being a sort of action emanating from the fact cannot be entirely inefficacious, there is produced in the mind *at least* an incipient inclination to recognize the implications, and this inclination reflected back by the mind on to the fact which is its origin causes the fact to seem to the mind to be charged with interrogation and surrounded by a sort of aura or fringe of suggestion.

In other language, the fact produces in the mind a state of wonder, and itself seems wonderful. This state is the beginning of reflection.

If there is a God occupying such a position in Reality as monotheistic religion assigns to Him, He will be implied by every fact at least in the capacities of its exemplar, final and efficient cause, and therefore, on the theistic hypothesis, and in accordance with what has been said above about the inclination evoked by implication, every fact will be accompanied by *at least* an incipient reference of itself to God in the above-mentioned capacities, and therefore, correlatively, by an incipient awareness of God as terminating this reference.

By inference I shall mean that spontaneous reaction of the mind by which the given object is enlarged by being recognized as surrounded by a field of implication. This is much less than is ordinarily meant by inference, but I adopt this terminology to introduce my contention that while this first act is ampliative and irreplaceable (since it inducts us into the intelligible world), what follows on it,

which I shall call the development of the inference or the development, may be carried out in more than one way. In my view the totality which is constituted by the original given object, together with its field of implication, is co-extensive with the universe, and it has a structure such that there is within it a "proper place" for everything nameable. All therefore of what I am calling the development consists in filling in this original schema out of its own implicit resources.

The ways of development are Meditation, Logical Eduction,[1] and what I will call Dialectical Meditation. Logical eduction has certain advantages (communicability, recoverability, verifiability), in virtue of which it may be regarded as *primus inter pares*, but it is no more than this. It is one way of doing what may be done otherwise, and not all the advantages are on its side.

Meditation.—This method consists in making the mind sensitive, docile, responsive, to the solicitations of the object, in purifying it and freeing it from diverting and obstructive pre-occupations so that it can take in the messages which things are striving to communicate, the most important and pervasive, though not the most strident and insistent of which is "He made us." This is the way of the Saints, and hence, as Joubert says, "The great Saints are great Metaphysicians." Hence also it is that the clean of heart see God.

Logical Eduction.—Meditation is a method of becoming aware of the implications of the object by enhancing the intrinsic sensitiveness of the mind. Logical eduction is a dodge for making the object as if it was more insistent than it is. It does for the mind what a telescope or microscope does for the eye. By logical eduction the implications of the object are enhanced up to perceptibility level by being apperceived in terms of simpler implications, or, in the ideal limiting case of a perfect logical demonstration, by being apperceived, *via* intermediaries if necessary, in terms of elementary implications which are, for every mind, inseparable from the object. Logical eduction does for the clear of head what meditation does for the clean of heart.

Dialectical Meditation.—This method has in common with Meditation that it proceeds by intending the mind on the object, and in common with eduction that it proceeds by steps or stages, but the terms required for these steps are not links but stepping-stones, guides to the mind's eye. Ground is gained a little at a time, consolidated, and then made the basis for a fresh advance. This method can be applied both to the object and to the mind. Suppose I pick up a broken flint and am in doubt whether it is a sport of nature or an artefact, I may be able to resolve my doubt by comparing it, on one side with an undoubted sport, and on the other side with an undoubted

[1] Deduction is a sub-form of eduction, *a* way of effecting eductions.

artefact. The comparison, supposing the flint to be really an artefact, will bring out on the one side the absence of the marks of natural origin, and on the other side the presence of the marks of human workmanship. Or again, I may be discontented and restless, but unable to analyse my state of mind until I am led to compare my state of mind with that of St. Augustine, "Thou madest us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it repose in Thee." *Then I may be able to see in my mind what was there all the time, but what until aided by this comparison I was unable to discriminate.*

Any object which is such as to be capable of supporting an inference, afterwards to be developed by one of the methods already mentioned, must be pregnant with self-transcendence, and as a result of its effort to give expression to this self-transcendence it will be known, clearly or dimly, as in a context, a sort of logical analogue of space, surrounding it. This context is the universal of which the given object is a particular value or instance.

Thus Bosanquet[1] says, ' there is something in a curve as given which is capable of dictating a continuation and completion of its outline."

Whitehead[2] speaks of Nature as exhibiting "entwined prehensive unities each suffused with the modal presence of others," and of "the brooding presence of the whole on to its various parts." This modal suffusion of the primary object, this brooding presence of the whole universe in each of its parts, is the character which is the basis of the possibility of inference. Again, Wallace[3] says, "All objects of science, all terms of knowledge, lead out of themselves and seek for a resting-point and centre. They are severally inadequate and partial, and crave adequacy and completeness. They tend to organize themselves and to constitute a system or universe."

Professor Stout has made this, to me, all important point, that of the given self-transcendence of the given, *the self-transcendence of the given as a given fact*, specially clear. I will therefore allow myself to quote from him[4] at some length. "The presentation in asserting itself, also asserts more than its own being. It does not present itself in isolation as something self-complete and self-existent. From the outset it is cognized as part of a system, having its existence only in relation to other parts of the system. The special context to which it belongs may be very vaguely apprehended." "Apart from classification, interpretation, and description, what is immediately given cannot constitute an object of thought at all. It is never an object by itself,

[1] *Logic*, vol. ii, p. 3.

[2] *Science and the Modern World* (Popular Edition), pp. 104, 108.

[3] *Logic of Hegel.*

[4] *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*, pp. 309, 310, 373. See also p. 256, and *Analytic Psychology*, vol. i. p. 95 (Implicit and Schematic Apprehension).

but only as part of a context. We have no means of defining it so as to draw a line of demarcation between it and its implication. This is impossible, because in defining it we must describe or characterize it, and in describing or characterizing it we must include its connection with what is other than itself." "The process through which the parts of the Universe are successively revealed must start from primary objects, which ultimately specify for thought all other objects. These primary objects can be nothing else than those modes of immediate experience which we have call presentations. But this implies not only that presentations are essentially fragmentary, and so related in various ways to being which transcends their own existence, but also that they are *apprehended* as being incomplete, and therefore as related to objects which are not themselves presentations falling within the experience of the moment."[1]

The entry on the Itinerarium to God may be an impression in consciousness of an implication of the primary object which in respect of clearness and distinctness is far below the level at which it can be introspectively identified. It may emerge at first only in the form of a vague, rudimentary, spordic aurge.

There is in the *Ingoldsby Legends*—I must surely ask many pardons for introducing such an illustration in such a connection, but I can think of no other equally telling—a recipe for a salad which ends, "some onion atoms lurk within the bowl and unsuspected animate the whole." So I would say that the first rudimentary, subconscious reference to God orients and animates the whole of our mental life.

We may lack something and yet be unaware that we lack anything. Mr. Chesterton[2] has described the consciousness of the Graeco-Roman world as being haunted by a sense of "the presence of the absence of God." This seems to me convincingly true, but they may well have been unaware, not only of *what* they lacked, but that they lacked anything.

> I said to heart,
> How goes it?
> Heart replied,
> Right as a Ribstone Pippin,
> *But it lied.*
>
> BELLOC.

It lied indeed, I should like to gloss, but I may have lied in the most transparent good faith.

Professor James has described vividly the way in which a forgotten name haunts and teases us, "there is a sort of gap in

[1] This ultimate specification by presentations gives the true and acceptable sense of the anti-Platonist slogan, "Nothing is in the intellect which was not previously in the senses."

[2] *Everlasting Man*, Part I, chap. iv.

consciousness and in the gap a sort of beckoning wraith of the name." I think that there was in the Pagan consciousness, though at a low level of insistence, a sort of disturbing beckoning wraith of the Self-Same. And all our thinking can ever do is to make the gap relatively definite till it outlines a silhouette. God is ever present to us as ever inaccessible, immanent as transcendent. I have read of a lady named Blanche who suffered from some sort of aphasia which prevented her being able to recall her own name, but she knew it because she could explain, "It's what you do to almonds by scalding them." So with us, the word that solves the riddle of the Universe escapes us, and yet in some sense is pervasively present to us, "Deo quasi ignoto conjungimur."

There is something about our world, a sort of ambience. It presents itself from the first as self-transcendent, instantial, fragmentary. It challenges, solicits, provokes the mind. It will not let us make an inventory of its content of facts and let it go at that. We react to a quite universal and inevitable impression when we speak of an open secret, or of the "Riddle of the Universe"; we do not speak of the riddle of the meaning of a number of weathering marks on a rock surface, but we do speak of the riddle of the meaning of a half-obliterated inscription.

The solicitation of our world on us varies in insistence according to the favourableness of inner and outer conditions. Sometimes it is no more than a perfunctory stirring only just distinguishable from sheer matter of factness, sometimes it needs only just a touch of enhancement to become the successful delivery of an entrusted message, "He made us." The most favourable outer conditions are morning and evening calm, when objects are distinct enough to support thought, and yet the mind is not distracted by a profusion of noonday detail.

Whether or not man is definitely a religious animal, he must be willing to fly in the face of all the facts who will deny that man is a *meta*-physical animal, an animal in whose object-consciousness the natural and physical is impregnated and internally qualified by an awareness of the numinous, the mystical, the supernatural.

If this is not clear from a casual introspection of our ordinary daily business consciousness, all doubt is at once removed if the power of consciousness is a little heightened, say, up to the Wordsworthian level so that it becomes sensitive to the less intrusive exigencies of the object—to those implications emanating from the object which tough-minded realists in philosophy overlook to their irreparable loss.

What I may call the Wordsworthian consciousness may be used as a sort of illustrative middle term to make a bridge between the

business consciousness and the full-blown theotropic or mystical consciousness.

Who is there who, when his habitual level of consciousness is even only a little heightened, is not aware of "moving about in worlds not realized"? "Obstinate questionings of sense and outward things," "the presence and the power of greatness," "sense sublime of something far more deeply interfused." Is it not true that we do at some moments, our clearest and best, "dimly guess what time in mists confounds."[1]

Intensify the business consciousness, that is, make it more responsive to the message of the object, and it becomes Wordsworthian. Repeat the operation on the Wordsworthian consciousness and it becomes theotropic; the diffused awareness of something numinous immersed in nature becomes liberated and concentrated into an awareness of God subsistent in Himself as referred to by nature.[2] The whole process is a process of condensation or precipitation. Of making explicit the implicit. Of achieving a successful expression of a haunting problematic presence. Something is at first subconsciously active as an urge, then emerges into consciousness as a diffused pervading quality (the numinous), and finally is precipitated as a transcendent, adorable object "present as absent."

Wordsworth's Nature contains God as it were diffused and in solution. The primary object implies, in implying it refers, in referring it refers upwards (the *meta*physical is the *super*natural). In referring upwards it refers to the absolute goal of its reference. In referring to the absolute goal of its reference it refers to its absolute measure in respect of entity and worth, therefore to a subsistent concentration of reality and perfection, therefore to that which in respect to it (the primary object) is supreme cause of its reality and worth, therefore to its adorable, transcendent Creator; since no other status of the referred to object can give the reference the requisite finality, absoluteness, and uniqueness. We are looking really, though at first unconsciously, for something, then we look consciously. In the adorable, transcendent Creator we find what absorbs every detail of the reference, and is therefore then recognized as its proper object from its first dim beginning.

I remember reading that Carlyle, on being told that one of the New England Transcendentalists had said that she "accepted the Universe," commented, "Gad, she'd better." No doubt this remark of the sage's was rewarded with the looked-for laugh. But really it

[1] *Hound of Heaven.*

[2] Something like the argument I am here attempting is to be found stated in a masterly way in *The Natural and the Supernatural*, by John Oman. I refer in particular to pp, 134, 136, 138, 169. See also the whole of chap. ix, on "The Individual and Individuality."

was rather cheap. To accept because resistance is hopeless is not really to accept, and willing acceptance as a duty indicates a prescience of a factor in the Universe which, when it is successfully discriminated, is recognized as Him "in whose will is our peace." It is this same prescience which no doubt is the cause that, as Bosanquet has remarked, none of the major philosophers end on a note of rebellion and defiance, and that, may I add, those minor ones who do so end, strike us as theatrical *poseurs*.

I must apologize if some part of these last pages seems rather headlong and breathless. I will now try to corroborate by way of logical eduction the results reached, and in doing so I shall hope to remove at least some of the obscurities.

Let me call "P implies Q" the inferential complex. This complex is triune because any variation in any one of its three elements entails a sympathetic compensating variation in each of the remaining two. The whole structure of the complex is therefore implicit in each of its elements. In the mode of development which I have hitherto been employing the procedure has been to develop P, the primary object, and, for us, independent variable, of the complex, and to obtain as a result a compensating development of the remainder. Now suppose the initiating wonder to take not the form "What does the World imply?", but the form "What is the relation between the essential world and God?". I say essential because there is yet no question of existence. Both God and the world may be mere floating ideas. The object of the technique called logical eduction is to educate the mind's eye to perceive (if such is in fact the case) that the relation between God and the world is a relation of implication such that if P in the inferential complex is given the value "the World," then Q will receive the value "God." This is like educating the eye to perceive the artefact character of the doubtful flint.

The ideally satisfactory procedure would be to begin with an elementary implication, and to enrich it gradually till it perfectly fitted the case of the world and God. I must content myself with attempting something less, namely, to show that the form of development of an inferential complex is such that it culminates in a reference identifiable in a very crucial characteristic with the form of the reference of the world to God.

An object implies in virtue of its being an instance of a universal. What it implies is primarily that part of the area of the universal which it does not itself occupy. In fact the primary implicate is the "other" of the implicans within the area of the universal. The relation of what implies to what is implied is therefore (*a*) positive on the basis of the universal, and (*b*) negative and complementary

within the universal; but (*c*), and this reacts on (*a*) and (*b*), so long as the mediating universal has any residual character of its own besides its character of relating P and Q, the implication is not a pure case because in these conditions the universal having its own positive character affects the implication and forms, as it were, a matter within which it is immersed. When therefore the implication is perfectly relevant and pure, the whole content of the universal is absorbed into the terms, and therefore the universal as having an independent status vanishes. It is to this vanishing, in the interests of implication, of the universal which is the basis of implication that I wish to call special attention. Orthodox theology, Thomism is the most prominent instance, finds itself committed to what at first sight appear to be intolerable paradoxes, if not open contradictions, in its account of God It has to say that though the world is relative to God, God is not correlative to the world. This is saying that the relation between P and Q is not a relation between Q and P. God is the Absolute Being. He is not in any class, however general. There is nothing univocally in common between Him and any creature. In all propositions about God the terms have a special appropriated, one might almost say Pickwickian, sense. All our rational equations seem on the point of refusing to work, and of talking nonsense, *e.g.* the coincidence of opposites.[1] Now I shall try to show that the culminating and limiting case of implication exhibits these same paradoxes so that they prove to be not irrational but essential to any construction of Reality which is a really successful expression of that implication with which the primary object is pregnant from the first.

The following extract from St. Bonaventure's famous treatise, from which, of course, I have taken my title, will serve as an introduction: "The intellect understands signified terms when it understands what each is by definition. But definition is in terms of the superior, and this superior must in turn be defined by its superior until we reach the supremest and most general knowledge which being lacking it is impossible to understand thoroughly the inferiors. Therefore, unless we know the definition of *ens per se* we cannot thoroughly know the definition of any special substance. . . . Being can be known as fractional and complete being. As imperfect and perfect being, as being in potency and being in act, as *secundum quid* and *simpliciter* as in part and totally, as transient and abiding, as *per aliud* and as *per se*, as mixed with non-being and as pure, as dependent and absolute, as posterior and prior, as mutable and immutable, as simple and as composite. And as privations and defects can only be known in terms of the correlative perfections, our intellect cannot

[1] This is specially emphasized in *S. Thomas D'Aquin*, by Père Sestillanges, O.P., by which I have been much influenced, partly by way of suggestion, partly by way of reaction (see vol. i, pp. 142, 162, 182, 189, 275).

fully understand any created being unless in relation to understanding of the most pure, most actual, most complete and absolute being, which is simple and eternal being, and in whose purity are the ideas of all things" (*Itinerarium*, Cap. III).[1]

The primary object implies in two dimensions. First, it implies, laterally so to speak, other possible primary objects on a level with itself in respect of ontological status, and which together with it make up the finite world of which it is a member; second, as a representative of this world it implies in the direction of the non-transfinite. This second dimension of implication is the direction in which the implication of God is to be looked for, and is the only one which will concern us. The correlates in the first direction may be called co-ordinate correlates of the primary object, the correlate in the second direction is the unity which is correlative to the multiplicity of the actual and co-ordinate possible primary objects, it is therefore universal in comparison with the primary object and as universal superior and dominant. The more clearly its implication is perceived the more it tends to become separate and subsistent as well as dominant. The universal idea is a tendencious surrogate for the universal cause. I shall call it at first the superior correlate.

Now take the world as implying merely, if we like, as a fact in the phenomenology of mind, such a superior correlate. If this correlate has anything univocally in common with the world, then this correlate and the world form a second multiplicity which again bespeaks as its correlate a second unity of a yet higher order. If we can significantly say God *and* the world, additively, a unity of this multiplicity is implied which will be intensively and in unity the counterpart of what God *and* the World is extensively and in multiplicity. Now I do not propose to say "this cannot go on to infinity," because so far as the abstract serial form is concerned it may be equally true that it cannot do anything else either, and we shall have arrived at an impasse. But this series has direction (orientation), it is therefore part of its internal and positive meaning that it *refers to*. A reference to nothing is no reference. A reference of which the finite is the basis is *ipso facto*, and as a matter of description a reference of which the transfinite is the goal. The finite does as a matter of description carry this transfinite reference, whatever the interpretation may be, therefore it can. From fact to possibility the inference is valid. What is actual cannot be impossible. I think that those who deny this transfinite reference are either uncultivated in respect to the appreciation of implication, or are blinded by a theory to a plain fact. The most plausible way of escape is to allow the term of this

[1] It is evident from these antitheses that Spearman's third neogenetic principle, the Eduction of Correlates, was thoroughly familiar to St. Bonaventure.

transfinite reference only a formal, or *als ob* or *focus imaginarius* status. My answer to this way of escape I can best put in the form of a criticism of Kant. This criticism has been suggested to me by reading Norman Kemp Smith's *Commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason.* Its essence is that these are two tendencies in Kant, a sceptical and an idealist, and that one or the other must have its way entirely. Kant was convinced by the history of metaphysics that no science of metaphysics was possible; he was also convinced by the history of natural science that this is possible (for it is actually in being). Being then convinced, or all but convinced, of the fact, he was not too exacting when he found what seemed like a theory which seemed to place the boundary of the knowable in about the right place. That is so as to include Science, which has no enemies; and to exclude Theology, which has no friends. I say "what seemed a theory," because to limit knowledge to the sphere of possible experience is merely to limit it to objects which in some undefined respect are like material things, and I cannot see that this limitation need exclude anything in heaven or on earth. If an electron is includable, why not an angel.

If Kant's sceptical tendency had had its way he would have professed a solipsism of the specious present, or less than that; he would have allowed only *als ob* reality to other human minds (are these objects of possible experience?) to all the absent in space, and to all the past in time. He would have said that the historical reality of Queen Elizabeth consists in the present being "as if" she had preceded it. I knew a priest who used to say that Adam might have been created with a half-digested pork chop from last night's dinner in his stomach. I suppose the wine of Çana of Galilee had a specious past, and that some local connoisseur may have rolled it round his tongue and identified the vintage.[1]

So far, then, for Kant's sceptical tendency. Now as to his rationalist or idealist tendency. If this had had its way, he would have made the ideas and then the Ideal of Reason dominate and measure the sensible world. He would have allowed the sensible world such reality so conditioned as the ideas prescribe for it, and *not conversely*.[2]

[1] It is, says my authority, ". . . not as having existed in itself, that even the immemorial past course of the world can be represented as real . . . a similar interpretation has to be given to all propositions which assert the present reality of that which has never been actually experienced" (*Commentary*, p. 503). The passages from Kant which are quoted in support are from the *Antimony of Pure Reason*, sec. vi (Kemp Smith's translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 442, Kant, A 496, B 524).

[2] Our awareness of the conditioned as being conditioned presupposes, over and above the categories, an antecedent awareness of Ideal standards; and to that latter more fundamental form of consciousness all our criteria of truth and reality are ultimately due" (*Commentary*, p. 416). I wish to reiterate that I do not advance this as a substantive criticism of Kant. I am not competent.

Of the two apparent options open to Kant, one, the sceptical, is really self-negating. If we follow the second way to the end we have to crown it *vi formae* by positing the inaccessible and indispensable Ideal of Reason, first as exemplar cause of the whole realm of essences, the absolute and separate unity of all multiplicity. The universal to become definite must become substantial and separate, (see Stout, *op. cit.*, p. 218), but to get what we want as we want it we should have to pass the off scale of being *at the upper end.* God therefore is known as unknown, present as absent, immanent as transcendent, satisfying as baffling, intimate as ultimate baffling.

Then, since however long we go on determining this world of essences, beginning from a mere schema and tending towards concreteness, we can never in this way clothe it with actual existence, and since actual existence is given as a fact (and is also implied as the ideal limit of fully determined essence), we have to endow the Ideal of Reason with a function corresponding to the bestowal of actuality on the inherently only possible. This function in an intelligence, and a subsistent intelligible is self-intelligible, is causality through will. The Ideal of Reason as the seat of efficient causality is therefore actual. God as the *total* cause of beings which are not capable of entering into an additive relation to Him is Absolute Being, Creator *ex nihilo.* Grand Separé, Ganz Andere, Cor Cordium. A monistic construction of reality is impossible because it does not allow of a successful expression of the negativity which is indubitably there. A dualistic construction denies the indispensable absoluteness of the Absolute. Theism is able to do justice to the finite and to the infinite, to provide, as it were, a proper place for each so that neither have finite things to be depressed into appearances or illusions in the interest of the integrity of the Absolute, nor has the Absolute to be dissipated to maintain the reality of appearances.

The status of creaturehood solves an otherwise insoluble philosophical riddle. The creature is no *other* to God, and thus dualism is avoided. The creature is not nothing, and thus acosmism is escaped.[1]

But I have as a convenient device presented my ideas in the form of a criticism which, as a criticism, may or may not hit the mark. My main point is that if we are to respect reason at all we must go all the way with it, and must let it and it alone prescribe its limits. Either we must surrender ourselves unreservedly to the implication of the primary object and take what it gives to us as the standard and not as the subject of judgment, or else we must deny it from the beginning, and then, except as a result of inconsequence, we shall have no available beginning to deny it from.

[1] Two criticisms of Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* show what a difficulty he had in dealing with Appearances which he was not willing to substantiate into Creatures. Professor Pringle-Pattison in an early review illustrated Bradley's treatment of Appearances by quoting from Tacitus, "they make a solitude and call it peace." Mr. Schiller gave one of his anti-absolutist gibes the title, "On preserving Appearances."

I am aware of the danger that, in this last part, I may appear to some to have been indulging in sterile logic-chopping. Let me therefore in conclusion sum up so as to try to show that the logical interest of the last part is continuous with the religious interest of the first part. (1) What the primary object implies is inseparable from what it is. (2) The primary object objectively and solicitously, though not in the early stages as a matter of subjective appreciation, implies God in such and such capacities, (3) It is impossible to produce a fully satisfying description of the primary object, one which expresses it intimately, except by making patent the tension of implication which is latent in it. (4) There are three techniques for releasing this implication. In all of them the mind and the effect form a conservative system, and assistance from without, though indispensable, is purely ministerial and obstetric. (5) What logical eduction yields is an abstract or extract of the more massive and polydimensional satisfaction which is yielded by meditation.

The whole personality of the Saint is the vehicle of a development which is reproduced schematically in the intelligence of the Philosopher

KANT'S ETHICAL FORMALISM

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THE generally accepted interpretation of Kant's formula "act only on that maxim which thou canst at the same time will to be a universal law," is roughly as follows:—

Our moral experience is fundamentally a consciousness of the difference between Duty and Inclination, between "doing what we ought to whether we like to or not, and doing merely what we like whether we ought to or not."[1] When we have open to our choice different acts, there are some which we would like to do, others we would not like to do, and perhaps others towards which we are indifferent; or we like to do any one of them, or we may dislike all, or we may be indifferent to all. But we must ignore our inclinations, our aversions, our attractions, and our indifferences. We must ask ourselves which of the acts open to our choice *ought* we to do, no matter what our feelings in the matter may be. But how are we to know what act we *ought* to do? Since our inclinations are no guide to what we *ought* to do, i.e. no guide to what our duty is, we must derive our knowledge of what our duty is from reason. It is the function of reason to concern itself with law. In the sciences reason tries to discover the laws which connect together all phenomena; in the sphere of human action, the function of reason is to prescribe law in accordance with which man ought to conduct his life. But what law of conduct does reason as the source of our moral guidance tell us to conform to? All men ought to do their duty, therefore all men can; and if they all can, then all must know what their duty is. Duty must therefore be a law which is known by all. The only law which can be known by all is the abstract form of law, or the general nature of law itself. The general nature of law is that it holds universally. We ought only to do that act which we can will to be a universal law.

Furthermore, Kant's distinction between the motives of our acts and their consequences is understood somewhat as follows: The consequences of our acts consist in those concrete values which are related to human needs. If I tell the truth, I satisfy someone's need to know; if I give away a loaf of bread, I satisfy someone's need to eat. But the concrete values should never be the motives of my act. Even if my act will secure some particular good thing for others, or even for all mankind, such as health, for example,

[1] Professor Hoernlé's lecture notes quoted from memory.

the securing of this particular good thing should never be the reason why I act as I do. In other words, when I select out a particular act as one I ought to do, my reason for selecting it should never be that it will make anyone wiser, or healthier, or happier. I must ignore whatever consequences my act may have. My sole reason for selecting out any particular act as my duty should be that it is intrinsically capable of being conceived of us a universal law; as an embodiment of the principle that what I conceive of as obligatory for me, I must be able to conceive of as obligatory for all, no matter what results from fulfilling such an obligation. Reason demands of all men conformity to the same laws, not because such conformity would increase human happiness, but because conformity is an end in itself. All men should, *qua* moral beings, be treated alike, irrespective of what effect such-like treatment will have upon our human needs and desires, because such-like treatment is an end in itself. I cannot secure this like treatment, but I can at any rate do that which would be required of me if such-like treatment were established. My motive would be "like treatment for all as an end in itself"—treatment not to be considered with reference to its consequences.

Finally, the object of Kant's examples in which he illustrates the application of his moral formula is usually taken to be this, viz., to show how, independently of social traditions or moral upbringing, we can pick out from all the possible actions open to our choice those which alone could be moral duties for anybody. If this conventional interpretation of Kant's theory be correct, then Kant's ethics is ludicrous. In order to make sense of Kant's theory I feel compelled to give it a fresh interpretation and to criticize his commentators.

My objection to the conventional interpretations and criticisms of Kant's formula is that they are preoccupied with its value as a practical guide, and that they misunderstand the kind of guidance Kant meant his formula to afford. This misunderstanding is due to a misunderstanding of his formalism as expressed in his dictum, and illustrated in his examples.

The aim of this article is to show that the primary aim of Kant's formula and of his examples is not to provide us with a rule of thumb which can be the sole and complete guide of our conduct, but to express scientifically the essence of morality and to illustrate its nature.

I shall show what kind of guidance Kant's formulistic conception of duty *can* give. I shall then show that if we believe in an absolute standard of duty, unvarying and alike for all, we can yet maintain that different individuals and different peoples might have their own ideas as to what their particular duties are, and yet all alike

be moral if they act in accordance with their consciences. Finally, we shall suggest why, and in what sense, Kant believed that if we listen to our consciences we must all necessarily come to recognize the same duties.

Every act may be viewed from two standpoints: (*a*) from the standpoint of the particular changes the act is intended to effect and the part these changes might possibly play in promoting the good of humanity; (*b*) from the standpoint of the impartiality and disinterestedness with which the act is undertaken, i.e. from the standpoint of the principle. We must therefore apply two standards in judging the worth of an act: (*a*) how far will what we intend to do promote the good of mankind; (*b*) did we honestly believe that our act would help to make human life better and happier, and is this why we undertook it, or did we undertake the act because it suited ourselves or because it might benefit someone in whose favour we happen to be prejudiced? These two standpoints are not identical. The first will vary with different individuals according to their insight into what constitutes the true good of mankind. The second standpoint is absolute. Did the agent ignore the effects his act might have upon himself, or upon those whom his feelings tend to favour, and did he judge, well or ill, from an impartial point of view that the changes he intended to effect would really be good for mankind? Judged by the effects an act really has upon the happiness of mankind, it may be worthless. But judged from the standpoint of the man's will to promote the good of mankind, the act may be morally good.

When Kant applies the test of consistency he really means "Is the act I intend to do consistent with my nature as a reasonable and therefore an impartial being?" If I am to act morally, then reason and not my likes and dislikes should be the motive of my conduct. The function of Reason is to take an objective standpoint. If we are to act consistently with our nature as rational beings, we must not measure the value of an act and judge its right to be effected by its appeal to our feelings, prejudices, and self-interest. We must transcend the subjective point of view and try to discover if an act is really worth while doing whether we like it or not. Although we ignore our likes and dislikes and our prejudices, our reason may fail to come to a true decision as to what is objectively the best, but we can, at any rate, be impartial, according to our lights and therefore reasonable. A reasonable man may have a very imperfect conception of what is best for the welfare of mankind, but he may know when he is reasonable and impartial, and this reasonableness is the most important element of man's true good. To make mistakes is not inconsistent with our nature as rational creatures, but to put our own interests or those of our favourites first is. There is

no absolute standard by means of which we can test whether any action is, under the circumstances, the best suited to improve human life. But there may be an absolute standard of reasonableness or impartiality. All men may know what reasonableness is, and be able to attain to it, and reasonableness may be the same whenever found, although it may find expression in different acts and may be variously enlightened as to what are the best acts in which to display itself. Can we state clearly the essence of reasonableness or impartiality so that we may test whether or not we have acted in a spirit of reasonableness, quite apart from the question, "Is what we have actually done really going to improve human life?" Of course, if we are reasonable we will try to find out if what we propose to do is really going to improve life, and our criterion of reasonableness must be able to test if we have really done our best to find out; but our moral criterion cannot tell us whether what we think best really is so. With these preliminary remarks we may turn to Kant's conception of the essence of morality as expressed in the formula, "act only on that maxim, etc.," and try to show that *Kant intended this formula as a criterion of reasonableness; as a test of our principles and not as a rule of thumb by means of which we can without fail single out those acts which alone can be an expression of the good will.*

Kant's formula merely attempts to make precise that minimum amount of knowledge which is possessed *a priori* by every rational being, and enables him to live a moral life. To be moral we must be fair and square in our dealings; we must genuinely *judge* what is the best we can do, instead of doing what we want to and finding moral excuses for it afterwards. In a word, we must act in accordance with the spirit of reason. Now Kant holds that we cannot be acting reasonably and impartially unless we are willing that, what we propose to do, should become a universal law. By asking ourselves, "Can I will that this act should become a universal law?" we rise to the rational plane; we examine an act from a *universal* or impartial standpoint. If I really believe an act is supremely good, then I I would be only too glad to see it become a general practice, *i.e.* a universal law. If I am unwilling that my act become a universal law, it means that I do not really believe the act is good for all, but good only for me or from my point of view, *i.e.* only subjectively and not objectively good. By applying Kant's formula then we can test whether we have really *judged* the value of what we have purposed to do, from an impartial point of view. The rejoinder which most readily suggests itself is this: It is our duty to do the best *under the circumstances*; but that does not mean that if we judge a particular line of action to be the best in the circumstances, we must be able to wish that everybody would do likewise at all times; for under different circumstances the act will have a different value.

But, as we shall see later on, this criticism has force only if we think of the act in a very specific way. When Kant says we must be able to universalize our acts, he is thinking of those acts which are always a means to some ultimate end which all recognize as good, or of the quite general act of promoting the ultimate end. The acts which we cannot universalize, and which we may nevertheless feel morally obliged to do, Kant regards as variable means. For the time being it is sufficient to mention this point, as it will be discussed in full later on.

To sum up: May Kant not really have meant, though he does not explicitly say so, that the changes we will to effect are objectively good or bad? They cannot be both (it is possible, of course, that part of the changes may be good, and part bad), and that an act is morally right if it is directed towards the disinterested promotion of what appears to us to be the greatest amount of objective good. If we are aiming at the disinterested promotion of what we really believe to be the greatest amount of objective good, we would will that all aimed at the same objective good we are trying to promote. The rightness of our act is affected neither by the value of the results which do actually follow nor by the soundness of our judgment with regard to what we believe to be the greatest amount of objective good. Is there not underlying Kant's theory an extremely objectivistic theory of value, viz., that if we judge an act to be the best possible, we must believe that it is best for all to do it? If I really believe an object is square, I must believe it is square not merely for me, but for all; it is the same with regard to objective values. If we would not wish to see others do as we are doing, it means that we really think that our act had better be excluded from human conduct; this is tantamount to believing that the act is really bad, but we propose to do it because it happens to suit us or those in whose favour we are prejudiced.

But the willingness to promote the good impartially cannot by itself tell us what is good and worth promoting. Whence do we derive the conception of a good the willingness to promote which, disinterestedly and impartially, constitutes our moral goodness? Certain possible acts must first of all suggest themselves to us. These suggestions come from our various needs and experiences through which certain ends come to appear worth while. We require experience and that employment of reason in which it compares and correlates in order to arrive at the conception of values in relation to which we must take up an objective point of view. There is nothing in Kant's formula against his holding that our choices will vary with our experiences and our powers of comparing and correlating one value with another. But we cannot judge how good or bad a man is from the *moral point of view* by

what he *believes* to be the best he can do, or by what he achieves. All that we are entitled to extract from Kant's formula, so far, is that it cannot be morally right to aim at any ideal unless we can uphold it as an ideal for all. If we recognize an ideal as worthy of being realized, we should regard its realization as an obligation to be adhered to, and not sneak out of the obligation when it happens to inconvenience us or our friends. This would be putting our own convenience or that of our friends first, which is unfair and therefore immoral.

If we now turn to Kant's examples we shall see how readily they yield to the interpretation suggested in this article, and we shall understand why he seems to apply his formula, quite arbitrarily, in a negative way. However mistaken Kant may be in his notion of what constitutes impartiality, however mistaken he may be in his adherence to an extreme objectivistic theory of values, and however confused he becomes when he tends to regard the objective attitude itself as the only objective value, the function of his examples is to bring out the contrast between being biased or irrational, which is the essence of immorality, and being impartial or reasonable, which is the essence of morality; a contrast we often hide from ourselves both when selfishness inclines us to act contrary to what conscience or impartiality commands, and also when it does not.

The reason why Kant does not show the positive application of his formula is that his examples presuppose this application. His examples are instances of obligations we recognize, but from which we propose to exempt ourselves because they press heavily on us. Kant then proceeds to show that this exempting ourselves is immoral because motived by partisanship, as may be shown by applying the test of impartiality.

Immorality implies a recognition of what, from an impartial point of view, appears to us to be right and a resolve to do something else. This exempting of ourselves, so Kant believed, means that we shut our ears to the voice of reason and give way to a weakness we have for ourselves or for our favourites. We recognize the obligation to be impartial and yet act from partisan motives. The incompatibility is between two different motives. But motives are the inner aspect of conduct and do not disclose themselves unmistakably in our acts. A tradesman may believe that it is a duty to be honest, but at the same time he himself may be honest because it happens to prosper his business. A selfish act may, from an external point of view, be the same as that which our conscience requires of us. It is from the inner side, from the point of view of motives, that the two are opposed. But the opposition cannot be illustrated forcefully when both motives lead to the same act. On the other

hand, if what selfishness inclines us to do is opposed to what our conscience requires of us, then it is easier to illustrate the incompatibility between impartiality and favouritism, justice and injustice; an incompatibility we try to hide from ourselves because if we see it we are in a dilemma: Either we may uphold our dignity as a moral being by fulfilling our obligation and sacrificing a cherished wish, or we may satisfy our selfish wish at the expense of our moral integrity. Suppose our hypothetical tradesman who recognizes honesty as a moral obligation, but fulfils his obligation from selfish motives, finds that he is being ruined, but can save himself by dishonesty. If now he decides to cheat because he thinks that under the circumstances he is justified in exempting himself from the obligation to be honest, we can show that he is acting contrary to the spirit of impartiality, which must be wrong if impartiality is right. In this way we can illustrate the incompatibility between the two motives of all human conduct, favouritism, which to Kant is always favouritism towards oneself, and impartiality. Our tradesman, as an impartial judge, believes that all men ought to be honest, and yet shirks the common obligation when it happens to be troublesome to him. His conscience is opposed to his actual conduct. But he will probably not only shirk the obligation he recognizes, he will probably say to himself, "I recognize the obligation to be honest, but under the circumstances I feel justified in exempting myself." There will then be a contradiction in the man's soul. A contradiction is always a sign of falsity, and the falsity here is moral evil; a "lie in the soul." The man is moved by two contradictory motives, neither of which he can whole-heartedly surrender. But that he has acted from a partisan motive, and has therefore really surrendered the moral principle to which he has paid only lip service, may be shown as follows: Would he be willing to see cheating become a general practice? Certainly not if he is proposing to cheat from selfish motives. For then he puts his interests first, and he cannot at the same time be willing that others should try to hinder him in his selfish purpose, by cheating in favour of *their* interests. His motive will not stand the test of impartiality, and must therefore be selfish. We cannot be impartial in our selfishness. If it is right for me to be selfish, then it must be right for all. But this is a self-contradictory proposition, for if my interests come first, the interest of others cannot also be first.

Kant's theory, as far as we have examined it, does not necessarily imply that every man who wills to do good must arrive at the same judgment with regard to what in particular ought to be done. A complete ethical theory ought to show as far as possible who the good will may enlighten itself with regard to the end it ought to promote. But this problem belongs rather to applied Ethics

than to the metaphysical basis of Ethics. The *Critique of Pure Reason* shows that our scientific knowledge is based on the Causal Principle, and tries to justify the validity of this principle. The causal principle cannot tell us what the particular cause is of any particular event, and it is not the business of pure logic to show how we can get a content for our empty form, "Every event must have a cause." But at any rate we cannot suppose a set of conditions as the cause of an event, if such a supposition is directly inconsistent with the causal principle. For example, if the conditions are found to be absent while the event is present, it would be nonsense to speak of them as the cause of the event, saying that sometimes they are the cause and sometimes not. This amounts to a denial of the causal principle. Similarly, it is not the business of a treatise on the "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals" to point out what ends a reasonable man ought to promote. We can no more state dogmatically what conditions are best suited for the promotion of man's complete good than we can say with absolute certainty what the particular causes of particular events must be. In the *Metaphysics of Ethics* we are dealing with the nature and justification of first principles, viz. the *a priori* principle of conduct considered in abstraction from the particulars to which it has to be applied. Our loyalty to this principle, which constitutes our moral goodness, does not vary with the various applications of the principle. Furthermore, this purely formal principle does not leave us without *all* specific guidance, for in a sense the command "Be impartial" does tell us what to do. It prescribes one act at least which is obligatory upon all, namely, "Be reasonable and not prejudiced in whatever you do." This is in itself an act. It is that inner decision of the will for which we are ourselves entirely responsible, because we do not depend on experience to teach us what this act of good will is, nor how to do it. Nor does this act change, however much, with increasing knowledge and experience, the channels in which the good will issues may change. This guiding of the good will is the variable element in the moral life, and depends on factors other than the good will itself. Now while admitting that the absoluteness of dutifulness is compatible with different opinions as to what our particular duties are, we might nevertheless argue that there will be a tendency to recognize common moral obligations.

We will come to a working agreement about certain ends, and therefore about certain general laws which will on the whole secure the promotion of those ends. It may be that of no law can we say that it ought to hold always. But law there must be. We can but frame such laws as appear best to our limited wisdom and abide by them. If someone should think that the generally recognized

body of laws is bad, that does not mean he should be allowed to make a change which from an impartial point of view he believes to be good, if the laws forbid the change. His impartiality would be a mistaken one, he would be favouring his own judgment; nor would he be impartial if he forced on others a change which he alone wanted, even though he believed it to be one which ought ultimately to be made, *e.g.*, if he lived in a country in which people had conscientious objections to giving children sex instruction, he would not be justified in instructing all children he came in contact with, no matter how much he realized what harm is caused by being secretive about sex. He would at most have the right to persuade others to his point of view, and thus perhaps be instrumental in bringing about a new general agreement.

While then the formal commandment to be impartial need not lead to absolutely uniform and unchanging laws everywhere, yet in so far as men obey the commandment it does tend towards some uniformity. Even where we have different societies obeying different laws, there will be a tendency towards uniformity. Different societies are bound to come into contact with each other, and under the repeated urgings of conscience the members of the different groups will recognize each other as moral beings. Their sense of duty or impartiality will lead to co-operation for the formation of general laws for all.

On the other hand, we must remember that all that our formal moral principle can tell us is the spirit in which we must conduct our lives, it does not and need not by itself tell us what in particular we must do. We have all of us to be guided by experience as embodied in the social traditions into which we are born. It is highly improbable that Kant meant that his formula was a means by which any individual could, on his own initiative, draw up his own moral code for the guidance of his conduct. But this limitation of conscience to the merely formal injunction "Be impartial" is no defect as far as morality is concerned. The *a priori* conception of duty may be an infallible guide to the moral aspect of our lives, though not a complete guide to the whole of life. It can tell us in what spirit we must act, but not what acts we must do. However changing and defective our knowledge may be with respect to what acts we ought to do, it is not defective with respect to the spirit in which we should do them.

We may interpret Kant then in such a way as to allow for the absoluteness of the obligation to be dutiful, without denying that man's opinions as to what in particular ought to be considered obligations may vary and improve, and without justifying moral anarchy on the grounds of the relativity of moral ideas. But why then did Kant insist that we must all *necessarily* recognize the same

moral obligations, if he did insist on this? We have shown how on Kant's theory we can explain a tendency to uniformity, but no more than a tendency, which in fact has not resulted in complete uniformity of social codes. But why, or rather let us ask, in what sense does Kant believe that every conscience which is honest with itself must recognize the same moral laws?

The first line of thought is somewhat as follows: We should select as duties and make obligatory those acts which are absolutely necessary for the promotion of that ultimate end which we all recognize as indisputably good, *e.g.* human happiness. But, it would seem, if acts are to be selected only in so far as they promote certain ends, such acts cannot be made into rigid laws, because the exact repetition of an act which at one time secures the required end may quite fail to do so when circumstances have changed. We may, however, avoid the difficulty, if we take our act abstractly enough, *e.g.* promote the happiness of mankind. Such an abstract law allows of a great variety of different acts, all of the same general type in that they are all directed to the same end. In fact, our duties will be expressed in terms of general ends (those ends which are ingredients of happiness) rather than in terms of either particular acts or general types of acts. The different acts which are required at different times for the promotion of happiness may be regarded as means to happiness, although they are really the changing constituents of happiness. We might then say that it is the means (*i.e.* our particular duties) which are relative, but the ultimate end and the moral obligation to promote it is absolute. These means are hypothetical imperatives, their imperativeness is conditioned by the Categorical Imperative of Duty which we may now express in terms of an end, namely "promote human happiness." What we shall consider as means will be conditioned by our circumstances and knowledge, so that our particular duties are conditioned both with respect to their content and to their obligatoriness. But through these changing means we express our dutifulness, our will to promote happiness; this will is an absolute good, an end in itself, apart from the happiness which it may or may not succeed in promoting.

In support of this interpretation of Kant's thought, the following extract may be given from his *Metaphysical Elements of Ethics*, Section III, Of the Reason for Conceiving an End which is also a Duty. (Abbot's Translation, page 295.)

"An *end* is an *object* of the free elective will, the idea of which determines this will to an action by which the object is produced. Accordingly every action has its end. . . . Now since this act which determines an end is a practical principle which commands not the means (therefore not conditionally), but the end in itself (therefore unconditionally), hence it is a

categorical imperative of pure practical reason, and one therefore which combines a *concept* of *duty* with that of an end in general.

"Now there must be such an end and a categorical imperative corresponding to it. For since there are free actions there must also be ends to which, as an object, those actions are directed. Among these ends there must also be some which are at the same time (that is by that very notion) duties. For if there were none such, then since no actions can be without an end, all ends which practical reason might have would be valid only as a means to other ends, and a categorical imperative would be impossible; a supposition which destroys all moral philosophy.

"Here, therefore, we treat not of ends which man actually *makes* to himself in accordance with the sensible impulses of his nature, but of objects of the free elective will under its own laws—objects which he *ought to make his end.*"

What are the Ends which are also Duties? They are: our own Perfection; the Happiness of Others. Kant then goes on to point out that we cannot invert these and claim that it is also our duty to promote our own happiness and the perfection of others. Duty implies constraint, and we cannot force ourselves to promote our own happiness, for we are naturally inclined to do so; then again it is impossible to promote the perfection of others because this perfection is an end which they must choose of their own accord. This point, however, does not concern us here. The passage quoted is in agreement with Hume's statement that "no act is virtuous or morally good unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it distinct from the sense of its morality," a statement which *does* imply, even though it does not emphasize it, that "the sense of its morality" should form part of the total motive. Kant would of course have insisted on emphasizing "the sense of its morality." We should promote the happiness of others because this happiness is a good which ought to be. On the other hand it is not the only good; the disinterested *will* to promote happiness impartially is itself a good, and the making of this act of will is of more value than the happiness it might foster.

Kant does, however, insist that there are certain acts much more specific than the very general act "promote the happiness of others," which duty requires of us, *e.g.* telling the truth. But he does so insist because he regards such specific acts as necessary means to happiness, and therefore necessarily required of all men who *will* to promote the happiness of mankind. Telling the truth is good because it is always a means to happiness; it is therefore a particular embodiment of the *will* to do good which cannot be varied. In his article "On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives," Kant writes that if I tell a lie to save the life of an innocent man from a murderer, then though I may be doing no wrong to the murderer, and I am benefiting the innocent man, yet by making a false statement . . . I do wrong to mankind in general in the

most essential point of duty, for I wilfully cause, so far as it lies in my power . . . that declarations in general find no credit, and hence that all rights founded on contract should lose their force, and this is a wrong which is done to mankind. A lie . . . always injures another; if not another individual, yet mankind generally, since it vitiates the foundations of justice, upon which, we may add, the happiness of mankind depends. My duty to tell the truth may conflict with my duty to promote the happiness of others, because I am considering the happiness of only a limited number. If I take a long enough view, then it may become apparent that strict veracity is a *sine qua non* of the happiness of mankind in general.

What justification has Kant for assuming that we know *a priori* any end which is also a duty; that there is any end which by its very notion must be a duty? Then again can Kant really prove that the particular acts which he chooses and regards as invariable means to these ends are always so, and that these different means will never conflict? These questions may legitimately be raised, but they are irrelevant to this paper.

In conclusion we may trace another line of thought which underlies the "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals." In the "Fundamental Principles," Kant tends to regard impartiality, the objective attitude, or the *will* to do good, as itself the only objective value. The value of the particular ends which the good will sets before itself is relative to human desires. Particular acts are means through which the good will tries to promote the happiness of others. But our knowledge of the means is extremely uncertain, and our ability to effect them very limited. Not the best will in the world can do much to promote human happiness. But not only is there very little happiness; what is still more regrettable is that its distribution is so unfair.

On the other hand, man's sense of justice demands equity. If we could satisfy our sense of justice only by an equitable distribution of the joys and sorrows of life among all, then our craving for justice is in a sorry plight. It seems to be humanly impossible to establish this equity. How then is our sense of justice to be satisfied? We may give up all attempt at a fair distribution of happiness in life and seize upon something we can distribute equally, namely, certain obligations which we can all fulfil. No matter what intrinsic or instrumental value these obligations may have, by requiring the same tasks from all, we can display our impartiality. If anyone refuses to take his fair share, nevertheless the fair share is there for him to take. We cannot in the same way apportion to each man his fair share of happiness and say to him, "if you are miserable and unhappy, it is your own fault; your share was there and you

can't complain of being unfairly treated." But if all are to fulfil the same obligations, although this fulfilment increases the happiness of some and the miseries of others, the assignment of the same tasks to all would seem to be anything but an equitable distribution. We may solve this difficulty by regarding happiness and unhappiness as of no importance, and forthwith ignoring them. If we make ourselves believe that neither joy nor sorrow matters very much, a law which causes joy to some and sorrow to others will cease to be unfair. If the spirit of impartiality is the only thing which counts, then it does not matter what laws we make nor what effect the laws may have as long as we require all to fulfil the same laws. Laws which require the same tasks of all will give us an opportunity of showing our impartiality by voluntarily accepting these same tasks, and in comparison with this spirit of impartiality, joy ceases to have much value and sorrow loses its sting.

True enough some will make the attainment of joy and the avoidance of suffering their chief aim in life; they will therefore try to exempt themselves or others from the common obligations if thereby they can bring some joy into life or diminish some suffering. These are the great betrayers. They have dared to emphasize the value of happiness, and have thereby reminded us of the good things of life which we have denied in the interests of a fictitious justice. These traitors threaten to take away the peace which we have attained by crying "sour grapes" to happiness, and by consoling ourselves with a sterile equity. But we will console ourselves, nevertheless, and count ourselves better off with our righteousness than they with their joys of life. Besides, we have renounced happiness for awhile only. We shall have our reward hereafter, whereas they have had their reward already without paying for it by doing their joyless duty. But they will have to pay for it yet. Perhaps it is some such compensatory psychological process which has partly vitiated Kant's ethical thinking. It is fairly obvious in most rigoristic moralists, and it also seems to fit in with Kant's rigoristic tendencies. Kant would, of course, never have agreed that we may make any laws we like, provided we all agree to abide by them. Kant does seem to have upheld a particular moral code as the only true one, a moral code which, if taken quite generally, seems to have been widely recognized throughout the history of mankind. But, like most of us, he absorbed this code unreflectingly early in life, and with it the sentiments with which it was regarded by those responsible for his moral upbringing. His ethical theory, or at least a certain phase of it, is an attempt to find "bad reasons for what he already believed on instinct." In trying to justify his feelings of approval for a particular moral code, he found he could not justify them on the

grounds that this moral code was a means to human happiness. Thus the moral code he approved became for him solely the expression of man's good will or will to be fair and law-abiding, and in this, it seemed to Kant, lay not only the primary, but also the sole value of the moral code.

THE METAPHYSICS OF WONDER AND SURPRISE

By R. V. FELDMAN, M.A.

PHILOSOPHERS, accounted wise in their generation and even beyond their generation, have enthroned the unchanging and sung the praises of fatality and acquiescence. But there is a voice even more authoritative than that of the sages—the voice of the Life-Shaper himself. Perched on the height of the human soul, he has set two watchmen, more sagacious and knowing than the Metaphysicians who weave words "About it and about" in the taverns beneath; their names are Wonder and Surprise. Wonder spies out novelty, and Surprise discerns change. Wonder arises at that which is *beyond* expectation; Surprise at that which is *contrary to* expectation. What could completely surpass expectation save the completely novel? What could so drastically dismantle expectation save the hurricane onset of change?

To attach a revelatory significance to spokesmen of the soul so humble as immediate emotions may seem risky; and risky it possibly is. Yet is Philosophy so well off that she can afford to ignore any by-path to the real? The fatalist who accepts all ought to accept, at least as a venture, the possibility that nature (I had almost said Providence) has endowed Wonder and Surprise with oracles that tell no lies. Are the emotions such faulty spies of the promised land? Just as boredom tells us truly that the organism needs a change, may not Wonder and Surprise tell us truly that the Real is on the move and has fresh miracles up its sleeve?

It may be said that the naïver promptings are not blind; but, even so, they must be superseded by the "larger vision" of Philosophy. Yet it would be strange if those extended poems which we call Philosophy were allowed to gag or stifle the more spontaneous oracles. Philosophy itself (as Plato knew so well) is a child of Wonder. All invention and science are the offspring of the Surprise that prompts curiosity to ask questions and explore. Are we melodramatically to posit a pre-established disharmony in which the children are invited to parenticide? Is Philosophy wantonly to upset the bowl from which she herself drinks the waters of life?

We have been content, so far, simply to suggest that the testimony of "immediate" emotions, such as Wonder and Surprise, should be treated with respect. That this particular track is not without pitfalls is painfully obvious. What these pitfalls are we shall

indicate further on. But, the reader may enquire, what is our metaphysical interest in such a wild-goose chase? The answer is, that we humans seem rather badly off when we examine our intellectual tentacles into the Real, and that therefore the evidence of any fresh witness should not be overlooked. We have already learnt from Locke that, though we know our station and its duties sufficiently well to live a life pleasing both to God and Man, we run up against obstacles when we meddle beyond. "Critical" Philosophy, in its turn, has confronted Speculation with a "So far and so far only" notice. Nowadays, Biologism rubs in our Metaphysical ignorance. Our senses, our instincts, our intellections are all instruments of adaptation; our vision has been constricted in order that we may survive. Some philosophers, indeed, proudly credit the mind with a long list of indigenous categories. What more can we want? But if identity, difference, causality, etc., are offered us in abstraction from experience, we dangle nought but notional luxuries. Such collocations of adjustable terms are delightful to analyse, but they do not lead us beyond our own thoughts. If, on the other hand, we predicate them of experience, we are never sure if they are rightly applied. Identity is identity, but what we treat as identical may really not be so. Our notions are neat and simple, but we may manipulate them with clumsy fingers. Other philosophers favour Intuition, but their opponents must be allowed the intuition that this Intuition is an honorific name for irresistible beliefs for which we are too lazy or too wise to seek the reasons. The future is unknown, but it is comforting to delude ourselves that we possess a private insight into the "Not-Yet" Others, again, endow "Practical Reason" with wings by which she soars aloft into the Transcendental; but though all agree that "Right is Right," or "one ought to do one's duty," the thing that interests us is the actual situation, and we are never certain that any of our actions was unconditionally right: "With God alone is the truth."

Our range of certitudes is thus very limited, and those that we possess hold good of abstract formulae or significant collocations of words. This poverty of our resources I have stated "maliciously," captiously, and somewhat too much in the manner of an advocate. But I have done so purposely, in order to send up the price of any information given by a fresh source. Let us at this point ascertain the rôle of Wonder and Surprise.

Our lives are governed by expectations and anticipations built into the soul by need, convention, and routine. Expectations are unruffled and faint; anticipations are more eager and vividly coloured. But both alike, be they relaxed or keyed up, presuppose a fixed order of things into which the future will fit. Events which

are likely to be "Non-Conformist" do not trouble their calculations. Pleasure and pain, success or unsuccess, we come to take for granted, and each outflowing, as it springs to the surface, we tend to attribute unconcernedly to the fixed and immutable scheme of things. Yet, against ourselves, against our interest, against the propaganda of fixity, which the mere stress of living drums into our ears, the Disposer of destinies pulls up the blinds and startles us in spite of ourselves. Change, bare, unqualitied change, darts suddenly before our gaze and evokes bare unqualitied Surprise: "Surprise-in-itself," neither pleasurable nor painful, but simply Surprise. Novelty, also, like a sudden raincloud, bursts upon us unforeseen and unawares, and from novelty, simple and unqualitied, arises the Wonder which is momentary, uncomplicated, and unmixed. Both attitudes, in their instantaneous apparition, are unadulterated either by pleasure or pain; and yet, as psychologists have insisted, they are such that, at their very inception, we succumb to an apprehension that shoots through and unsettles. Whence springs that less than painful malaise? The reason is that both alike overtake us "in spite of ourselves," not indeed contrary to what we desire, but contrary to what our mental habits might have led us to desire. "In spite of ourselves" they force us into wonderings externalized in gesture or let loose to ruminate through the mind. So much, indeed, are they "in spite of ourselves," contrary to our accustomed idolatry of the static, that we are surprised at our own surprise and wonder at our own wonder. We had drawn the curtains and retired snugly into our own "Nil admirari," when novelty, like the Cupid described by Anacreon and Herrick, stepped up to our door and "knocking, us molested."

I hinted above that certain pitfalls endangered an enquiry such as the present. The most insidious of these I shall now explain. The "relativity of our emotions"—who is not familiar with this phrase? It will be said that Surprise is simply "baffled curiosity" in the spectator, that wonder is nothing but a mental leak in a mind that yet has much to learn. With knowledge surprise evaporates, with experience wonder is pensioned off. Both are illusions that wisdom must smile away. Each argues an attitude in the subject, but neither discloses a quality in the object. Doubtless such an objection states what seems true of events when the initial upleaping has vanished and we review them again at a distance and in retrospect. Possibly the quality that was adjectival to the happening may itself be neither surprising nor wonderful. The essence that broke through that spurt of becoming may reject or disown our untutored valuations. But the actual moment of occurrence, the vanishing transience through which the essences broke loose as wild horses through some unfastened gate—these in their

bare suddenness and surface-breaking novelty were, I think, the true causes of the emotions that flashed up, lit their light, and passed away. Again, it should count in favour of Surprise and Wonder that they are what have been termed "Neutral emotions." They do not say "choose this" or "avoid that"; they are not predisposed to prefer one quality to the exclusion of another; they do not act as danger signals to the organism; their message is not sweetly tendencious in the interests of some vital well-being; they do not evaluate, they simply accept. May not such a disinterested receptivity have some keener organ of its own to seize the Real before preference has selected and sorted out?

A second objection might be this. The emotions seem too low in rank to possess an eye of their own. Subservient to organic conservation, they are but instrumental to faculties less preoccupied and more highly endowed. They are not feet to climb and peer beyond the wall, but simply ladders by which Reason, Insight, or whatever is first of the speculative aristocracy, may mount upward and look.

Such an *a priori* helotization of our passional attitudes might have seemed conclusive in some more tightly graduated age, when hierarchies were fixed and men believed in Reason and Reason alone. But nowadays the "landmarks are removed," and every faculty is given a chance and given likewise a high-sounding name. Even before Bergson we had heard of a "clarified sentience" for which no antinomies would remain. The phrase clung to our memory, but what precise mental attitude it denoted, what visions it would unfold, was less evident to the uninitiated. That it was more than a roundabout invitation to read writers Ruskinian or Pateresque we suspected, but further than such a suspicion our knowledge did not extend. Have not Wonder and Surprise something at least vaguely reminiscent of that Bradleyan term that comes to stay and remains to perplex? Are they not at least "Sentience" unmixed and unadulterated by self-feeling and the insignificance of actional valuations? "Clarified" indeed they are not: they are still ruffled and not smoothed out. But if not "clarified," they are at least clarificatory—the initial collision between convention and creativity which both challenges and reveals.

In the *Theaetetus* (155 D), Plato with characteristic grace says Thaumas (Wonder) was the father of Iris. This genealogy is all the more apt if we remember that Iris is the messenger of Heaven who penetrates into the Stygian realms which for us will symbolize conventional darkness and mental death. Wonder begets tidings that dazzle like the rainbow, uniting heaven and earth; and the divine powers to which it ministers are novelty and change. In another way also Wonder reminds us of the rainbow goddess. For

as the soul is agreeably stricken by Wonder, so also "our hearts leap up when we behold a rainbow in the sky."

Note.—I have not troubled in this article sharply to distinguish between Wonder and Surprise. Such distinctions are competently stated by Drever and Shand. There is no need to reduplicate what is already achieved. For the views of earlier moralists I would refer the reader to Brown's *Philosophy of the Human Mind*—an old-fashioned work which is meritorious enough to deserve mention but not arresting enough to deserve quotation.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

F. Enriques and G. de Santillana have begun in collaboration the composition of a general history of scientific thought. The first volume of this work, which has been recently published, is concerned with the science of antiquity,[1] and to a large extent covers the same ground as the history of ancient philosophy, as the frontiers of philosophy and natural science, at any rate until the time of Aristotle, were not yet clearly differentiated. But the two historians are interested in bringing into prominence a great many problems and personalities that the history of philosophy generally leaves on one side, although they help to complete and vivify the picture of the mentality of the ancients. Mathematics, medicine, geography, astronomy, applied mechanics, and physics, in short all the particular scientific studies that were just beginning to detach themselves from the parent trunk of general philosophy are studied by the authors in their individual developments and through the personalities of their cultivators. The explanations are clear and simple and can be followed even by readers unversed in science; the information is at first hand and is supplemented by a careful discussion of sources. The scientific questions are not isolated from the historical setting of the civilization of antiquity, but are shown in relation to matters of philosophy, religion, art, and moral and political life. The bibliography, intended for the more purely scientific and technical departments of philosophy, forms a very useful and timely completion of the bibliography of philosophic thought in general.

In the study of historical personalities traditionally numbered among the philosophers the authors follow the method introduced by Gomperz, Tannery, and Burnet, which consists in passing over the more dialectical and metaphysical aspects of their works in order to bring out more clearly their physical, astronomical, or biological significance. It is a method that has undeniable advantages; by its means the history of the presocratic thinkers, for example, has been thoroughly revised in the last decades. Previously it dallied too much with the formulas of abstract metaphysics, and by its very abstraction gave rise to fallacies and anachronisms in the transposition of ancient and modern problems. Present-day researches, on the other hand, by showing that those formulas were attached to well-defined physical views, have helped to objectify them in time and space, and have given them a more concrete sense. But these advantages are counterbalanced by corresponding defects, which consist in regarding as adventitious and negligible the dialectical and metaphysical translation of physical problems, although it is essential for fixing the logical structure of the physics of antiquity. The pure science of being and not-being, of the one and the many, of identity and difference, ought to be studied in its vital bearing on the physical problems of the empiric world, in order to gain a true understanding of Greek thought. Otherwise there is a risk of bringing in evidence only the modern anticipations of the science of antiquity, and of considering as an aberration or failure the whole *corpus* of Aristotelian physics and astronomy. The authors of the history

[1] F. Enriques e G. de Santillana, *Storia del pensiero scientifico*, vol. i: Il mondo antico, Milano, Treves, 1932 (8 gr., p. 682).

under review, like their predecessors, have not escaped this danger, which is inherent in the method. When they have to do with Parmenides, the Pythagoreans, Democritus, the scientists in the modern sense of the word, that is according to the modern ideal of science, they have not asked themselves why this science has waited twenty centuries before seeing the light which it was on the verge of greeting. The truth is that, behind the suggestive analogies with modern science pointed out by the authors, there were logical and metaphysical problems of a different kind, which came to be fixed afterwards in the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. These doctrines are compared by our authors with excessive haste and a somewhat negative judgment unsatisfactory to our historical sense. They concede to Plato some "formal" anticipation of the physico-mathematical science, but treat Aristotle somewhat cavalierly, and even omit to disclose the principles that informed his physics (for example, the conception of movement in his typical logical structure), confining themselves to retracing the more obvious aspects of his view of the world. They will be obliged to take cognizance of this deficiency when, in the course of their work, they come to study mediæval science, which is based wholly on the Aristotelian models.

A philosophical undertaking on a large scale has been begun in Italy in the translation of Zeller's classic *Philosophie der Griechen*. It is being continued down to our own times with the addition of notes and supplementary chapters. The first volume has already been published, under the editorship of Mondolfo, and comprises the introductory part of the work (relations with the Orient: internal and external sources; religious, moral, and social life; the characteristics of the Greek genius).[1] Mondolfo's additions bulk much larger than the original text and contain a precise and exhaustive critical survey of the whole philological and historical literature from 1891 (the date of Zeller's fifth edition) until the present day. A similar work had been partially effected in Germany by Lortzing and Nestle for the sixth and seventh German editions, but the Italian editor's completion is much fuller and is extremely useful for the student, as it sets before him, together with Zeller's standard text, all the most recent developments of particular philological and historical questions. In this introductory section the survey of studies in Greek religious thought and the Greek genius generally is of special importance. Zeller had denied or minimized the philosophical importance of the mystery religions, in particular the Orphic cult, and had been one of the most authoritative upholders of the "classical" view of the Greek world. Now all the most recent researches from Rohde onwards have successfully endeavoured to bring into prominence those elements of the Greek genius that we might call "romantic," which are most conspicuously in evidence in the mystery religions. The historical picture is thus greatly enriched, and Zeller's "classical" view—as Mondolfo appositely remarks—has been superseded in so far as it is one-sided, but not fundamentally disproved. Rather might it be said that it has acquired greater force by the very fact that "classical" form (the sense of limit, order, harmony, etc.) is not understood as an independent value but as a force that binds to itself a content of realistic and passional life and succeeds in triumphing over it. Greek idealism in this synthesis with realism acquires much more depth.

An important contribution to the history of political philosophy is made

[1] E. Zeller, *La filosofia dei Greci:* Parte I, I presocratici, vol. i: Origine, caratteri e periodi della filosofia greca, Traduzione e aggiornamento a cura di R. Mondolfo (La nuova Italia Editrice, Firenze, 1932, pp. xv, 425).

by two small works recently disinterred by Croce and composed in 1791 and 1793 by an Italian of Trieste, Antonio de Giuliani, an Austrian subject who studied with an alert and unprejudiced mind the political and economic vicissitudes of Europe in the period between the enlightened despotism of Joseph II and the outbreak of the French Revolution.[1] From his first writing, "*Saggio politico sopra le vicissitudini inevitabili delle societa civili*," Giuliani, who in his youth had shared in the generous illusions of illuministic rationalism, already appears disillusioned, as if he no longer believed in the power of reason to regulate and guide the course of human events. According to him, man believes that everything is guided by reason because he reasons on everything that happens. On the contrary, the forces that govern the interweaving of events are much more elemental and natural, and politicians are rather passive instruments than active artificers of the course of history. There is an elemental principle of life that regulates the life and death of social groups. This principle is as much hidden from politicians as the principle that animates living species is concealed from physicians. Man falls sick and dies despite the efforts of much vaunted science; and societies languish and die in spite of the efforts of politics and legislation. This principle consists in the fact that there exist two classes which ought to balance one another —the class that produces economic goods, and the class of consumers that only exists by virtue of the former, and which corresponds to a certain extent with the "sterile" class of the physiocrats. As long as the two classes balance society has a prosperous and harmonious life, and these conditions are usually found in the less progressive phases of an historical period when the mass of production sufficiently covers consumption. But in the periods that are generally considered most progressive, when population is rapidly increasing and great urban agglomerations begin to appear, Giuliani is on the contrary inclined to note a beginning of decadence and dissolution. "The equilibrium of the two classes begins insensibly to alter; men multiply without any restraining law to regulate the increase of population according to the means of subsistence. Instead the politicians hail with satisfaction the increase of population and do not perceive that in nature the various living species are balanced by mutual destruction, while man, with whom no other animal can enter into competition, is condemned to regulate his species himself, and to be the author of his own destruction." Hence revolutions, wars, commercial rivalries, and all those vicissitudes of human history that are usually named from their apparent causes, though they have at the same time a hidden reason disguised in the undeviating order of nature.

The English reader will easily recognize here the characteristic traits of the doctrine of Malthus, but it is Malthusian doctrine *avant la lettre*, as it antedates by seven years the famous *Essay on Population*. There are wanting in Giuliani the mathematical determination of the two series, arithmetical and geometrical (which is anyway the most arbitrary part of the *Essay* of Malthus), and the counsel of moral restraint. Nevertheless both authors are equally alive to the complex consequences resulting from the disproportion between population and the means of subsistence, and both have, as Croce says, "the merit of having considered not only the paradisiacal aspect of *crescite et multiplicamini*, that of placid, increasing, and idyllic prosperity, but the demonic and revolutionary aspect as well." Croce also asks whether Malthus might have come across Giuliani's essay, which was published in French and German as well, but even if a direct relationship is excluded it

[1] A. de Giuliani, *La cagione riposta delle decadenze e delle rivoluzioni* a cura e con introduzione di B. Croce, Bari, Laterza, 1934 (pp. xxviii, 108).

is still certain that the ideas of the *Essay on Population* were in the air towards the close of the eighteenth century. In any case this would not diminish the originality of Malthus, because the merit of a thinker does not consist in the arbitrary invention of problems, but in the interpretation of the exigencies of his own time and in the focusing of ideas that are circulating widely in a vague and indeterminate form. Finally, we may note the characteristic that Giuliani, like Malthus, deduces from his economic principle a political attitude that is not only conservative but to some degree reactionary. Giuliani's second essay, written in 1793 and addressed to the National Convention of Paris, is an indictment of the French Revolution. It is, however, clearly differentiated from the arraignments of a Burke or a de Maistre because it is not a *laudatio temporis acti*, but a judgment on the vanity of abstract proposals for the reformation of humanity, and on the injustice of the ferocious revolutionary condemnations of men and systems that, far from being the artificers of social evils, are themselves the unconscious instruments and victims of greater forces.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(*Translated from the Italian by* CONSTANCE M. ALLEN.)

PHILOSOPHY IN RUSSIA

PHILOSOPHICAL literature in Soviet Russia displays the same arid uniformity as before and is almost entirely confined to the exposition of dialectical materialism. That can be seen from the very titles of the books published within the last year: *Dialectical Materialism—the Philosophy of the Proletariat*, by V. Pozner; *Dialectical Materialism*, extracts from Marxist classics, selected by the students of the Institute of Red Professorship; *Marxism and Natural Science*, a collection of articles; *The Problem of Causality in the History of New Philosophy and in Dialectical Materialism*, by B. Bogdanov and Mihailov. The latter is a digest of papers read at the seminars on the history of philosophy at the Institute of Red Professorship and does not contain a single original idea or throw any fresh light on what has already been said on the subject by Engels, Lenin, Byhovsky, and others. The very quotations from Engels and Lenin are the same as are generally made in Soviet works on dialectical materialism. Arzhanov's *Hegelianism in the Service of German Fascism* is a critique of neo-Hegelian theories from the orthodox Marxist point of view. But although Hegel's name is often used merely as a bludgeon against the infidels, the non-Marxists, there is a genuine interest in Hegel's work in U.S.S.R. and a desire to introduce it to the general public. In 1929 the Marx and Engel Institute undertook the publication of a Russian edition of Hegel's works, except his lectures on the "Philosophy of Religion"; this year two volumes of Kuno Fisher's *History of Modern Philosophy*, dealing with Hegel (first translated into Russian by Lossky thirty years ago), have been republished.

As before, dialectical materialism is contrasted with idealism on the one hand and mechanistic materialism on the other, and just now it is perhaps the latter that is attacked more bitterly. The latest formulation of the official Soviet philosophy is to be found in Pozner's book, *Dialectical Materialism—the Philosophy of the Proletariat*. Like other U.S.S.R. writers on the subject during the last five years, Pozner argues that the world-process is a creative evolution, leading from the lower stages of being to the higher—from the

inorganic matter to the organic, and then, further, to social life. The content of the cosmic process and the laws that govern it cannot be reduced to a mere summing up of elementary mechanical processes, as the materialists of the old school imagine. The chief condition of evolution is the struggle of the opposites, the presence of inner contradictions inherent in every event. This inner struggle is to be found even in inorganic matter which contains a faculty akin to sensation. The human mind can and does influence material processes; man's spiritual achievements, though they have their roots in economic relations, can in their turn affect and modify the economic basis. The stress laid in dialectical materialism upon the supremacy of the human factor over material environment has a practical bearing: it justifies the Soviets' belief in their power to reconstruct Russia according to plan, and is therefore in keeping with the Communist creed. Pozner makes continual excursions into politics in order to show how well his philosophy fits in with "the general line" of the party. He is so anxious to emphasize the importance of collective units as against individuals that he introduces it even into his account of sensation. Lenin taught, says Pozner, that sensation was an image produced in the mind owing to the affections of the sense-organs by an external object, but "dialectical materialism goes further: according to it sensation results from the interaction between the *social* man and his material surroundings"—whatever this may mean!

The most remarkable book that has appeared in the *émigré* literature during the last year is unquestionably Father Sergey Bulgakov's *Agnets Bozhi* (*The Lamb of God*), published by the Y.M.C.A. Press in Paris (460 pp.). It is one of the best things Father Sergey has written. The style is clear and straightforward—which is not always the case with his earlier books—and he faces the problems at issue with the intellectual fearlessness characteristic of the Russian mind at its best. Many of his contentions are highly debatable; some of his fundamental ideas—of matter, of time and eternity—are not sufficiently thought out; now and again there are curious lapses into a sort of Sunday-school theology, as, *e.g.*, in the argument about free will on page 169; but in spite of all this, *Agnus Dei* is a great book. It is professedly theological, but there is a freshness and originality about it which one does not as a rule associate with books on theology. Much of what the author says is of purely philosophical interest and must be tested by the ordinary canons of logic and reason, and not by an appeal to the authority of the Scriptures. Bulgakov sets out to show the metaphysical implications of the central fact upon which the Christian religion is based—the Incarnation of the Logos. He does not question the fact itself, for his initial standpoint is that of an Orthodox Christian, but he goes on to ask what it means and how it is possible. In trying to answer this, Bulgakov works out a system of philosophy that is reminiscent of neo-Platonism and Vladimir Solovyov, but carefully avoids any approach to pantheism. He argues that we must distinguish in God His self, which is Tri-Personal, and His nature or *ousia*, which is the all-embracing and inexhaustible fullness of being. God creates the world which is co-eternal with Him because He needs it as the object of His love. The positive content of the world is the Divine nature itself, Sophia, the all-in-unity or the perfect organism of Ideas. Creation "out of nothing" means that God posits this divine world as a *becoming*, plunging it into the stream of time and thus introducing into it an element of relativity, of non-being. The "nothing" is a *state* of being, the "not-yet" aspect of it, the potentiality of becoming. The act of creation is thus an act of voluntary self-limitation or *kenosis* on the part of God. Beside His own absolute existence He posits an existence that is relative, but is called to share in

the fullness of the divine life. This requires a long and laborious process of development in the course of which every created entity becomes in and for itself that which it was for God from all eternity. The purpose of the cosmic evolution is that the created world should become one with its heavenly prototype. The possibility of this final union with God rests upon the fact that in its essential nature the world is divine. Man is made in the image of God, and his final end is *theosis*, deification. Human nature is "conformable" to the divine, and, in becoming man, the Logos sanctifies it from within, not only individually in the person of Jesus Christ, but for all men, since Christ is the living centre of mankind.

The chapters dealing with the divine *kenosis* and with the union of the two natures in Christ are the best in the book, and will be read with absorbing interest by all who want to understand the meaning of the Christian dogma. And if those who regard it as mere moonshine could be induced to read the book, they would at any rate see that at the bottom of the dogmatic definitions of the Church lies not an unreasoning faith but deep and subtle thought.

Most of the articles in the recent numbers of *Put* are concerned with religious questions, and a good many are devoted to the consideration of social and political problems from a Christian standpoint. There are, as usual, excellent reviews of current philosophical literature, both Russian and foreign.

NATALIE DUDDINGTON.

NEW BOOKS

Beauty and Other Forms of Value. By S. Alexander, O.M., Litt.D., F.B.A.; Hon. LL.D., D.Litt., Litt.D. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1933. Pp. x + 305. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

Professor Alexander's new book is based upon numerous papers published by him since *Space, Time and Deity*. It is not a set of independent essays, however, but a continuous work containing additional subject-matter, and the wider public which awaits eagerly the words of his voice and his pen—equally distinguished and equally unabated in beauty and vigour—will be grateful for this new systematization and consolidation of his thought. The more so because though this new work is mainly on aesthetics it is by no means exclusively so; we are given Professor Alexander's synoptic view of the values and their place in reality.

The book is divided into three parts: I. Beauty; II. Truth and Goodness; III. Comparative Value in General. The order, as can be seen, is from "higher to lower" values. This is convenient for some purposes, but Professor Alexander insists that it is not to be taken as implying that the lower can only be understood in terms of the higher.

Value (or "higher" value in general) is described sometimes as arising out of the satisfaction of some impulse or other, sometimes as being that satisfaction itself. The value of beauty—or of the beauty of fine art which is chiefly considered—arises from (or is) the satisfaction of the impulse of construction diverted from practice and become contemplative. Being contemplative it is "disinterested." The beautiful object also gives rise to illusion (admittedly an unhappy epithet), it has "significant form," unity in variety, and it is individual. But the full significance of such terminology can only be understood if we remember always the importance of the *material*. Fine Art, Professor Alexander rightly urges, is not mere translation for purposes of communication of ideas or images in the mind; fine art has no existence prior to material embodiment—though, of course, more or less perfect or imperfect images of this embodiment may occur and may facilitate construction. "What does exist is the subject which detains the artist, and fixes his thoughts and images and passions and gives his excitement a colour and direction which would be different with a different subject-matter. Excitement caused and detained by this subject, and at once enlarged, enlightened and inflamed by insight into it, bubbles over into words or the movements of the brush or chisel" (p. 59).

The most original part of the section on Beauty is, I think, the application of the ideas of "prose" and "poetry" to the arts other than literature. Here is no mere analogy. Painting, sculpture, architecture, music, have their real poetry and their real prose, the difference depending upon the proportion between the formal and the representative elements. Poetic art is primarily lyrical, dramatic; springing up spontaneously in a self-contained, autonomous life. Prose art is analytic, purposeful, instrumental to an end outside itself. Salisbury Cathedral or St. Mary Redcliffe at Bristol, to take architecture only, are like plants or trees growing out of the ground, culminating in their spires. Somerset House, on the other hand, is prose—though good prose in

its unity and organic character. Its rows of windows reveal its function as an office. All architecture, it is true, has uses; but poetic architecture "lives out" its uses, prosaic architecture "displays" them. This all seems to me interesting, important, and, I think, sound. (I agree, however, that the pretty suggestion of a prose and poetry in *biscuits* (digestives and Bath Olivers) is "merely an analogy"!)

I have no space even to enumerate the topics of the greater part of the rest of the book. I may simply mention the discussions of beauty and greatness (depending on form and subject), the objectivity of beauty, and some topics of the last two shorter sections—on science and history, on the nature and value of truth, on morality (after Adam Smith), on psychological and on sub-human values. Indeed, I find it difficult to criticize Professor Alexander without many reservations and qualifications, not because I do not often believe him to be profoundly wrong, mainly in matters I have not mentioned, but because his language is elusive, and he seems to unsay here what he says there. It may be the very felicity, even the occasional poetry, of his words, "living their own autonomous life," which dumbfounds me. Whatever the reason, I know that I do not know him as I could wish, and I expect he could refute my criticisms by quoting antitheses to my theses.

I find Professor Alexander's now familiar metaphor (is it more?) of the mixing of mind and matter interesting, particularly where he shows how in fine art the two factors are fairly evenly balanced, whilst in science reality rather than mind, and in morals mind rather than material, is in control. But I doubt if it helps to call science or morality "an art, though not a fine art," and I think the importance of the instincts of construction, curiosity, and so on, is exaggerated.

Again, satisfaction may possess value; value may arise out of satisfaction. But *is* value satisfaction, and can we say that satisfaction is the only thing (in the realm of "higher values") which possesses (not to say is identical with) value? There is valuable satisfaction in finding truth, but surely truth, if it is a "value" at all, *is* not the "objective satisfaction of the impulse of curiosity . . . become contemplative"? (p. 194). Truth is, in the words of a phrase previous to this, "true knowledge," and true knowledge or science is (or is something like) "a faithful representation of reality. . . ." But I am still, after careful study of conflicting accounts, in the dark as to what Professor Alexander means by truth, and by the value of truth. His view of goodness, "Goodness is the character which good conduct possesses of satisfying the social impulse, and of being approved" (p. 265). I think I do understand better. I can only reply to it (for it involves a whole philosophy) in the words of the second remark of the caterpillar to Alice after her repetition of, "You are old, Father William." The problem of beauty is much more complex. I agree in the main with Professor Alexander's analysis, but it seems to me not to go far enough. He rightly rejects the view that beauty is the expression of "emotion." And he makes much of "subject-matter." But I wish he had gone further and had analysed the grounds of the artist's excitement and emotion about his subject-matter. I suspect he might have found beauty to be an embodiment of many grades of values, some of them objective and not subjective—which would have led to a very different theory. On the other hand, if Professor Alexander could see Spinoza's view of good (p. 10) reversed, he would not be himself, and we should not have had this book, with its provoking charm, nor Professor Alexander's general philosophy, which is an art, and sometimes a fine one.

Louis Arnaud Reid.

The Balfour Lectures on Realism. By A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, LL.D., D.C.L., F.B.A. (Edited, with a Memoir of the Author, by G. F. Barbour, D.Phil.) (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, Ltd., 1933. Pp. x + 258. Price 7s. 6d.)

All who knew Professor Pringle-Pattison, and many glad now to know something of this most distinguished Scottish philosopher, will be grateful to Dr. Barbour for the painstaking and restrained Memoir which occupies nearly two-thirds of the present volume. The rapid rise of Andrew Seth to the premier chair of Logic and Metaphysics in Scotland is seen by the reader to have been predestined: no other fate could have befallen this pre-eminent student of Campbell Fraser. But it was a strange turn of destiny which—in middle life—made the grave scholar Laird of a broad and beautiful domain in the Borders, and gave him the name by which he is known to our generation, but which baffled a public already familiar with several volumes written by Seth. The Memoir, it is sufficient to say, adequately reflects the dignity, generosity, and quiet good humour with which Pringle-Pattison lived and worked in his dual station. Concerning his development as philosopher a paragraph may be permitted here.

His early studies allied him with the then gathering school of Anglo-Hegelians. A reaction from the narrow associationist orthodoxy of the time was inevitable; but from the first he adhered to the extreme right-wing of the new party, criticizing alike the pseudo-philosophy of Bain, the subjectivism of the German neo-Kantians, and the materialism of the Hegelian left. His own deep-grained realism, inherited from generations of Scottish philosophy, moved him to welcome Hegel's repudiation of the *noumenon* on behalf of the intrinsic validity of knowledge. But he soon rejected—if he ever consciously adopted—Hegel's mode of assuring this validity by identifying knowing and being. Thus in the first series of Balfour Lectures (*Scottish Philosophy*, 1885), and steadily thereafter, he insisted upon the necessity of a realist epistemology to the exposition of which this third series (now published for the first time in book form) is devoted. In the intermediate course (*Hegelianism and Personality*, 1887) he so sharply attacked the "Master" and brought into such high relief positions antithetic to Hegelianism—notably his emphasis upon the integrity of persons in respect of one another and the all-enveloping Absolute—that, in my belief, he could never thereafter be deemed an Hegelian. Dr. Barbour appears to suggest a considerable subsequent return upon earlier positions, and a larger measure of substantial agreement with the school, but—if I am not mistaken—he under-estimates the cleavage between the two doctrines; and it is certain that Pringle-Pattison never abated his main differences with Hegel. The "qualification" he offers in *The Idea of God* (1917) of the notorious phrase, "impervious in a fashion of which the impenetrability of matter is a faint analogue," is rather a concession to further knowledge of the nature of matter than a diminution of his position with respect to finite persons. To this the well-known controversy with Dr. Bosanquet (who represents, I suggest, the most moderate Hegelian position) bears witness. To the end he insisted that, while personality is measurable by the kind and degree of its interconnections with other persons, these interconnections constitute the conditions of a personal entity and not its cancellation.

He did, however, withdraw his semi-deist view of the relation of these persons and their Maker; and from this extreme he tended farther toward a pure immanentism than would appear fully compatible with his own ethically formed philosophy. He therefore expressed himself strongly against all notions of the transcendence and creativity of God. These lectures, *e.g.*, close with the characteristic phrase, "There is no region outside of God into which he could

extrude his creatures, and cut it adrift from himself." But (it may be asked) does not this type of denial follow a lapse in Pringle-Pattison's ideal anthropomorphism toward conceptions more appropriate of spatio-material than of the personal entities by which he purports to account for the world? This feature is, perhaps, an idiosyncrasy rather than an integral element of his position. And—on the other side—those who hold that immanentism is inadequate, and that creaturely *dependence* is something real, must do so with full awareness of the abysmally mysterious character of the relation between the Creator and the creature, which, nevertheless, they feel compelled to postulate.

In the four *Lectures on Realism* Pringle-Pattison justifies the prepossession of contemporary philosophers with epistemology, expressing the conviction that without clearness in this field "we can hardly expect to make satisfactory progress in philosophy" (p. 182). His chief contention is that once epistemology and metaphysics are clearly distinguished it is manifest that in the former realism is alone tenable (or even statable). "Idealism," he observes, "exists only as a criticism of Realism. When developed itself as a substantive theory, it leads to a view of existence which is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the doctrine in question. . . . Realism is left in possession of the field, and a critical or carefully guarded Realism is established as the only satisfactory, indeed the only sane, theory of knowledge" (p. 192). Hegelianism he describes as an "hypothetical divine epistemology" masquerading as a "metaphysics of existence." "But," he adds, "if Hegel swamps Epistemology in Metaphysics, the Realism of Scottish philosophy often errs in an opposite direction" (p. 181). The defect of the school of Reid is that it takes the duality of knower and known for the basis of an irreconcilable metaphysical dualism. Such a "metaphysical dualism would cleave the universe in two, leaving two absolutely non-communicating worlds. But the possibility of knowledge "becomes, on the other hand, the surest guarantee of metaphysical monism—of a unity which underlies all differences" (p. 256). And further, "Epistemological investigation . . . must tacitly presuppose this metaphysical unity of the subjective and the objective, or, to put it more strictly, the harmony of the subjective function with the universe from which it springs" (p. 258). On this view, then, knowledge is seen to presuppose a transubjectivity which is the basis of an epistemological dualism, but which points also (unless we are content with a total scepticism) to a metaphysical monism.

Professor Pringle-Pattison, however, derives his metaphysical idealism not from this indeterminate harmony between the knower and the known, but from a wider "ideal anthropomorphism" which lies at the root of all—in the widest sense—idealist theories. His metaphysic is not developed in these lectures which conclude with the opinion quoted above; but it is present in outline in the preceding series, and its general tone may be gathered from the observation (p. 193), "If we take away from Idealism personality, and the ideals that belong to personality, it ceases to be Idealism. . . ." This observation may throw a little light upon the somewhat obscure controversy now conducted in an American contemporary as to the nature of idealism. In view of the confusion raised about this term it may well be time it was dropped, but that the type of philosophy it imperfectly designates is perennial cannot for one moment be doubted. Professor Pringle-Pattison would be the last to suggest that theories of universal nature so founded afford certainty (for he enjoyed a full measure of Scottish caution), but he could point out that in this they are at one with every alternative, and that on this level the decision can only go with what proves most congenial in the long run to the generality of cultivated and critical minds.

In the closing pages of the Memoir Dr. Barbour prints a letter to Pringle-Pattison from F. H. Bradley. It records a surprising agreement with the essentials of *The Idea of Immortality* (the Edinburgh Gifford Lectures, 1922), and contains the remark that, "The mood in which my book" (*Appearance and Reality*) "was conceived and executed was, in fact, to some extent a passing one. . . . I cannot alter the book now, though I would not repeat all of it. And in particular I certainly would *not* say now that 'a future life must be taken as decidedly improbable.' "

We are deeply indebted to Dr. Barbour for what has evidently been a labour of love.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

The Emergence of Novelty. By LLOYD MORGAN, D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S. (London: Williams and Norgate. 1933. Pp. 207. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

Professor Lloyd Morgan has written this volume in response to requests from those who have found difficulties in his already published views. He attempts by his A B C method to show that what is required of him and that what he seeks to do is to give an exact but purely interpretative and in no way metaphysically explanatory account of what happens in terms of the notion of emergence. It is interesting to note the frank recognition of the need of the Aristotelian conception of potentiality and the attempt to define it in accordance with the requirements of modern empirical science.

The main subject of discussion, however, is the idea of *emergence in mind*. Professor Lloyd Morgan is anxious to maintain that there is such a thing as emergence in mind. He speaks, of course, on the basis of a wide experience as a psychologist; and yet it is here where it is most difficult to follow him. For instance, following James Mill, he argues that "mental space" is emergent in mind. Value is an emergent in a relational field of which mind is a constituent, and thus would seem to be supra-mental; yet it is "possessed by mind" and also characterizes the object or objects which are the other constituents of the relational field.

There are several reasons why one feels difficulty with this view. There is an obscurity in the term *mind*; the difference between Professor Lloyd Morgan and Professor Alexander is largely due to a disagreement as to what is mental and what is non-mental. There is an obscurity in the phrase *emergence of mind*; it seems at times to come perilously near signifying *what mind apprehends* or what is meant by the word emergence in the phrase *the emergence of an idea in the mind*. There is a further difficulty, to which these two obscurities no doubt conduce, expressed in the question whether emergence in mind is in any way analogous to emergence in the non-mental, and whether therefore the term emergence is ambiguous. Molecules are supra-atomic; crystals are supra-molecular; but would Professor Lloyd Morgan speak of emergence in atoms? On analogy, value would have to be spoken of as *possessing mind*. The difficulty arises from the possibility that mind, because of its nature, plays a rôle which makes it impossible to consider emergence in mind and emergence in the non-mental as being in any way analogous.

These difficulties are ultimately of a philosophical nature, and therefore attention must be re-directed to the A B C method. The method may serve to mark the difference between philosophy and science; but Professor Lloyd Morgan intends it to elucidate what he is going to do. He claims to follow a scientific method. The particular points to which he refers, namely Activity, Directive Causality, etc., may give support to his method, even though his

theory does thereby become complicated through duplicate meanings of these terms; but these philosophical concepts do not exhaust all the philosophical issues that arise. Because of the philosophical assumptions involved, which a scientist need not make, Professor Lloyd Morgan's theory cannot be admitted to be purely interpretative. It comes under the A category, and not merely under the B and C categories.

B. M. Laing.

The Challenge of Humanism. By Louis J. A. Mercier. (New York and London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. vi + 288. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

Those who are not directly acquainted with the philosophical work of Professor Irving Babbitt and Professor Paul Elmer More in America and of Baron Seillière in France will find in this volume a very interesting exposition of their views and of their affiliations with Plato, Aristotle, and the Scholastics, and with Christianity and the Neo-Scholastic revival. But there is another purpose behind this exposition. As expressed in the title, the book is intended to be a challenge of this type of philosophy, called by the author *Humanism*, to every other kind of philosophy, all these being labelled together as *Naturalism*. This sharp distinction of all philosophical thought into humanism and naturalism, if admitted, certainly presents a challenge; but it will seem to many to be an over-simplification that is harsh, arbitrary, unsympathetic, and provocative. Certain idealists may be left to speak for themselves.

Humanism is a term that is coming to have various meanings. Students of literature have their "humanism," which is to be understood in reference to the Renaissance and to which most who argue for humanism philosophically claim to turn for their fundamental meaning. There is a "new humanism" in America which the present author opposes and criticizes. Professor J. S. Mackenzie, in his *Lectures on Humanism* (1907), regards pragmatism as one of the special forms of humanism. F. C. S. Schiller, in his writings, regards pragmatism and humanism as identical. Mr. Mercier opposes humanism in his sense to pragmatism; but that the issue is not so clear-cut as this opposition might suggest appears from the author's remark that all those who are not monists might be included under humanism (p. 273). Yet the author makes it quite clear what humanism in his sense stands for. It refuses to merge God, man, and nature, and hence is opposed to monism. It insists upon the possibility of discovering standards raised above the realm of change, being thus opposed to naturalistic relativity, though it recognizes that, since man lives in a changing world and is part of the process, these standards are flexible. It stresses the need of a principle of restraint in human nature, for, contrary to what naturalistic theories maintain, man's impulses are disordered, prone to excess, and incapable of attaining balance and righteousness instinctively, and he is therefore not naturally good. Naturalistic theories, by abandoning these principles, have been disastrous; they have led to a disintegration of individual character, have dechristianized Europe, are dechristianizing America, and are making any religion whatever impossible. They are accused of leading to the World War of 1914; though to the reader this causal rôle is not obvious, and the case of naturalism ought not to be prejudiced by assigning to it without careful analysis any such causation.

It may be admitted that one of the most pressing problems of the day is that of standards. It may be admitted that there is much in humanism, as expressed by the author, which is valuable. Whether, however, man is or is not naturally good is a proposition difficult to decide, partly because of the

obscurity of the term natural and partly because it is not clear whether a *de facto* disorder in human nature must be accepted as ultimate or has causes of a natural kind. Where questions relevant to human life and conduct are being discussed, two vices of philosophical discussion require to be avoided —the barren method of assertion and counter-assertion and the device of having recourse to powers or faculties of a pretended higher kind. The really vital thing is not whether such powers or faculties do or do not exist, but what propositions or principles are to be formulated as true or sound for human guidance. It is necessary to put the test question, what specific difference does it make for the individual in his life and conduct whether he accepts humanism or naturalism. How does the choice affect his activities, the functions he is to perform, and the performance of them?

B. M. Laing.

East and West in Religion. By S. Radhakrishnan. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1933. Pp. 146. Price 4s. 6d.).

Sir S. Radhakrishnan has become a recognized and authoritative exponent of Indian philosophy, and is often quoted as an example of the quality of Eastern thought. It would be more correct, however, to regard him as the example of the blending of Eastern and Western thought. In these essays, the New Testament, both actually and by implication, is more in evidence than the Veda. Radhakrishnan is a Hindu, but no Hindu who had not been deeply influenced by Christianity could have written such a book as this. It consists of a couple of lectures, delivered when on a visit to England, a couple of sermons, both incidentally from Old Testament texts, also given in this country, and an address on Rabindranath Tagore, delivered in Calcutta. Despite the varied character of the contents, there is a unity throughout, created by the spiritual, mystical, kindly, and tolerant outlook on life adopted by the author. Of controversy and argument, as we Westerners understand it, there is not a single trace, and yet in the subtlest way the essays are controversial. There is no denunciation, no challenge, not even irony, and yet as certainly as if he had employed all these methods, and one suspects more effectively, Radhakrishnan gets his points home. For example, the controversial European might desire to remind the East of some of its crimes. He need not. Radhakrishnan anticipates him. "We burnt widows, indulged in human sacrifices, enjoyed execution and torture, demanded hara-kiri; and we accepted them all as part of the recognized scheme of things. When any line of conduct is in conformity with social opinion, we feel we are exempt from personal responsibility." That is an acknowledgment and a confession, but the next sentence simply adds: "To-day a State sacrifices millions of its citizens with a clean conscience in the name of war." There is not the slightest attempt to point the moral, but it points itself. The controversialist would rejoin to the West that if the East burnt widows by the thousand, the West makes them by the million. That is not Radhakrishnan's way. He quietly and objectively sets out widow-burning and widow-making, without saying who did either, as examples of the law that the social conscience abrogates the individual conscience. Similarly he quotes St. Paul's saying that if meat makes a brother to offend, he will eat no meat, and without saying so manages to bring to the reader's mind a remembrance of the offence we give to the Hindu by our lusty beef-eating. He tells us that it is the duty of the strong to help the weak, and adds, without a single word to emphasize the contradiction, that it is understood that backward nations should serve the stronger

Powers. It is a very subtle and effective method of passive resistance to Western superiority. Tough indeed must be the skin into which these unbarbed shafts do not penetrate. Out of our own mouths we are judged, without a word of judgment being passed on us. Let us at least acknowledge the justice of the proceeding.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Christianity and Economics. By A. D. LINDSAY, Master of Balliol. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1933. Pp. vii + 177. Price 5s.)

This little book is big with ideas, developed in five lectures, which were first delivered in 1930, and again in the U.S.A. in 1932. Dr. Lindsay's philosophy is based upon the distinctively Christian principle that our belief in the Fatherhood of God carries with it the implication that we are all children of one father, that economics is a branch of ethics, and our theology should be the best expression of ethics. The business of the State is to provide a framework within which men shall have room themselves to lead the good life. Whether they do so or not depends upon the extent to which they are influenced by ethical considerations, which, for most of us, must have a religious basis, and involve active membership of a religious body, with all the obligations which that implies.

Religion and politics have separate aims, but neither can operate effectively without the active co-operation of individuals, drawing inspiration from either side, moral obligations being inculcated by the one, "rights" and, to a less extent, duties being proclaimed by the other, though it is clear that every "right" enjoyed by one man entails the discharge of duties by others if it is to be enjoyed.

There is no situation in life which has no moral bearing, but it does not follow that economic relations should be transformed into ethical relations, but rather that they should be informed by ethical principles operated by men of their own free will in true freedom and not under compulsive laws. The failure of the present economic system under which we live is a moral failure. Economic relations are impersonal, but if they are to endure, the men and women who have entered on them must be in a moral relationship to each other. That is too seldom the case at present, and when the economic supersedes the moral aspect there is danger. Exchange rather than the simple processes of production dominates our civilization, which is so complicated that it eludes our grasp and drives men either to accept it complacently or to desire its destruction without, in either case, full understanding of the system or its implications.

"Where your treasure is," said our Lord, "there will your heart be also." A scale of values based on the standard of others, on the ground that "a thing is worth what it will fetch," is not a true scale; it has no greater validity than the assumption that the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice—by eight votes to seven—has any greater claim to acceptance than temporary expediency.

Dr. Lindsay sets forth (p. 83), in language which I personally accept as true and adequate, the distaste and antagonism felt by many to a system which makes great numbers of men in large-scale industry feel that they have lost status or personal dignity because they have no share in responsibility, and are, whether employed or unemployed, mere automata whose bodies "the State" has undertaken to keep alive, but whose personalities are no one's concern.

No Government, he says, has ever been successful which did not involve loyalty and personal respect, real mutual relations between men. Economic relations are not enough. So far as Communism, Capitalism, and State Socialism depend upon the intensification of economic relations they will fail. So far as politics and religion appeal to the loyalty of men to leaders who expound ideas which are worthy, in their eyes, of loyalty, they will continue to appeal, and rightly so, to active minds. Our sentiments are as real as any facts set forth in a Blue Book or a Balance Sheet.

Dr. Lindsay describes "wage-slavery" as a cant term, but emphasizes the underlying truth that so far as men are treated as instruments, and their personality disregarded, they are slaves, and so far as they lack security of employment, and therefore of a full life, they are worse than slaves. He refuses to condemn competition; it is not inconsistent with co-operation, and he holds that to eliminate competition would entail other evils. He deals firmly with those who object to profit. "The distinction between production for use and production for profit is only between production for a known and an anticipated demand"—the latter a genuine and essential social service (p. 93). Inequality in function and of fortune is inevitable, but produced in excess it causes divisions and misunderstanding which are certainly evil if only because they divide us who are of one family into two nations, as Disraeli noted eighty-eight years ago in *Sybil*. "To be friends with people," says Aristotle, "you have to live with them." Almost every town-planning scheme is devoted to making it impossible for employer and employed to do so.

The author combats the deterministic view of economics, as an admission of human failure and a denial of our Christianity, which cannot acquiesce in the view that man is irredeemable any more than that road accidents are inevitable, that the birth of children is independent of human volition, and that the doctrine of evolution knows nothing of symbiosis and commensalism.

A democratic society is one in which each cares for all. The measure of the success of the religious bodies in England is the degree of brotherliness and lively care for the common good which informs our lives. The measure of Bolshevik ruthlessness is the measure of the failure of the Christian Church in Russia. Mechanization, technical skill, and administration can never make life, they can only magnify and sustain it, whether they are managed by the State or as a public utility or for profit. Inspiration must come from above—from the urge which can inspire men to give to others willingly of their best.

Upon one point only would the present reviewer be disposed to differ from Dr. Lindsay, viz. his estimate of the Co-operative Movement (p. 123). So far as it is locally managed it is, or may be, all he says. So far as it is centralized, and managed by men at a distance and out of touch with the shareholders, it is neither better nor worse than other chain stores, whilst the emphasis on profits rather than on quality and the widespread avoidance of some lines (*e.g.* retail coal supplies) has weakened the moral prestige that the movement once enjoyed. But this is a small point in a great book.

"The English Nation sit enchanted," wrote Carlyle a hundred years ago, "the poor enchanted so that they cannot work, the rich enchanted so that they cannot enjoy." Dr. Lindsay comes near to Carlyle's view in his application of ethics to politics and in his general analysis of the position to-day. "Leave the high pulpit and the safe cloister," wrote Carlyle. "Down into the market place and see what is to be done." Politics would be enriched by Dr. Lindsay's presence in Parliament; he has done the next best thing and sent his son there.

A. T. Wilson.

The Will to Fuller Life. By J. H. BADLEY, Headmaster of Bedales School. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1933. Pp. 282. Price 10s. 6d.)

Plato held that there could be no health in States till rulers were philosophers. But before there can be philosopher rulers there must be a body of citizens out of which they can come and by which, when they have come, their mandates can be recognized as the demands of what is best in itself. Before that, again, we must have a race of teachers who are also philosophers. This book, coming from one of our most distinguished schoolmasters, lends substance to the hope that this dream is already beginning to be realized. It is a study of man's life as in its essence a striving towards the values which in the depths of his being he knows to be the highest, and of the conditions that are necessary to secure the success of such a striving. What gives it especial value is that, as the author tells us, it is based on his own experience as a teacher, and is the direct outcome of discussions which he has conducted with his higher classes. It falls into three parts. The first is occupied with a general statement of the nature of values as such, and of those which are called spiritual in the sense of being apprehensible only by a being who can raise himself above himself to the vision of forms of good which transcend the needs of mere existence or are merely instrumental to some further good. The second is occupied with a detailed treatment of the three main forms of spiritual good, the familiar trinity of truth, beauty, and goodness. The third part consists of a short section on "Looking Forward," in which the present state of civilization and the dangers which threaten it are submitted to analysis, and the way to something better shown to depend on the union of a faith (in its essence religious), that these values are not merely relative to human needs but have objective reality, inasmuch as they are that which gives the universe its meaning, with the knowledge of the conditions under which we can best contribute to actualizing them in the life about us. The treatment, however, is subject to two admitted limitations. Though dealing with philosophic subjects, the author disowns any attempt to put forward philosophic solutions of the deeper questions raised by them; and with regard to the most important of them, the nature and place of religious experience, this is "left for separate treatment" (p. 9 *n.*)—as we hope in a future volume. Readers of *Philosophy* may think that these are serious limitations in a book of this kind (and I cannot help thinking that they are right), and that they leave one with a certain sense of not getting to the root of the matter, *e.g.* when in the treatment of pleasure this is described as "the fundamental element of value" (p. 55) (how, we might ask, could this apply to truth?), or again when moral value is distinguished from others by the apprehension of what ought to be (p. 187), regardless of the view (which may be right or wrong, but is supported by great authorities) that it is intrinsic to *all* value to come to us with the sense of something that ought to be; or finally, with regard to the main point, which I understand the writer to hold to—the objectivity of the great values,—how is this consistent with the declaration that "the real nature of the universe may have little relation to either our logic or our feeling"? (p. 112). But it would be a mistake to allow any such discontent to blind the reader to the great value the writer has managed to import into what he modestly calls "a cursory discussion" of his subject. The book is written with an ease and grace of style that would put many specialists in philosophy to shame. It is full of penetrating analyses, suggestive observation, and forceful statement of truths that are far too liable to be overlooked. Particularly fresh seems to me the treatment of Moral Good, which occupies Chapters VIII and IX. Ethics has too long been waiting for

just the sort of treatment we have of it here as merely one department of the wider science of Axiology. If in this excellent section one thing deserves a mark of special excellence it is, I think, the fine treatment of love, defined, in contrast to justice or giving all their due, as giving to each "all that we can," and as a "radiant goodness" that is at once "the Creator and the revealer of values," belonging to "a region in which the sense of claim gives place to the free outpouring of life for its own sake." If, as I hope, I am right in interpreting the note already referred to as meaning that Mr. Badley intends to follow this book up with a fuller discussion of the nature of religion and the Reality which is its object, there are others besides his colleagues in the teaching profession to whom it will be welcome.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

Indian Psychology: Perception. By JADUNATH SINHA, Professor of Philosophy, Meerut College. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1934. Pp. xvi + 384. Price 15s.)

This work, apparently, though not explicitly, the firstborn of more to follow, is to be welcomed as an attempt to parallel what others, German, Italian, and English, have tried to do for European Psychology. The European writers have confined themselves to an historical survey of Western psychology from the date of the breakaway of their subject from philosophy in general. They have left the centuries of non-specialization in psychology to histories of philosophy. Their works are in consequence rather "cuttings" (in garden parlance) than trees. Professor Sinha has sought to give us a "tree." He is fully aware of the fact that never in India has there been our modern specialization in philosophy. He insists that the "Hindu mind is essentially synthetic . . . never destroys the organic unity of a subject." Hence, as a loyal son, he has seen in his task "an exposition and interpretation of the fundamental problems of perception in their logical development." He takes various aspects of perception—physical basis, objects and conditions, recognition, space, time, and movement, the universal, the self, ab- and supernormal perception, etc., and sets one school of thought in each section over against others.

Such a Vergil may make the man he leads a little dizzy:

Ma io perchè venirvi? o chi 'l concede?
Io non Eneo; io non Paolo sono . . .

but the result certainly is that he gets more of a purview than if he follows along one path, as I had perforce to do twenty years ago in my little Buddhist psychology.

But the synthetic purview may be attained at too heavy a cost. Namely, the book is not, the author avows, "an historical survey of the subject." This compels him to fix on this or that school of thought at a certain date in a certain region and call that by the general name of the school, Buddhist or other. But it is fairly obvious that every school—none more than the Buddhist—has its history of changing values. By what right, then, is any one stage to count inclusively as "Buddhism"? Or as any other school? It is the weakness of your metaphysician pure and simple that he often fails to allow Time-value for the growing organism of the collective mind, or, better said, for the changing values in teachers of different periods. Indian writers, as synthetic, are peculiarly liable to this myopia, and tend to write of "systems" as so many ready-made boxes of puzzles, each completed at a given date.

In the next place, when the author claims a metaphysical basis for Indian psychology, and leans upon metaphysic in the perception of the self, he adds that this psychology is also "based on introspection." But if so, is there really any need for metaphysic? Among the data of introspection there is surely nothing more introspectively immediate and inexpugnable than this; that in any awareness of a percept we say: "*I* see it!" "*I* hear it!" etc. *I* perceive it. And that however near some tongues may seem to bring us to just "see it" (*tam passāmi, hoc video*), the man-who-sees is *never absent from introspection*. For me it will be a happy day for philosophy when this Privy-Council-Chamber of "metaphysic" gets banished once for all from our mental apartments.

Lastly, a word on Supernormal Perception, where the author rightly places the rapt musing known in Buddhism as *Jhāna*. It is as yet unfortunately characteristic of Indian writers to be uncareful of what anyone they quote has been publishing up to date. A writer who is good enough to speak of my little work of twenty years ago as "monumental"—(I feel rather like an urn)!—should have taken the trouble to find out what this author has been saying in more recent years. The theory I have been for five years putting forward about the *object* of *Jhāna* he ignores. It is true everybody else has so far ignored it. So I must say it over again. But not here. Here I do but repeat, it is based on passages in the earliest Buddhist scriptures as yet ignored (in a double sense) by writers on Buddhism. Professor Sinha may say: Well, your theory is not in Buddhist Yogāchāra literature. I reply: So much the worse for that—and for you, sir. You are displaying, as Buddhism, a puzzle-box composed of my little immature book and that far, far later literature, and you hold this ill-assorted pair up and say: Here is Buddhist psychology! Now there is plenty of interesting, if very crude, immature psychology in the older books, the Pitakas, but the monumental manual hasn't got it all in. There is psychology of a sort in Yogāchāra literature, but it had *lost the early Buddhist standpoints*. Here is the price you pay for refusing to make your survey historical.

C. A. F. Rhys Davids.

The Aesthetics of William Hazlitt. A Study of the Philosophical Basis of His Criticism. By E. Schneider. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. vii + 200. Price 8s. 6d.)

Miss Schneider writes of Hazlitt the thinker, as distinct from the artist, the critic, or the essayist, and her work falls into three main divisions. The first deals with his general philosophical outlook; the second with his theory of art, and in particular of the painter's art; and the last with his theoretical explanation of literature, poetry, and literary criticism.

Who remembers now *An Essay on the Principles of Human Action*, published by a young artist-philosopher of twenty-seven, or the *Prospectus of a History of English Philosophy*, launched by the same dauntless fellow after his first book had issued still-born from the press? Almost no one. It is the unique and admirable distinction of Miss Schneider to have unearthed the obscure roots of the Hazlittian philosophy, and to have introduced its author to the world not, like his other devotees—W. P. Kerr, H. W. Garrod, George Saintsbury, Nichol Smith, or, most recent of all, Virginia Woolf—as a literary connoisseur, a familiar essayist, or a forceful personality, but as a thinker pure and simple.

Versatility at last has received its due of justice. And let no man dismiss

Hazlitt the philosopher as a mere plagiarist of his friend Coleridge; some ideas, no doubt, were transmitted in the fire of conversation, but the kernel of his philosophy was already ripe before the two had met, and the viewpoint expressed in it is fundamentally Hazlitt's own. Miss Schneider does well to explode a legend that deceived even Saintsbury.

There is something essentially commonsensical and English, something solid and superbly unimaginative, about the philosophy of Hazlitt. He regards religion with the respectful but critical eye of the agnostic, and the rhapsodical theism of Coleridge strikes no chord in his soul; he clips the wings on which philosophy rises towards the infinite and the eternal, and confines its flight to the near-by regions of epistemology, psychology, ethics, and aesthetics.

Miss Schneider calls him a "realist"; and this much-abused term is justified if she simply means that his criticism of eighteenth-century rationalism forestalls in many respects the views of modern scientific philosophy. He refused to believe that the mind is a *tabula rasa* or a mosaic of mental atoms, and notes with finesse the activity of memory and volition in ordinary perception. Steeped in Rousseau—he had shed hot tears over Julie, through the "Confessions" which he loved best of all—he asserts boldly that man is not a purely or even a primarily rational animal, and that "feeling" is an indispensable feature of human personality. He also champions "natural disinterestedness" as against all those, including Hobbs, who were persuaded of the unswerving selfishness of the motives of man.

Miss Schneider rightly affirms that these are the two notions in his general philosophy that bear most directly on his aesthetics. But what a pity she fails to follow up the scent! It would have been so easy to show that sympathetic feeling was the very foundation of Hazlitt's unerring taste in literature, poetry, and painting.

His theory of art is cloaked in the traditional formula, hallowed by a lineage reaching back to Aristotle and Horace, that art does and should "imitate nature." But he rescues it from confusion with anything so inartistic as exact reproduction by the original and profound meaning he gives to "nature"; for this concept is equivalent to reality, and includes that which dwells within as well as without the mind of man, so that "the more ethereal, evanescent, more refined and sublime part of art is the seeing nature through the medium of sentiment and passion." Such is the gist of Hazlitt's whole attitude towards the arts.

One would like to mention, besides, his interesting views on genius, on imagination, on taste and its standards, on comedy and tragedy; but space forbids. The authoress is to be congratulated on a monument of thorough, accurate scholarship, an original contribution to our knowledge of Hazlitt that no lover of the great essayist can afford to overlook. But, suggestive as his philosophical ideas undoubtedly are, we cannot subscribe to her view that they represent the last word on aesthetics. We would advise her to pursue the movement of aesthetic speculation from Hazlitt's decease to the present day, paying special attention to Germany.

Her book concludes with two valuable bibliographies; the first, a list of Hazlitt's reading, will go far to dispel the illusion that he was an ignoramus, while exposing his unfortunate deficiency in German and Greek; the second is an admirable account of his own works and of the general interest taken in him by the literary world. But why does she not include the charming all-round *Selections from Hazlitt*, produced in 1930 by the Nonesuch Press, and furnished with a graceful introduction by Geoffrey Keynes? And why is not the title of her work the "Philosophy" rather than the "Aesthetics" of Hazlitt?

LISTOWEL.

The Headquarters of Reality. A Challenge to Western Thought. By EDMOND HOLMES. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1933. Pp. x + 207. Price 5s.)

In this truly pioneer work, short though it be, the author has placed English reading philosophers under no small debt to him. Till to-day our purview of philosophy either has ignored the Eastern philosophers, or has mentioned them only to apologize with Ueberweg: "philosophy could not originate among 'the Orientals,' who were . . . content simply to retain culture in a spirit of passive resignation," and, with Burnet: "they had no philosophy to be borrowed from." It was, I believe, Paul Deussen who, in his *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie* (1906–8), without protest and just as truth which had become evident, opened up for our century a new perspective, and led off by giving us an Indo-Germanic philosophy, where *ātman* of India greets *αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτου* of Plato, and in which, as an act, so to speak, of historical revenge, it is Western philosophy which, to be colloquial, doesn't get a look in. Deussen is on our library shelves; Edmond Holmes, readjusting the balance in treatment, writes for Everyman's leisure hour a brief, lucid, most readable examination of the Greek concept of Reality, the mystic's concept of it, and the concept of it gathered by quotations from the Immanence theory of the Indian Upanishads. If this book gets read as it deserves, our cultural curricula will come to be rearranged. Till this is done, the philosophical vista of British youth will get but half-way between West and East, halting at Levantine ports to greet Thales and his brethren, as it still does.

The author's 'challenge' consists in an arraignment of the Greek spirit (as typified in Aristotle) for a 'word-bound sense-bound' contentment with the world of sense-perception as the ultimately real, and with a regulation of man's thought within this world by a triune law of logic, which "is effective just when there is no work for it to do." That is, when we are seeking reality outside the normal visible world, when we have to deal with words as alive and growing in meaning, when we have to be creative in charting perceptions yet uncharted, we find that 'identity' is a shifting quantity, that 'contradiction' cannot deal with opposites, that the 'excluded middle' only serves for a world of word-bound things. Such, too, is syllogism.

My Greek lore is rusty, yet I do not readily admit that Aristotle ever sought more than to guard *consistency* in thinking (not reality) with his 'analytics.' Nor was more than a similar regulation sought, surely, by J. S. Mill in his guarding Inductive thought. But both are concerned with weighing and valuing what is known, what has come to be known. And our author is, with deeper vision, more concerned with reality, as something we are in process of coming to know and coming to be, and as such, is subjective rather than objective. He is more interested in intuition than in intellection. (I miss Bergson in his pages, and would fain see the effect of that genius on his thought.) He is feeling in intuition after a range, stunted in most of us, of other-sense perception. And he finds it necessary to substitute it, where intellectual apperception is too slow, as *e.g.* in the mental adjustments made by a batsman facing the swift bowler, or a pedestrian crossing a busy thoroughfare. I venture to think he may here be confusing the nature of the two activities. In the flash of intuition, man is creating. He reacts, it is true, to a given conjuncture. But he does not create by way of fusing adjustments $x, y, z \ldots$ with such swiftness, that they are as like an act of sense as are the inferent sensations. The act is the man's fiat; the subsequent identification of $x, y, z \ldots$ is the expository act of intellection, is a purely reflective operation, and can only be theoretically supposed to have been the mental work preceding the act itself.

The intuition itself is perhaps the nearest we can get to the unseen, not

yet understood, process which is Reality. And that is 'the man as becoming.' Both East and West have tended to see in reality too much what 'is' in the sense of 'stands still for you to look at it'; too much, to use Bergson's phrase, as 'perches,' too little as the flying. (He said 'flights'; I prefer 'flying.') Reality is a journeying towards the Real, and the journey will take us all our time, and not these few years only. The Upanishads show us Indian culture as feeling after this, but they dropped the quest, and contracted in Yoga. Plato, as representative of the opposite side of Greek thought, felt after it; Gotama called the Buddha felt after it; Hegel, Bergson, Holmes . . . they will the way in the Real (*satya*), that is, in becoming in a More wherein 'the face is set towards' a Most.

C. A. F. Rhys Davids.

The Psychology of Effective Speaking. By T. H. Pear. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1933. Pp. xiii + 232. Price 6s. net.)

That the problems which Professor Pear raises and discusses in this book are of the very highest importance must be apparent to every psychologist who, in spite of his studies, has managed to retain an interest in actual human activities. As Pear is never tired of saying, broadcasting and the "talkies" have made the influence of the voice and of speaking much more obvious and perhaps much greater than ever before in human history. Yet if, having read the book, we ask, "What is Effective Speaking?" it is still not quite easy to find the answer.

At the beginning of his argument, on p. 21, Pear refers to a classification of the functions of speech once made by Professor Grace de Laguna, "Speaking conveys emotion, it issues commands, and it communicates news concerning which no immediate action need be taken." It is perhaps fair to assume that he regards this classification as satisfactory, for he returns to it with appreciation in several other places as well. But so vague a classification obscures a lot of important points. Emotion may be conveyed, as, one perhaps believes, by Adolf Hitler, or aroused, as by an actor who remains perfectly cool in face of a raging audience. Commands may be equally effective though they come by way of delicate hints, by barking insistence, or by conventionally accepted phrases. The eye-witness of an important event may communicate news, and so, in the sense in which the word has to be used here, may the light and cheerful conversationalist. These different cases demand a different technique, and in any one of them the effectiveness of the speech has its own peculiar basis and conditions.

Or take again the two chapters headed The Criteria of Effective Speaking and Getting it Across. The first makes the following list of Criteria and adds comments: Clear Speaking; Interestedness and Disinterestedness; Suitable Pace; Naturalness; Avoidance of Marked "Dialect," Geographical or Social; Sincerity; Intimacy. It is an excellent list and as long as need be; but the comments are very scrappy and anecdotal, and although I have tried hard, by reading them several times over, I cannot clearly understand what Professor Pear considers to be the psychological bases of, for example, naturalness, sincerity, and intimacy, or how they produce their effects. The chapter on Getting it Across is constructed on the same plan, but here Professor Pear merely takes chapter headings from a book by Professor Overstreet and comments on them. It may sound ungracious, but I cannot help thinking here, as at several other points in the book, that if only Pear had dropped some

rather indifferent pilots and gone out upon his voyage of discovery himself, he would have found landmarks more permanent and important.

At least half the book and the great majority of its thronging illustrations are about broadcasting and talking films. It is an extraordinary thing that a remote voice, often maintaining a long monologue and issuing from an electrical instrument, should yet be able to convey an impression of unobjectionable friendliness. The technique seems to lie somewhere between that of the "old fashioned" public speech—as it is rapidly coming to be called—and the intimacy of face to face conversation. Does the adoption of a friendly voice, or the recognition of the friendliness of a voice, when both speaker and hearers are outside the range of vision and belong to different social groups, set up a reciprocally friendly attitude? This might be a subject for experiment, but if it does, the international character of broadcasting may have some very far-reaching social effects. It may, for example, do more for the establishment of peace in the world than the most elaborately guarded official organizations. Pear hints at this kind of problem many times; I cannot help wishing that he had discussed the matter more thoroughly.

The parts of the book that do not deal with broadcasting seem to me to be less satisfactory. Some of the topics discussed are Effective Speaking in Schools, Debates and Discussions, Lectures and Lecturing, and Humour in Public Speaking. A good many of the arguments seem to assume that everybody, or nearly everybody, ought to be trained for some kind of formal public speaking. The conversation, as a form of effective speaking, gets little consideration, though it is far the commonest and certainly not the least important form. Professor Pear does not much like debates, mainly because he thinks they overstress dialectic and, among other things, lead to a terrible waste of time on public committees. It would be interesting to know whether debaters do actually waste more time on committee than other folks. I doubt it, and the view that they do seems to demand a kind of transfer of training upon which doubt is rightly cast in other parts of this book.

University lecturers are most drastically treated. No doubt many are chosen for reasons which have nothing to do with effective speaking, but my impression is that the bulk of teachers in a University shake down to a style and an audience that meet the needs of their case. On both sides of this perennial controversy more facts are needed, but in the meantime the serious suggestion that young University teachers should be handed over to University Education Departments to be trained to lecture seems little short of fantastic.

The chapter on Humour is full of good fun. Humour is regarded as a very good thing in public speaking within limits. But the limits are not very clearly stated.

I seem to have grumbled my way through this review. This may be partly because Professor Pear, in a chapter on Spoken and Written Style, remarks, apparently with disapproval, that "British psychologists are not criticizing each other." I think this book is like a glass of sherry or a tasty savoury before a meal, or like a brilliant curtain-raiser before a serious play. It is full of notes of interrogation without the answers. It skirts problem after problem and then runs to a new one. I hope lots of people will read the book, and more than anything else I hope that Professor Pear will return to this topic on which his own magnificent gifts as a speaker make him peculiarly fitted to write, and then that he will find the definitive answers to many of the very vital questions which here he sets before us.

F. C. Bartlett.

Religion and Communism. By JULIUS F. HECKER, Ph.D. (London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd. 1933. Pp. xii + 303. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

In this volume the writer gives on the whole an adequate and interesting and, as far as my knowledge justifies a judgment, an accurate account of the relation of Communism in Russia to Religion. In the first chapter he states the problem: a brief historical survey leads him to the conclusion that Communism is opposed to religion as such, not only to the abuses of a reactionary religion, but even more to "any of its modernized and philosophically improved forms" (p. 11). In the following three chapters he describes the religion of the people, the relation of Church and State, and Nonconformity in Russia. It is an appalling picture of superstition, corruption, and oppression which he paints. Orthodoxy was so close an ally, and so servile an agent of autocracy, that revolt against the latter led inevitably to the rejection of the former. The fifth chapter deals with the beginnings of the anti-religious tradition. Here the author deals more fully than seems to me necessary for his immediate purpose with the Foreign Sources of Russian Atheism, as he is covering already well-known ground. In Chapter VI he passes to deal with the first encounters of Religion and the Revolutionary Movement. Not all the intellectuals who were forced to abandon the teaching of the Church surrendered religion altogether; the seventh chapter deals with the "God-wrestlers" and "God-seekers" among the Intellectualists. The movement of the *Neo-Christians,* the opponents of Communism are sympathetically described; but their failure to stem the tide is marked. A brief but clear account is given in the eighth chapter of Tolstoy's Religious Anarchism.

With the ninth chapter we pass to the present conflict. The Communist Theory of Religion is described. Its antecedents are stated in one sentence: "German Hegelian philosophy merged with the French materialism through the influence of Feuerbach, who interpreted religion anthropologically and prepared the ground for the Marxian development of Dialectical Materialism," in which Marx gave to religion "a social-economic interpretation characterizing it as 'the opiate of the people' " (p. 174). Not only was there thus a theoretical opposition between Communism and Religion, but, as Chapter X shows, the Russian Church identified itself with the old order of Czarism, and challenged the new order of Communism. Inevitable was the conflict of the Church with the Revolution; and the Church played its game so badly that it lost. Of the compromise in the Living Church movement a more sympathetic account is given than is usually allowed to reach us here in Great Britain, as many of the losers in the game are as exiles carrying on an active propaganda against it. The Sobor (the Supreme Church Council) of 1923, under the control of this party, "assured the Government of its undivided sympathy and loyalty, declared capitalism a deadly sin, and pronounced the social revolution just. In this way it annulled the anathemas of the previous Sobor, and recognized the decrees of separation of Church and State, of nationalization of Church property, and even these limitations on the rights of citizenship which were imposed upon the clergy and the Church as a punishment for counter-revolutionary activities" (p. 213). This submission has not saved the Church from further oppression. Since 1929 all social activity or religious propaganda of the Church is forbidden, as is the education of youth in religion; only worship is allowed, although under many pretexts hindered.

On the contrary, the next three chapters give the record of the anti-religious movement, show how the collectivization of industry is made to subserve the atheist propaganda, and how thoroughly the anti-religious propaganda is being organized, and how effective are the methods adopted. The author

shows, however, that, despite these seeming advantages, there is a waning interest among the young in the anti-religious movement, and that "the constructive programme of the Five-Year Plan" is absorbing their interest. "The more thoughtful," he says, "are beginning to ask the eternal questions of 'whence' and 'whither,' and have not received satisfactory answers. The old anti-clerical agitation does not appeal to them any more, they desire something more constructive and interesting, and in this respect the anti-religious movement has so far failed to meet the demand" (p. 223). What I miss in this otherwise competent record is a more adequate recognition of the severity of the persecution of ministers of religion, the hardships and sufferings imposed on them under the pretext that they are not discharging any socially useful function, and the constant pressure on the people to abandon their religious belief and worship—facts of which there is ample, trustworthy evidence.

In the last chapter on the Outlook the author states his own conviction that there is no future for the former established Church of Russia, although it may linger longer than its Communist opponents expect, nor yet for the Evangelical Sectarians, because of their fundamentalism, their refusal to adapt themselves to the new situation. Indulging in prophecy he forecasts the probable future thus: "Step by step, in place of the abandoned cults and traditions, the new life creates its own social and cultural forms. We see, therefore, no reason why the former institutions of organized religion should not disappear altogether and be replaced by something new, a higher synthesis in form and content of the obscure cults and idealogies of the past. A few centuries hence historians and sociologists, in analysing the superstructure of classless society, will point out that there are many survivals, rudiments and developments of what once used to be called religion" (p. 271).

Recognizing the value of the volume as history, I shall close by discounting the author's prophecy by two comments. It is not so certain that the present economic social order in Russia will endure throughout the centuries. It is not so improbable that a revived and reformed Christianity of the Orthodox Russian type may again win the mind and the heart of the Russian people; for this many outside as well as within Russia are working, praying, and hoping. Which of these alternative anticipations the reader will be inclined to adopt will depend largely on the estimate of value he forms of Communism on the one hand and Religion on the other. Mine is not the author's.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

Science and God. By BERNHARD BAVINK. Translated by H. STAFFORD HATFIELD. (London: G. Bell & Sons. 1933. Pp. ix + 174. Price 5s.)

This little book is weightier in thought and suggestion than its slight bulk would indicate. It sketches in a lucid manner the world-picture of the classical physics, traces the events which led to its collapse, and outlines a "programme for the solution" of certain central philosophical problems in the light of this scientific revolution.

The conclusion drawn from physics is that the world consists of "completely independent units of action," and therefore that no *laws* concerning the behaviour of these or of macroscopic objects can be established. The scientist as such asserts that these "actions" are undetermined, or a matter of "pure chance" (p. 118), but on other grounds he is at liberty to say that they are "freely determined" by God, and that their nature is spiritual (analogous to our acts of will). The author does so conclude, thus tentatively resolving the "most indigestible of all our philosophic problems" (p. 21).

The most important suggestion of the book is that these actions exist only as elements "of a more comprehensive Gestalt or form, which alone would have real existence" (p. 111). A hierarchy of such forms is thus postulated in which the highest are individual and unrepeatable—and so incalculable. This is the basis of life and freedom, which can thus be accounted for without "bad vitalistic reasoning." For the effective study of a universe so constituted a Gestalt mathematics is required (of which the rudiments are already provided in the "newer logic").

The doctrines of the "free determination" of the unitary "actions" by God, and of a hierarchy of "forms," are not effectively integrated, but the author sees clearly that this problem leads immediately to that of God's will in relation to such other wills as may be operative.

Obviously these matters cannot be discussed here, and the issue most sharply raised—namely, that of causation—concerns not this book only but the whole of contemporary philosophy of science. Perhaps it may be observed, however, that in just this case (of the causal principle) the physicist's generally justifiable habit of denying the existence of what he cannot observe or deduce may be out of place. This principle is certainly not observed or deduced, but is the presupposition of both, and our final inability to calculate the behaviour of "Planck's h" (or the unit of action) may not—as Planck himself argues—affect the question as to the validity of this principle.

Certain of the author's observations on contemporary theology are wise and timely; but some passages and phrases—*e.g.* about Aryans, Bolshevism, etc.—accord so well with the present temper of Germany as to seem quaint in cool English print.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

Life Beyond Death in the Beliefs of Mankind. By JAMES THAYER ADDISON. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1933. Pp. x + 309. Price 8s. 6d.)

Mr. Addison has collected from manifold sources the leading types of belief in life after death. About a third of the book is given to primitive faiths, and the remainder to the beliefs of the more developed religions, treated comparatively by grouping the teaching round the various ideas embodied in these faiths, such as heaven, hell, judgment, transmigration, and so forth. His objective is the general reader, although the book will perhaps be of most service to theological students and others preparing for examinations in the Comparative Study of Religions. The first part is work of a kind that has been done much more fully by Sir J. G. Frazer and others, but in the larger works the amassing of evidence sometimes bewilders the more casual reader, and Mr. Addison's shorter account may be more valuable to them. It is well done, considering the limitation of space, and presents a representative account of the chief types of belief in primitive races.

The second part is commendably impartial, even where the controversial is touched upon, as in the case of the doctrines of purgatory and indulgences. The chapter on belief in hell shows what unimaginative dullards the Western literalists have been in comparison with the thought of the East, which has invented hells of every type, hot and cold, and torments that make the European mediaeval hell a health resort in comparison! Naturally, heaven is made to match on the opposite side, whether it be the Sultan's palace of Muhammad, or the Pure Land of Amitabha Buddha.

Mr. Addison has succeeded in marshalling his array of material in such a manner that justice is done to all the leading religions, and in providing a

good bibliography has made further study easier. It would not be difficult to point out omissions, and occasionally one might criticize the importance of some of the passages cited, but judging the book by what it offers, it must be admitted that it has succeeded in giving what it intended in a manner that may justly be called admirable, and one congratulates Mr. Addison accordingly.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Modern Tendencies in World Religions. By CHARLES SAMUEL BRADEN, Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1933. Pp. xi + 343. Price 10s.)

Such a book as this must necessarily soon be outdated, but at the moment it is full of interest. It is said by some that the awakening of the East is superficial, and that below the surface things are unchanged. Dr. Braden's book will not be found to confirm that view. He deals with Islam, Hinduism, and Judaism, as well as the religious life of Japan, China, and Russia, and finds everywhere the ferment of ideas. In some cases nationalism is a factor, for racial pride is touched when the religion inherited from the fathers is patently out of line with progress, as in the case of the position of child wives and widows in India. Islam in Turkey has suffered because it has proved a barrier to the Westernization of that land. Japan seems inclined to a composite notion of religion mingling Shinto, Buddhist, and Christian ideas, if we are to judge from some of the authorities quoted. But the real difficulty in assessing Dr. Braden's book is just this question of authorities. It would be misleading if the currents of thought in the Church of England were judged simply from one of the papers which represent its various bodies of opinion, and one thinks that some of the articles quoted by Dr. Braden represent few beside their authors. No one man can have personal acquaintance with so many different faiths, and Dr. Braden and his readers must accept much that is said here as subject to revision. Yet, even so, the book is singularly readable and interesting. Not the least important chapter is that which deals with Russia. No one knows precisely what is happening to religion there. The Japanese Government, in its fear of communism, has tried hard lately to encourage religion, just as Russian communism has tried to destroy it. That the atheist policy of the Soviet has had some success is undeniable, but unless it can make a record in history by substituting the State for God, its difficulties are yet ahead. Dr. Braden's book affords abundant material alike for the student of religion and of sociology, and deserves the attention of both.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

The "De Sacramento Altaris" of William of Ockham. Edited by T. BRUCE BIRCH, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of Philosophy in Wittenberg College. Latin Text and English Translation. (Burlington, Iowa: The Lutheran Literary Board. 1930. Pp. xlvii + 576.)

In the Introduction we have a brief account of Ockham's life, a still briefer account of the MSS. and printed editions of his work *De Sacramento Altaris* (or *De Corpore Christi*, as it is called in the Balliol MS.), and a long series of quotations from modern writers setting forth their opinions of Ockham, his importance, and his influence, especially on Luther. A page from the printed edition, published at Agrigentum in 1491, is reproduced. Also a page from

the Balliol MS., which is in the reproduction quite illegible, whereas the MS. itself is in excellent condition and by no means illegible.

The text is based mainly on the printed Strasburg edition of 1491 and on the Balliol MS. 299. The passages which I compared with the manuscript agree word for word with the original. The critical apparatus is printed at the end of the book, together with the notes and a long and useful bibliography.

The chief merit of this edition of Ockham's treatise on the Eucharist lies in the text, which has hitherto been accessible only in MSS. and in black letter editions full of abbreviations and difficult to decipher, save to the expert. Though the work purports to be theological, its groundwork is philosophical. We have in it a clear account of Ockham's views on mathematics and on quantity, of conflicting theories which he repudiates, and of the bearing of these philosophic doctrines on the doctrine of the Real Presence. Incidentally, Ockham stands revealed in it as an original, but not as an unorthodox, thinker; for, as the editor remarks, there is "a ring of sincerity in all his declarations of belief in the fundamental doctrines of the Church." He accepts the Church's teaching on the Eucharist, but seeks to simplify the philosophic interpretation of it, which in his view is unnecessarily cumbrous. Nowhere is the application of his famous "razor" more plainly manifest than it is in this interesting work.

The chief defect of the edition is in the translation, which is full of mistakes and is often quite misleading. *Nullo modo* is rendered by "in no mode"; *simul* is translated "at the same time" even when it refers to magnitudes which are coincident; *inexistens alteri*, which means to exist in something else, is translated "non-existent to another"; parts which *nec faciunt aliquod unum* are said "not to make some one"; *natum* with the infinitive is translated "created to"; *unum per accidens* = "one by an accident"; *sine omni mutatione* = "without an entire change"; *anima intellectiva* = "rationable soul"; *contingere* is translated by "to touch," even though the context makes it clear that it means "to happen"; and so forth, not only in words and phrases, but in whole sentences, which make Ockham appear to be talking nonsense, whereas in reality he is at least trying to talk sound sense.

LESLIE J. WALKER.

Psycho-Analysis and its Derivatives. By H. CRICHTON-MILLER, M.A., M.D. M.R.C.P. (London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd. 1933. Pp. 255. Price 2s. 6d. net.)

This book meets a definite need. Psycho-analysis has successfully survived that initial period of intolerance and persecution which is apt to be the fate of any new ferment of thought sufficiently powerful to compel adaptations in other branches of knowledge, and it is time that the man in the street should be able to acquire a good general idea of what it is all about. The series in which this book appears has that particular aim, and it may be said at once that this book is fully up to the general standard of the Home University Library. The subject is particularly difficult of condensation, but a clear account is given of the three main theories—of Freud, Adler, and Jung—and in spite of the stress laid on their differences, a newcomer to the subject will gain a strong impression of the richness and permanence of the soil which has already produced three such varying theories. A liberal use is made of quotations, which are aptly dovetailed into the text, and greatly assist the march of the arguments. The book should be of especial service to the medical profession, since owing to the absence of any provision for a

training in psychology, they must, in the mass, unfortunately be still regarded as members of that public for whom the book is primarily designed.

J. H. Sheldon.

Crime, Law, and Social Science. by Jerome Michael, Professor of Law in Columbia University, and Mortimer J. Adler, Associate Professor of the Philosophy of Law in the University of Chicago. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1933. Pp. xxix + 440. Price 15s.)

This is a treatise, written at the request of the School of Law of Columbia University, to determine whether it is desirable to establish an institute of criminology and criminal justice in the United States, but the considerations urged and the conclusions reached are of equal importance to the criminologists of this country.

A protracted investigation, conducted with exhaustive patience into the problems of crime, based upon practical and theoretical knowledge, results in certain conclusions as follows: First, that there is no scientific knowledge in the field of criminology; no knowledge of the causes of criminal behaviour exists, and psychology and sociology have not yet developed anything more than what the author calls "raw empiricism."

After the premature generalizations of Lombroso and other *a priori* writers, this is surely a refreshing modesty!

But, secondly, the authors hold that we have some knowledge descriptive of the processes and institutions of criminal justice—we have learned that the notion of retributive justice is untenable and that criminal law should be directed towards social good and not toward punitive retribution. Offenders should be divided into three classes, incorrigible, corrigible, and potential.

To construct a science of criminal law, where science is now absent, as well as such a science, historical and controvertive studies of criminal law are essential, and therefore the authors favour the establishment of an institute devoted to research both theoretical and empirical.

Common-sense knowledge has proved itself inadequate to cope with the practical problem of controlling crime—that is to say, new historical records and statistics do not really assist to prevent the growth of the criminal mind.

In conclusion, the authors are driven to the view that the department of psychology dealing with crime and criminals is non-existent, and that the whole task remains not only to be completed but even to be begun.

It is typical of a certain modern approach to these problems that in the index neither the word "sin" nor the word "religion" appears. This is not due to any insufficiency in the index, but arises from a complete absence in the text of any theological consideration of crime and wrongdoing. A painstaking but essentially uninspired book.

Henry Slesser.

The Structure of Our Apprehension of Reality. By C. Lambek. Translated from the Danish by Agnete Kortsen. (Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard; London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1933. Pp. 95. Price 4s. 6d. net.)

This work by a Danish writer who has for more than thirty years carried out investigations into the structure of the psycho-physiological processes aims at the exposition of the necessity and nature of a dynamic approach to the study of our apprehension of reality. Regarding cognition as an endeavour to master future experience, he insists upon the epistemological

importance of the fact that we are living beings who in need of controlling future experience require an apprehension of reality and cannot abandon an inquiry into real coherence. The essay, though modest and unpretentious, and though presumably only a preliminary epistemological effort containing promise of further elaboration, is valuable because of its attempt to examine notions that play an important part in life and knowledge, and to shape and appraise philosophical issues in accordance with its dynamic standpoint.

B. M. LAING.

Conversion: the Old and the New in Religion from Alexander the Great to Augustine of Nippo. By A. D. NOCK. (London: Oxford: Clarendon Press; Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. xii + 309. Price 15s. net.)

Such a volume as this—so wide in its learning, so clear in its style, so well-arranged in its matter, so competent in its handlings—claims grateful welcome and confident recommendation. My only criticisms are that the title does not adequately cover the varied contents, that the Notes are relegated to the end, and that for me at least the attitude of the writer seems too detached. To whet the appetite of the reader, the Contents, of which there is a good Table, may be briefly indicated. After in the first chapter distinguishing Conversion as a thorough change of mind and life from social acceptance of the current religion and adhesion to a new cult without abandonment of the old, this idea of conversion is shown in the second chapter to be absent from Greek religion before Alexander the Great, an absence typical of the Greek mind. The conquests of Alexander are in the third chapter shown to have led to closer contacts of Greeks and Orientals, and consequently to "the creation of new mixed forms of worship." The same result followed from the opposite current, described in the fifth chapter: "the migration of Orientals and orientalized Greeks into great cities." Similarly, as Chapter V shows, was the path to Rome taken by such Eastern cults; but here there was more State control and more Romanization. How these travelled to Rome is described in the sixth chapter. Chapter VII discusses the Appeal, and Chapter VIII the success of these cults. They had the attraction of novelty; they promised divine protection in the larger and stranger world presented in expanding knowledge; they afforded some assurance regarding the hereafter; and they gratified the inquisitiveness about the supernatural and the desire for revelation. An instance of what may be described as a conversion is offered in Chapter IX, that of Lucius as told by Apuleius. The Last Phase of Paganism—conversion back from Christianity—is illustrated in the tenth chapter in the cases of Porphyry, Julian, and an unknown senator. The following chapter, the eleventh, should have special interest for the readers of this Journal, as it deals with the more frequent instances of conversion to philosophy. "Philosophy held a dominant place because (1) it offered intelligible explanations of phenomena; (2) it offered a life with a scheme, a discipline, and a goal; (3) it produced the saints of antiquity; (4) it had the influence of the living teacher; (5) it made a literary appeal" (pp. xi–xii). Passing in the last three chapters to Christianity, the author first describes the spread of Christianity as a Social Phenomenon, next its teaching as viewed by a pagan, and lastly three types of conversion, Justin, Arnobius, and Augustine. Its success he ascribes to its power to satisfy the current religious needs, as indicated in the previous chapters, rather than to "the human personality of Jesus as portrayed in the Synoptic Gospels." While most of its doctrines were intelligible to the thought of the age, the idea of incarnation did seem strange, as also the doctrine of the

resurrection of the body. "In general, Christianity could be represented as the cream of the best thought of antiquity" (p. xii). The mass of the material included can be commanded by the use of the excellent Index. The treatment throughout is so objective that it would be difficult to ascertain whether the author himself accepts the Christian faith or not. His last sentence would at least appear to negative any such assumption: " 'Here we have no final revelation of truth,' said John Inglesant, and this applies to any of our attempts to follow the history of man's gropings after ultimate reality just as fully as it must needs to those gropings themselves" (p. 271).

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

Science and the Spirit of Man. By JULIUS W. FRIEND and JAMES FEIBLEMAN. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1933. Pp. 336. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

"There are symptoms on all sides that the modern cosmology has reached the zenith of the possibility of its accomplishment and is already at the beginning of its decline. Never was empiricism more desperately defended; never was positivism more clamorous. . . . Yet despite the clamour of empiricism, faith is falling away from salvation by the control of physical nature, and also from subscription to irrational action. In the affairs of Western man, as empiricism is about to fall and nothing yet crystallizes to take its place, confusion is the burden and despair sets the moral tone. In physical science developments have taken place which call for a departure from empiricism, the very emotional substance by which science was nurtured, and for which it seemed to stand" (pp. 120–1). The present book is an attempt in a situation thus envisaged to push over the old fabric of cosmology and provide a map to help the new order on its way. But, just as the view attacked would be better called "naturalism" than empiricism, what the authors wish to put in its place is not anything that would ordinarily be described as a variety of rationalism, but rather a form of pragmatistic humanism strongly opposed to physical realism. However, although the book is in some respects very well and even brilliantly written, it is far from easy to discern the precise views expressed owing to a constant vagueness in the use of language. The authors employ words like "significance," "value," "concept," without showing any sign of having made up their minds precisely what they mean, and thus pass unjustifiably from the proposition that these are *in some sense or other* involved in the determination of what is objective to the proposition that all science and all the facts of nature have objectivity only relatively to human needs or human values. (It is surely an extravagantly loose way of speaking to describe, *e.g.*, sense and time indiscriminately as "values.")

This is not to say that the book is without many instances of fine philosophical insight and many suggestive points that might bear excellent fruit if further developed and clarified. The second chapter (on "The Historical Background") gives a fine bird's-eye view of the whole development of thought in certain respects, though it is very misleading to treat the subject as if the idealist school never existed and as if the history of modern thought were reducible simply to the progressive triumph of naturalism. The third chapter consists of an argument to show that recent scientific theories, especially the relativity theory, make physical realism impossible. It is ably argued, but the authors pass too rapidly from results valid for science to results valid for philosophy, and at several points there seems to me to be a *non-sequitur*, as in (*a*) the transition from the proposition that a characteristic can only be measured relatively to standards of reference to the proposition

that it can only exist thus relatively; (*b*) the assertion that causal laws are truisms following from a definition; (*c*) the transition from subjectivism about the physical world to the conclusion that no true theory can come in conflict with "the most basic human needs" or "insult human dignity." (I think the authors are here again misled by the ambiguous word "value.") No doubt there were some arguments in their minds intended to establish these conclusions, but such are not elaborated. In Chapter IV, on Psychology, they ably reassert the place of reason in human life, while denying that it can be an end-in-itself, and emphasizing the progressive and partial character of truth. This chapter contains many points of value. The last and more metaphysical chapter, while it suffers from the defects mentioned above, again contains fine passages and highly suggestive ideas, especially in the account of art and religious experience. While we must once more protest against the careless use of language and the too frequent occurrence of vague rhetoric, the book as a whole is an inspiring, if uneven, essay on philosophy, containing some fine ideas, and we might look for much from the authors if they would train themselves to make up their mind what they mean by words and use them precisely.

A. C. EWING.

The Meaning and Truth of Religion. By EUGENE WILLIAM LYMAN. (New York and London: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1933. Pp. xvi + 468. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

The purpose of this excellent volume, which I have read with great interest and almost entire accord, and which I can very warmly recommend, is timely. "The task of reconstructing our whole social order is upon us, and there is imperative need for such an interpretation of religion as will make clear its relevance to that task" (p. ix). While this practical purpose is kept steadily in view, the theoretic discussion is no less thorough on that account, but adequately informed and competently discerning. In the Introduction this purpose is more fully discussed; and the following three parts deal with Religious Experience, Religious Knowledge, and Religious Beliefs and their Rational Grounds. The first and second parts exhibit the meaning, and the third the truth of religion, or its value and its validity.

Religion, it is claimed, is fitted for the task assigned to it, because, when it is not merely conservative but creative, it can produce courage, reason, and love (p. 16), and so can prove itself a creative energy. Religion can deal with the present social problems, as it by memory preserves its past inheritance, enters by experience into the possession of its present resources, and on these bases its future expectations. "Men of the present may be inspired with such creative faith as will enable them to deal victoriously with the problems of war, of social justice, of race relations, and as will give them open-mindedness and resourcefulness for each of the social problems with which they are confronted" (p. 47). The vital characteristics of religion are "an experience of *kinship* with a human group" (p. 53), of "*power* (inspiration, enthusiasm, newness of life)" (p. 56), of "*insight* into truth and value" (p. 60), of "integrity (salvation)" (p. 63), by "the way of loyalty and obedience" (p. 65), "the way of realization" (p. 66), "the way of transformation" (p. 67), "the way of wonder" (p. 68), which is creative of "beauty in the presence of the mysteriously meaningful" (p. 69). The definition of religion resulting from this analysis is that—"religion is an experience of kinship with the Deepest Reality in the Universe, and hence of membership in an infinitely meaningful

world and of sharing in an ever-unfolding life" (p. 74). Space forbids as close an analysis of subsequent chapters, but this will indicate the writer's method.

One chapter discusses the relation of religion to ethics, and another to mysticism. Christianity is recognized as creative religion because it synthesizes the four types of religion: the ethical, the mystical, the aesthetic, and the philosophical; it relates goodness, truth, and beauty to the reality of God. That religion can claim to be the way of truth is shown in the second part on Religious Knowledge: first, the right of religious faith alongside of scientific inquiry is established; second, the relation of value and validity is shown; and, third, a place is claimed for intuition, not as a rival to but as an ally of reason.

This claim is further discussed in the third part, which seeks to show that there are rational grounds for religious beliefs in God, in Man and his Ideals, and in a Spiritual Universe. Naturalism and Pantheism are both rejected and Theism is accepted. It is shown that the new cosmology is not hostile but rather favourable to Theism. Evolution can be so reinterpreted as to lead to Theism, and so can Human History. Human personality can be so conceived as to justify the affirmation of liberty and immortality, and its ultimate values can be related to ultimate reality, since for the Problem of Evil such a solution can be found as justifies faith. The two extremes of the assertion of the transcendence of God and of the emphasis on His immanence must be avoided. "The counterpart of the insight that God is both transcendent and immanent is the conception that the universe is spiritual in respect to its ground and at the same time presents to all finite spirits a great task of spiritualization. . . . The comprehensive goal for this creative synthesis we may best apprehend as the Building of the Beloved Community" (pp. 436–7).

The writer thus gets to the goal of his practical purpose. "A faith which discovers that the transcendent God, who is the ultimate creative ground of the universe, and whose inherent nature is Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, is also immanent in human aspirations and idealistic strivings, and is most fully manifested in human personalities completely dedicated to the building of the Beloved Community, cannot be other than the supreme spiritual dynamic. . . . Such a faith can make religion both the supreme way to spiritual fulfilment and the supreme spring of spiritual power for mankind through the ages" (p. 456). It has been impossible to show in detail how solidly the conclusions indicated are based on adequate up-to-date knowledge, and how competent the author has proved himself for his task. Amid the doleful voices in the present distress, it is refreshing and cheering to meet with the intellectual confidence, moral courage, spiritual reliance of the "creative faith" of the author, which I fully share with him, and for the confirmation of which by him I am truly grateful.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

The Psychology of Infancy. By VICTORIA HAZLITT, D.Litt. (London: Methuen & Co. 1933. Pp. ix. + 149. Price 5s. net.)

During the last few years a very large number of books have appeared dealing with the early development of children, so that we probably now know more in detail about the first three years or so of the child's life than we do of any other period of human existence. It is clear that Dr. Hazlitt had made a very exhaustive and critical study of the literature up to the time of her death, and as the books that have been published since that time have made little alteration in the general picture, Dr. Hazlitt's attempt

at a synthetic and critical study remains of great interest and value. Dr. Margaret McFarlane, who has edited this book with great care and efficiency, points out that it is based not only on a study of the existing literature, but upon much first-hand observation, and no instructed reader could doubt this fact. But no parade is made of the patient original investigation that must have gone into the making of the book. Dr. Hazlitt seems throughout more willing to give credit to others than to assume it for herself.

The book deals first with the development in the child of sensorial and muscular control, then with the acquisition of walking, speech, and other habits, next with the growth of the higher mental processes, and finally with the architecture of character. Throughout Dr. Hazlitt never expresses an opinion without giving the facts upon which her opinion is based, and never criticizes another writer without a careful consideration of the concrete evidence that is available. Perhaps in consequence of this admirable caution her general notion of the psychology of the young child is neither quite in line with the view that growth comes by the building up of more and more complex structures and reactions out of originally discrete elements, nor with the view that the earliest reactions and objects are already organized. Further, while she is fully alive to the importance of active and seeking reactions she is somewhat sceptical in regard to many of the more extreme Freudian formulations.

Undoubtedly in various ways and places the book remains incomplete. One feels that Dr. Hazlitt would have added much both to the critical and to the constructive value of her treatment had life afforded her the opportunity. Particularly is this the case in her most suggestive discussion of recognition, memory, and thinking. She here seems to me to get far nearer than most people have done to the actual mental processes of the infant, and it is greatly to be hoped that some students who knew and were attracted by her way of approach will carry her hints much farther than she was able to do.

The book was well worthy of publication. It will stand as a record of what a thoroughly level-headed and competent psychologist can do in this field. I think that probably more than any other work by its author it will bring home to us how great a loss British psychology suffered by her untimely death.

F. C. BARTLETT.

The Organism of the Mind. By G. RICHARD HEYER, M.D. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1933. Pp. xiii + 271. Price 15s.)

This book, which is described in the sub-title as "An Introduction to Psychotherapy," is not so much an introduction to psychotherapeutic practice as an exposition of the principles upon which psychotherapy should, in the author's opinion, be based. The book falls into two parts, of which the first is devoted to "organ neurosis," *i.e.* psychogenic disturbances expressing themselves characteristically as impairments of bodily function. From his study of this class of symptom the author concludes that "the bodily and mental worlds are not two distinct fields of being (a false assumption which has given rise to such fundamentally erroneous theories as that of psycho-physical parallelism, that of reciprocal action, etc.)." "It behoves us," he continues, "to regard 'mind' and 'body' as merely two phenomenal forms of one and the same 'life.'" Life is regarded as manifesting itself in a series of psychophysical 'cycles' or 'spheres' corresponding to the level of development or phase of differentiation reached. These cycles, which correspond both to historical phases of organic evolution and levels of animal life, are represented

in the individual not only as stages of development but also as layers of mental structure. Dr. Heyer recognizes four great 'cycles' constituting a hierarchy in the human organism, viz.: (1) the vegetative cycle of nutrition which manifests itself particularly in the gastro-intestinal functions; (2) the animal cycle of circulation, which mediates the dynamic 'thymic' world of impulse and in particular of sexual impulse; (3) the pneumatic cycle of respiration, in which the polarity of rhythm already established at the circulatory level reaches consciousness, and in which the "spiritual" (N.B. *spiritus*) is foreshadowed; (4) the truly mental cycle associated with the higher differentiation of the nervous system—a cycle which is only as yet feebly represented in the life of modern man. The organic neuroses are regarded as expressions either of undue repression of the urges belonging to the lower vital cycles or of undue surrender to them on the part of the spiritual ego. This type of interpretation is reminiscent of the Freudian concepts of 'fixation' and 'regression,' but Dr. Heyer rejects the sexual orientation of Freud's "libido theory."

The second part of the present volume is devoted to the consideration of psychotherapeutic methods. The theories of Freud, Adler, and Jung are each considered in turn, but no systematic exposition is attempted. A tribute is paid to Freud as the pioneer whose researches into "depth psychology" have laid the foundation of modern psychotherapy, and dealt a death-blow to the barren rationalism of the nineteenth century by revealing the non-rational basis of life. The author feels, however, that, by surrendering to the reductive "nothing but" method of analysis, Freud failed to rise above the limitations of "the bourgeois century." Freud is also criticized on the grounds that, while appreciating that life is based upon non-rational instinctive urges, he recognized no basic urges except those belonging to the sphere of sex. This, of course, is unfair to Freud, whose main endeavour during the past ten years has been to emphasize the basic function of the aggressive impulses. It is surprising that Dr. Heyer should have completely ignored this characteristic aspect of Freudian thought—particularly in view of the importance attached to the concepts of 'rhythm' and 'polarity' by Dr. Heyer himself. One might have expected the Freudian antithesis of 'love-hate' to have appealed to a writer who attaches such importance to the polarities of 'systole-diastole' (cycle of the circulation) and 'inspiration-expiration' (cycle of the respiration), and who finds the keystone of his system in the notion that the development of life out of the *prima materia* has been inseparably accompanied by the formation of polar opposites. However, it is to Jung rather than Freud that Dr. Heyer looks for his inspiration. Whilst denying that his book is an exposition of Jungian doctrines, he admits that his own system of thought "has grown out of that of Jung and has been fertilized by his ideas." It would appear that he has also been directly influenced by Oriental thought quite apart from the Oriental influences mediated by Jungian psychology. Such influences explain the mystical atmosphere which pervades the book and which manifests itself in the author's interpretation of the numerous drawings of patients, which are reproduced in an appendix. It is characteristic that Dr. Heyer should consider the objective methods of modern science as inadequate for the understanding of mental processes and as requiring to be supplemented by intuitive appreciation.

In general the book is interesting and stimulating; it is well worth reading if only for the glimpse it gives into the vast fields which the study of psychogenic disease opens out to investigators who possess psychological and philosophical insight as well as medical qualifications.

W. R. D. Fairbairn.

Psychical Research. By Professor HANS DRIESCH. (London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd. 1933. Pp. xvi + 176. Price 5s.)

Such scanty interest as is accorded to the subject of Psychical Research by the majority of scientists and philosophers is wont to exhaust itself in asking the mere initial question: Is there, indeed, any reliable evidence in the matter at all? And this question too often remains without a definite answer. One cannot expect an analysis of the evidence to be undertaken in a book whose avowed aim it is to deal with the methodology of the subject and to act as a guide to the experimenter; but one is well rewarded in finding an outspoken expression of the author's opinions on the evidential question together with the conclusions which he draws from them.

Professor Driesch has divided his book into two main sections. In the first of these he enumerates and classifies the various forms of deception which have to be encountered and overcome; while in the second he discusses the theoretical headings under which the phenomena fall. If we agree with him that telepathy is a proved fact, his argument shows that a deep and far-reaching philosophical importance attaches to it. "We have," he says, "spontaneous telepathy as a quite certain fundamental phenomenon. Nobody who has thoroughly studied *Phantasms of the Living* (Gurney) and its supplements, as well as the remaining good literature, can doubt it." And in the following pages he proceeds to demonstrate the failure of any attempt to explain telepathy on a physical basis. Exhibiting, as it does, an independence of distance, and a selectivity so complete as to exclude as percipients all individuals except the relevant person; and transmitting (if the word is permissible) its meanings unclothed in any discoverable form of symbolism, it differs essentially from any physical method of communicating ideas.

This fact necessitates the hypothesis of a "mental field"—"a non-spatial connecting framework for many souls, a framework which must now, however, be expressly valid as a field for *single causal* happenings." Such a non-spatial and non-sensuous type of interrelation (which, as Professor Driesch holds, is foreshadowed by the *entelechy* of his vitalistic biology), he thinks to be sufficient of itself to refute the theory of psycho-mechanical parallelism.

There arise, however, further facts and difficulties out of the "metagnomic" acquisition of the contents of other minds, and these drive us, so the author holds, to a choice between two ultimate hypotheses. We must either postulate the existence of a universal, supernormal *subject,* which "contains in itself all the plans of the lives of all human beings," and to which the sensitive or "metagnome" has access; or we must accept the spiritualistic theory of personal, post-mortem existence and action, to which he prefers to give the name of "Monadism." These theories make about equal claims on conceptions which are new to science, and the final choice between them can be decided by further research alone.

The translation is by Mr. Theodore Besterman, and there is an appreciative foreword by Sir Oliver Lodge.

G. N. M. TYRRELL.

Functional Affinities of Man, Monkeys, and Apes. By S. ZUCKERMAN, D.Sc., M.R.C.S. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1933. Pp. xviii + 203. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

In spite of the great amount of work that has been done on the subject, there is still a good deal of uncertainty as to the relationships and evolutionary history of the animals belonging to the great mammalian Order of the Primates, which includes the lemurs, monkeys, apes, and man. The morpho-

logical and palaeontological evidence is insufficient to decide the questions at issue, and, particularly with regard to the evolution of man, there is still considerable divergence of opinion among the experts. Thus Professor Wood Jones holds the heterodox view that man developed from a simple generalized form like *Tarsius* quite independently of monkeys and apes.

Dr. Zuckerman, who recently published an excellent book on *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes* (1932), has in this new volume attempted to supplement the morphological evidence as to the relationships of the Primates by collecting together what is known about their "functional" characteristics, that is to say, their physiology and behaviour. Accordingly he deals among other things with the various mechanisms of reproduction found within the group, with the reactions of their blood, the physiology of their sense-organs, and generally with their behaviour in relation to the development of their brain. The sections on behaviour are perhaps the most interesting to the general reader.

Evidence is accumulating that at least some monkeys (of the genus *Cebus*) are little if at all inferior to chimpanzees in "intelligence" as judged by their power of utilizing various objects as tools.

On the whole, the functional data brought forward by Zuckerman are consistent with the orthodox view of the relationships of these forms, as reflected in the commonly accepted scheme of classification given on p. 17.

E. S. Russell.

Modern Theories of Law. Various. (London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. vii + 229. Price 8s. 6d.)

This book contains the text of ten lectures delivered at the London School of Economics in 1932. It is intended to provide an introduction to modern legal theory. There is a somewhat rambling re-examination of Austin by Professor Manning; a pleasant summary of the achievements and limitations of Sir Henry Maine by Dr. Robson; Mr. Meyendorff provides a fascinating glimpse of Leo Petrazycki, "the only one who has undertaken to re-examine the process of human motivation, and having analysed the dynamics or mechanism of the urges and repulsions which have a normative power, has begun to discover the process by which the individual and the community come to share or to differ in their legal and moral concepts, and form moral and legal averages never changing, some decaying, others in formation" (p. 28). Sir Maurice Amos provides a brief summary of the work of Dean Roscoe Pound. Professor Goodhart has little difficulty in showing the confusions into which some American realists have been led by their misunderstanding of scientific method and their misuse of physical analogies. Mr. Wortley provides a short account of the work of Francois Geny.

Interesting as these lectures may have been, it is probable that the student will turn with more eagerness to the critical examination of Renard, Stammler, Kelsen, and Duguit provided by Dr. Jennings, Professor Ginsberg, Dr. P. Lauterpacht, and Professor Laski respectively. It is probable also that he will be a little disappointed. For it is obvious that the lecturers were more interested in their subjects' criticisms of other theories than with their actual contribution to a theory of law. Dr. Jennings finds that the Institutional school of Renard and Hauriou suffers from "a confusion of method," failing to distinguish sociology and philosophy. "The real value of Renard's work consists partly in its renewed emphasis upon the disappearance of individualistic law . . . and partly in the numerous incidental but fruitful comments

which the author almost casually throws out." It is just these "incidental but fruitful comments" which a brief survey cannot give. Professor Laski, while agreeing with Duguit's criticisms of the classic theory of sovereignty, considers that as soon "as he embarked upon the task of discovering a constructive alternative, he missed the central necessity of his theory—a criterion of justice to which the specific commands of positive law must conform" (p. 66). To Dr. Ginsberg "the task of legal philosophy would seem to be not to rest content with the idea of justice as a remote idea of reason, but to endeavour to give it concrete form by defining the proximate conditions of the harmonious realization of human purposes" (p. 49). But he does not think that Stammler has succeeded where Kant failed in working out the implications of the idea of rationality in relation to human conduct. All students will be grateful for Dr. Lauterpacht's lucid statement of Kelsen's pure science of law, but whether they will be helped to a clear understanding of the nature of law is more doubtful. Kelsen, he tells us, "does not regard the law conceived as the sum-total of legal rules as a will. Neither does he regard it as a command or a psychological process or even a social reality. It is the product of a mental operation . . . the science of law is a branch of normative sciences as distinguished from natural sciences; . . . the legal rule is concerned with what the positive law shall be, and not with the question why positive law is obeyed or what the positive law ought to be" (p. 108). If we ask why the constitution should be obeyed, the only answer that can be given is that it should be obeyed because we have adopted as an initial hypothesis of the legal system the fundamental norm that the constitution shall be obeyed (p. 109). This fundamental norm is not grounded "in a material ethical value, for instance, that of justice" (p. 111). But once adopted, it constitutes the beginning of an autonomous system governed by its own specific—not by causal—laws (p. 111). But just what is the nature of these specific laws is not made clear. The normative rules of logic, grammar, ethics, aesthetics, are discovered by reflecting upon the nature of thought, language, morals, beauty. But upon what must we reflect to develop the normative science of law: the existing social system, or our conception of justice?

K. SMELLIE.

Social Development in Young Children: A Study in Beginnings. By SUSAN ISAACS. (London: Routledge & Sons, 1933. Pp. vii + 480. Price 15s.)

This volume is the second of a series of three, and is based on the records of children who attended Dr. Isaacs' School in Cambridge over a period of three years. In Volume I the records are examined with reference to the children's intellectual growth. In the present volume the social development of the same children is the main theme. Dr. Isaacs is careful to point out, and rightly too, that the two aspects cannot be treated in complete isolation, and that in the present study the background discussed in the first volume must ever be remembered.

The main theme of the treatise is that although "social instincts" do not appear until a later age in the child's development, these do not emerge suddenly, but have a pre-history, and it is this pre-history which Dr. Isaacs seeks to trace and unravel.

The book is divided into two parts. Part I contains the records of the children and their interpretation. Part II deals with educational problems.

Part I is subdivided into three chapters. Chapter I is a short introductory chapter, but of importance in that it contains the writer's attitude to the

experiment, and her reasons for studying the whole child and his reaction to whole situations. Chapter II contains the actual records of the sayings and actions of the children concerned in so far as these show "social" behaviour. The records are arranged under two main heads: (1) love and hate in action; (2) the deeper sources of love and hate. Under the first head are included instances showing the child's primary ego-centric attitude, his hostility and aggression, and finally his friendliness and co-operation. Under the second head are examples of the various forms of sexuality, and illustrations of guilt and shame.

On first reading, these records seem rather wearisome, for they occupy 174 pages. But on a second reading their real significance emerges. They show clearly the thoughts and actions of a group of normal children and form a background to which isolated instances of behaviour can be referred. Thus a parent worried over the peculiar behaviour of his young child finds on glancing through the detailed records of his group that his own child is no exception to the rule, and that his shocking behaviour is merely an ordinary manifestation of normal children of his age. This, I think, is one of the most valuable parts of the book. On these records, too, Dr. Isaacs bases her interpretation of the theory of development which is contained in Chapter III, again a lengthy chapter of 195 pages, and one of great practical importance, arranged according to the same logical scheme as the previous chapter. The interpretation throughout is psycho-analytical in character, and some of the findings may not be acceptable to all. But the writer is to be congratulated on having written an outstandingly lucid and interesting account of child behaviour. All the aspects of the data collected are treated against the background of modern psycho-analytic theory, but all through the reader is impressed by the open-mindedness and unprejudiced attitude of the writer. She does not force her facts to fit the theory, nor strain them too far. Where the data are fragmentary, she has no hesitation in admitting this, and throughout the book her own observations are supported by observations from other writers. A very valuable portion of the chapter is devoted to projection, another to aggression, and another to play, to single out only three of the many topics discussed. All of these throw new light on children's attitudes, and ought to be known by all who come into close contact with children. The section devoted to the discussion of sexuality is treated with restraint, and should be of interest not only to psychologists, but to all educators and parents.

Part III of the book attempts to show the relationship between psycho-analysis and education in the light of the findings already set forth in the preceding chapter. The author rightly deprecates the use of an amateur psycho-analysis by the educator, and points out the harmful effects which inevitably follow. She condemns, too, the policy of absolute freedom for the child. "The idea that if we leave the child entirely free to do what he likes we are thereby 'avoiding repression' is a mistaken one" (p. 424). This should give the advocates of complete freedom for the child food for thought. There is also an interesting section on play and its effect in easing strain and tension.

The whole book well repays careful study. It is not written in popular language, for it is not intended to be a popular presentation. It is addressed to the scientific public as well as to students of psychology and education. It cannot be read hurriedly, nor does a cursory glance do it justice. It requires to be read slowly and carefully, and then it reveals a wealth of information about child-life and behaviour which will be of inestimable value to all concerned.

MARY COLLINS.

The Psychology of Laughter: A Study in Social Adaptation. By RALPH PIDDINGTON, M.A. (London: Figurehead Press. 1933. Pp. 227. Price 10s. 6d.)

This book is badly proportioned, no less than 130 of its admirably printed, but rather slight, pages being devoted to the statement and criticism of the views of far too many people, not all important. In consequence, the writer treats his own views too cursorily, and in spite of his evident erudition and ability his book appears superficial. We would have been content to sacrifice the greater part of the critical sections if we could have had a fuller examination of his thesis that laughter at the ludicrous protects society by making an anti-social event harmless. For "the ludicrous is always anti-social, a sudden blow to social sentiments centred about objects and traditions of minor importance." Laughter shows that we can ignore the fact for practical purposes. This view might be developed with a wider range of instances, as, for example, to show that the conservative need not reorganize his social reactions so long as he can find pleasure in the contrast between a proposed novelty and his familiar world, while the mere fact of laughing will render him less able to think of reasons for reconsidering his convictions.

A. W. WOLTERS.

Books received also:—

L. TOLSTOY (Tr. A. Maude; Introduction by The Hon. Mrs. A. Lyttelton). *A Confession and Gospel in Brief.* Vol. 11 of the Works of Leo Tolstoy Pp. xxiv + 539.

L. TOLSTOY (Tr. A. Maude; Introduction by Lady Sybil Smith). *On Life; and Essays on Religion.* Vol. 12 of the Works of Leo Tolstoy. Pp. xxix + 412. London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1934. £9 9s. for 21 volumes. Not sold separately.

S. V. KEELING, M.A., D. ès L. *Descartes.* London: Ernest Benn Ltd. 1934. Pp. xi + 282. 12s. 6d.

H. D. OAKELEY, M.A., D.Lit. *History and the Self.* London: Williams & Norgate Ltd. 1934. Pp. 286. 10s. 6d.

C. D. BROAD, Litt.D. *Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism.* Cambridge at the University Press. 1934. Pp. 48. 2s. 6d.

J. L. STOCKS. *On the Nature and Grounds of Religious Belief.* (Riddell Memorial Lectures, sixth series.) London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1934. Pp. 47. 2s. 6d.

J. E. TURNER, M.A., Ph.D. *Essentials in the Development of Religion: A Philosophic and Psychological Study.* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1934. Pp. 308. 12s. 6d.

L. SEIF. *Individual Psychology and Life Philosophy.* London: The C. W. Daniel Co. 1934. Pp. 59. 2s. 6d.

W. R. WILLIAMS, F.R.C.S. *Science and its History.* Printed for the author by E. J. Burrow & Co., Cheltenham and London. 1933. Pp. 19.

J. S. HUXLEY, M.A., and G. R. DE BEER, M.A., D.Sc. *The Elements of Experimental Embryology.* London: Cambridge University Press. 1934. Pp. xiii + 514. 25s.

W. PATER. *Marius the Epicurean.* (Introduction by O. Burdett.) London: J. M. Dent & Sons. 1934. Pp. xviii + 267. 2s.

R. B. BAKER, Ph.D. *The Concept of a Limited God. A Study in the Philosophy of Personalism.* Washington, D.C.: Shenandoah Publishing House, Inc. 1934. Pp. 234. $3.

Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Vol. IV, *The Simplest Mathematics.* (Ed. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss.) Cambridge, U.S.A.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. ix + 601. $6; 25s.

C. Pleydell-Bouverie. *The Cosmic Awakening.* London: Williams & Norgate Ltd. 1934. Pp. 183. 7s. 6d.

F. S. Rodkey, Ph.D. *An Historical Approach to the World Problems of To-day.* Urbana, U.S.A. Printed by Urbana Courier Co. 1934. Pp. 24. 25 cents.

G. P. Gooch, D.Litt., F.B.A. *The Unity of Civilization.* London: The Ethical Union. 1934. Pp. 19. 2½d.

A. K. Rogers. *Ethics and Moral Tolerance.* London: Macmillan & Co. 1934. Pp. 323. 10s.

H. McLachlan, M.A., D.D., F.R.Hist.S. *The Unitarian Movement in the Religious Life of England.* (1) *Its Contribution to Thought and Learning, 1700–1900.* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1934. Pp. 317. 10s. 6d.

Various. *Creativity, Politics, and the a priori.* (Symposia of Joint Session of Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, 1933.) London: Harrison & Sons Ltd. 1933. Pp. 219. 15s.

L. S. Stebbing, D.Lit. *Logic in Practice.* London: Methuen & Co. 1934. Pp. ix + 113. 2s. 6d.

J. H. Leuba. *God or Man? A Study of the Value of God to Man.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1934. Pp. xii + 338. 10s. 6d.

Mrs. Rhys Davids, D.Litt., M.A. *Indian Religion and Survival. A Study.* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1934. Pp. 96. 3s. 6d.

W. M. Kranefeldt. (Introduction by C. G. Jung; Tr. by R. M. Eaton.) *Secret Ways of the Mind. A Survey of the Psychological Principle of Freud, Adler, and Jung.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1934. Pp. xl + 188. 6s.

Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1932. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1933. Pp. xiii + 497. 70 cents.

L. S. Stebbing. *A Modern Introduction to Logic.* [Revised edition.] London: Methuen & Co. 1933. Pp. xx + 525. 15s.

R. Bayer, D. ès L. *Léonard de Vinci. La Grâce.* Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1933. Pp. 303. 30 frs.

R. Bayer, D. ès L. *L'esthétique de la Grâce.* Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. Tome 1: Pp. viii + 635. Tome 2: Pp. 581. 2 tomes ensemble 100 frs.

J. de la Vaissière. *Méthodologie scientifique.* (*Archives de Philosophie*, Vol. X, cahier 111.) Paris: G. Beauchesne et Fils. 1933. Pp. 109. 24 frs.

E. Augier. *Mécanismes et Conscience.* Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1934. Pp. 355. 30 frs.

J. Iwanicki, Dr.theol. *Leibniz et les démonstrations mathématiques de l'existence de Dieu.* Paris: J. Vrin. 1933. Pp. 316.

E. Duprèel. *La Cause et l'Intervalle, ou Ordre et Probabilité.* Bruxelles: M. Lamertin. 1933. Pp. 51. 8 frs.

M. Blondel. *La Pensée.* (*I*) *La Genèse de la Pensée et les Paliers de son Ascension Spontanée.* Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1934. Pp. xli + 421. 60 frs.

M. Nédoncelle. *La Philosophie religieuse en Grande-Bretagne de 1850 à nos jours.* (Préface par A. Rivaud; Supplément: P. Archambault, J. Soulairol, M. Prélot.) Paris: Bloud & Gay. 1934. Pp. 233. 20 frs.

E. Wind. *Das Experiment und die Metaphysik. Zur Auflösung der kosmologischen Antinomien.* Tübingen. Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr (P. Siebeck). 1934. Pp. xii + 120. Im Einzelverkauf M.7.; in Ganzleinen geb. M.8.80.

Verhandlungen des dritten Hegelkongresses vom 19. bis. 23 April, 1933 in Rom. Im auftrag des Internationalen Hegelbundes herausgegeben von B. Wigersma. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck); Haarlem: N/V.H.D. Tjeenk Willink. 1934. Pp. 278. Mk. 14.50.

F. S. Varano. *Vincenzo de Grazia.* Napoli: Libreria Editrice Francesco Perrella S.A. 1931. Pp. 109. Lire dieci.

F. S. Varano. *L'Ipotesi nella Filosofia di Ernesto Naville.* Gubbio: Scuola Tipografica "Oderisi." 1931. Pp. 52. Lire cinque.

F. S. Varano. *Il Problema della Storia in Xénopol.* Gubbio: Scuola Tipografica "Oderisi." 1931. Pp. 55. Lire cinque.

A. Masnovo. *Da Guglielmo d'Auvergne a San Tomaso d'Aquino.* Vol. 2. *L'Origine delle cose da Dio in Guglielmo d'Auvergne.* Milano: Società Editrice "Vita e Pensiero." 1934. Pp. vii + 203. Lire quindici.

G. Gentile. *Preliminari allo Studio del Fanciullo.* Appunti: Quarta edizione riveduta. Firenze.: G C. Sansoni. 1934. Pp. vi + 96. L.6.

G. Gentile. *La Filosofia del-l'Arte in compendio.* Ad uso delle Scuole. Firenze: G. C. Sansoni. Pp. 182. L.7.

G. Gentile. *Discorsi di Religione.* Terza edizione riveduta. Firenze: G. C. Sansoni. Pp. viii + 105. L.6.

A. Carlini. *La Religiosità dell'Arte e della Filosofia.* Firenze: G. C. Sansoni. 1934. Pp. x + 227. L.24.

F. Meli. *Spinoza: e due Antecedenti Italiani dello Spinozismo.* (Prefazione di G. Saitta.) Firenze G. C. Sansoni. 1934. Pp. viii + 197. L.18.

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INSTITUTE NOTES

DR. BROAD'S address to the Institute on February 13th, entitled "Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism," is now published by the Cambridge University Press. Price 2s. 6d.

SUMMER TERM begins on April 24th and ends on June 26th. The following course of lectures has been arranged for the Summer Term of the Session 1933–34:—

"REAL VALUES," a course of six weekly lectures by Professor J. H. Muirhead, LL.D. (Fellow of the British Academy), on Wednesdays at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C.1, beginning May 2nd. Fee for the course, 12s. 6d. Members free.

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